Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/704

664

knots, a course which turned out very happily in the end, and gave the enemy an entirely wrong idea of the tactical situation. The discrepancies in reckoning, in conjunction with mistakes arising from the clumsy form of latitude and longitude code in

JELLICOE >

S

"f -..,...

BEATTY 4""'--.

I.. .S-M "-*-.

^*UC

JUTLAND

FIG. 3

"'-.. 5 HIPPER \ ISO.

SCHEER

use at the time, made it difficult for the C.-in-C. to get a clear idea of the exact situation, but by 4:45 P.M. it was clear to him that the enemy's battle fleet was coming N. and he informed the Admiralty that a fleet action was imminent. The word ran down to the dockyards and started a bustle of preparation to meet the needs of the fleet. It is impossible to give in detail the events of

I fm JflON DUKE i>'

KOOOUKt .-

"

I

Fig. 4. Discrepancies in Reckonings (" Iron Duke " and " Lion ").

the next crowded hour. It was of great importance for the C.-in-C. to get the correct bearing of the enemy battle fleet, but the wireless reports were confusing for the reasons mentioned above. The " Iron Duke " was actually some 4 or 5 m. to the S.E. of

her reckoning and the " Lion " some 5 m. to W. of hers, which threw out their bearings and the estimated positions of the enemy. The sth B.S., following some 3 m. astern of the " Lion," re- mained for some time within range of the enemy battle fleet, and its rear ship, the " Malaya," was being hit right up to 5:35 P.M. This gave rise to an erroneous idea that the enemy had a speed much in excess of 21 knots, but it was due to the 5th B.S. running on a convergent course and not to the enemy's speed, which never exceeded 21 knots.

Between 5:40 and 6 P.M. two actions developed. The action between Beatty and Hipper burst out afresh (5:40); the " Ches- ter " (on the starboard beam of Hood's squadron), coming down from the N.E., struck the 2nd Scouting Group ahead of Hipper, got badly mauled and retired leaving the British with the heroic picture of Boy Jack Cornwell winning the V.C. Hipper, whose fire was hampered by the setting sun, was heavily hit by Beatty and was forced to turn to the eastward (5:53). By this time Hood in the " Invincible " had arrived on the scene some 20 m. to the E. of Beatty; hearing the roar of the guns, he turned to the N. with the 3rd B.C.S. (5:57) and engaged the light cruisers of the 2ndS.G. to the W., which were chasing the " Chester " east. The sudden appearance of battle cruisers to the E. gave Boedicker's cruisers a severe shock. Hood's i2-in. shell forced them sharply to the S.E. (5:55), seriously damaging the " Pillau " and sending the " Wiesbaden " limping W. to her destruction. The " Shark's " little flotilla behind the 3rd B.C.S. saw the German light cruisers and pushed boldly out to the N.W. to attack them. Hipper, now coming E. behind Boedicker, heard the " Invinci- ble's " guns ahead, thought they were those of the British battle fleet, took the " Shark " to be the head of a big destroyer attack, and turned right round to S.W. to close his own battle fleet (6:7). The German gth Flotilla rushed out to screen their light crui- sers, drove off the " Shark's " little flotilla and sank the " Shark"; the V'48 was sunk at this time, and, close to where Jack Cornwell won his V.C., Comm. Loftus Jones, with his leg shot off and his ship sinking, won another. Hipper, after proceeding to the S.W. for five minutes, turned round again at 6:12 P.M., and as he came up on a N.E. course, the little " Acasta " (Lt.-Comdr. J. O. Bar- ron), which had been trying bravely to help the " Shark," sent a torpedo into the " Seydlitz."

All this happened some 10 m. ahead of the British battle fleet, which was now close at hand to the north-west. Its deployment had been deferred too long, and it was still in divisions disposed abeam, with the " Marlborough " on the starboard wing. Mist had come down, reducing the visibility to 5 or 6 m., and it was difficult to get a correct idea of the situation, for the thunder of heavy guns could be heard from right ahead (Hood) almost to the starboard beam (Beatty). The " Lion " had been steering approximately N. by E. since 5:35 P.M., with the sth Battle Squadron about 3 m. on her starboard quarter. The "Falmouth/' ahead of the " Lion," was in touch with the " Black Prince " as early as 5:30 P.M., but it was not till about 5:55 P.M. that Beatty's force could be clearly seen. By 6 P.M. the battle fleet was clearly in sight, and, finding himself converging on the " Marlborough," which was then some 3 m. N. by E., Beatty turned to the E. to take station ahead of her. Scheer had de- ployed at 5:42 P.M. and was now on a N.E. course led by the "Konig," which at 6:14 P.M. was about 7Jm. 27 on the " Marl- borough's " starboard bow. At this moment two reports of the enemy battle fleet came in from the "Barham " and " Lion," the former placing it S.S.E., the latter S.S.W. The " Lion " was then a mile or two sharp on the " Iron Duke's " starboard bow, going hard to the E. and engaging the enemy. The " Bar- ham " was some 3 m. off, before the " Iron Duke's " beam, draw- ing ahead of the " Marlborough " on a S.E. course. In conditions of low visibility, the C.-in-C. had prescribed a deployment on the wing next the enemy, and this is evidently what Beatty expected. But there seemed to be a risk of deployment into single line on the right wing, involving the " Marlborough " and her division in a premature action, and the C.-in-C. decided to deploy on the left wing. The signal, equal speed pennant, C.L. went up at 6:15 P.M.

.