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With columns covering a front of 5 m., to deploy on the wing farthest from the enemy meant an increase of the range from about 8,500 to 13,000 yd., a serious matter when visibility was

not much more than 11,000 yards. But in the mist and uncer- tainty one thing could be clearly seen.

The " Lion " with Beatty's flag could be seen some 2 m. ahead of the" Benbow," steering E.S.E. and engaging the enemy. To bring the enemy within effective range, the C.-in-C. had only to follow in that direction, ordering the battle fleet to deploy on one of the centre columns led by the " Benbow " or " Iron Duke." Whether this course occurred to the C.--in-C. it is impossible to say (no mention of it appears in his own book). In any case, the deployment signal did not permit of deployment on a centre column or on any but a wing column. The deployment therefore began on the left wing. The " King George V." led out on a S.E. by E. course; the five leaders of divisions turned to N.E., their ships formed a long single line behind them and filed round be- hind the " King George V." The " Defence " ahead of the battle fleet had already engaged the 2nd S.G. about 5:50 P.M. and now saw the " Wiesbaden " returning. She pressed impatiently with the " Warrior " across the bows of the " Lion " to engage her, only to receive two crushing salvos from the " Liitzow " or " Friedrich der Grosse," and to blow up at 6:19 P.M. in a vast pall of smoke. The deployment on the left wing placed Rear- Adml. Evan-Thomas in a difficult position. The battle orders instructed him to take station in the van in the event of the enemy deploying away from Heligoland, but this meant fouling the range of the battle fleet, and he decided to turn up astern of the " Marlborough " and made a wide sweep to port to do so; here the " Warspite's " helm jammed (6:17), and she made a complete circle to starboard, passing right round the " Warrior," saving her from the fate of the " Defence." The deployment was com- pleted by 6:40 P.M. When it started Scheer was coming up on a N.E. course. By 6:27 P.M. when the fleets engaged, his ist and 3rd Squadrons were on an E.N.E. course, just visible in twos and threes at about 14,000 yards.

Both fleets were now steering to the E. on approximately parallel courses. The "Iron Duke" opened fire at 6:30 P.M., and between 6:25 P.M. and 6:40 P.M. the British, who had evi- dently much the better horizon, were able to inflict considerable punishment on the head of the German line, whose ships could see nothing but the flashes of the British guns. Meanwhile the " Invincible " had turned E. ahead of Beatty's squadron and come into action (6:23 P.M.) with Hipper as he came up again on a N.E. course. A fierce engagement ensued between them, run- ning to the S.E. at about 10,000 yd. The mist cleared for a few minutes, and at 6:34 the " Derfflinger " sent a salvo into the " Invincible's " midship turret. A tremendous explosion fol- lowed, the masts collapsed, and the great ship disappeared beneath

the waves, leaving her bow and stem standing as if to mark the place where an admiral lay. The "Konig " at the head of the German line had turned to S.E. at 6:33 P.M. Scheer was now fully alive to the fact that he was facing the entire British fleet. The whole northern horizon was aflame. He gave the order for a " battle turn " (Gefechtswendung). The whole line turned at 6:35 and drew off to westward. In the mist and smoke it was lost to view and Scheer obtained a much-needed respite.

As the line turned, the German 3rd Flotilla darted out to attack the British line. It was recalled, but three boats (G88, 73, and 832) went on and, unopposed by any British flotillas, who were apparently too busy taking up their deployment positions to notice them, made two attacks on the British line, one of which was probably responsible for torpedoing the " Marlborough " at 6:54 P.M. At 6.55 P.M. the long British line turned to S., leaders together, bringing the fleet into divisions again with guides bearing south-east. The movement fulfilled no tactical purpose. It had taken half an hour to deploy the fleet, and no sooner was it deployed than it turned back into divisions in a formation unsuitable either for attack or defence. The " Marl- borough's " division was left on the right wing, exposed to attack, uncovered by any of the destroyer flotillas, which remained cling- ing to the positions given them for deployment in single line.

Beatty grasped the significance of the new formation, and, turning to allow the 3rd B.C.S. to take station behind him, shaped course to the S.W. right across the track of the advancing battle fleet and towards its exposed wing. Scheer was meanwhile making to the W. in a ragged sort of single line, with the battle cruisers in rear. The " Liitzow " was down by the bows and on fire, and Hipper left her to transfer his flag to the " Seydlitz," but, finding her full of water with her wireless out of action, went on to the " Moltke." But the battle cruisers had now turned to renew the action; the " Moltke " was under fire and could not stop, and it was 9 P.M. before Hipper could get on board.

When Jellicoe turned to S. at 6:55 P.M. the German fleet was some 13 m. S.W. of him, making to the westward. Scheer's next movement was one which exposed him to a tremendous counter- blow. He still had his whole fleet with him, and as it was too early to get into formation for the night he decided to turn and make a determined advance in the teeth of the foe. The motives actuating him are described by himself as follows. If the British were following him his move to the W. was nothing more than a retreat, which would involve the sacrifice of damaged ships and meant his tactics being dictated by the enemy. It was still less feasible to try and detach himself from the enemy, leaving the British C.-in-C. to choose where to engage him in the morning. The only way of preventing this seemed to be to force the British into a second battle by another determined advance. This would be bound to surprise the enemy and upset his plans for the rest of the day, and, if the blow fell heavily, would help the German fleet to liberate itself during the night. These arguments are grandilo- quent but inconclusive, and it is more probable that Scheer in- tended to slip past the stern of the British fleet unobserved, but he had mistaken its position and ran right into it. In any case, the fact that Scheer did liberate himself must not obscure the fact that his movement was full of risk, and, had the British fleet been pursuing him, must have ended in disaster. As it was, it met with a considerable measure of success. The whole German line swung round together to the E. again (6:55 P.M.), with the battle cruisers ahead led by Capt. Hartog in the " Derfflinger. " The German destroyers attached to the battle cruisers attacked the "Marlborough's " division about 7 P.M., but were driven off by gunfire, after firing six or seven torpedoes without effect.

At 7:12 P.M. the British fleet coming S. saw the enemy battle cruisers returning through the mist. The Germans sighted them simultaneously and turned parallel to the British course at a range of under 10,000 yards. The " Hercules " opened on the " Seydlitz," and the guns of most of the fleet, with Beatty's battle cruisers ahead of it, joined in. The " Derfflinger " and " Seydlitz," now came under a terrific fire. In the former two 15- in. shells (probably from the " Revenge ") crashed into the after- turrets, igniting the charges and sending great pillars of flame