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Adml. Kolchak in Feb. 1920, the only remaining reactionary leader was Gen. Semenoff, who had established his Government at Chita and had' the whole province of Trans-Baikalia under his sway. In March 1920 a most sanguinary incident oc- curred at Nikolaievsk, capital of Sakhalin Province and situated on the river Amur; all the Japanese residents of that city, men, women and children, numbering 350, including Consul Ishida and his family, were murdered by the " Partisans," a Bol- shevist guerrilla gang infesting the littoral regions. The Japa- nese Government declared on July 3 that as there existed no responsible administrative centre in Russia which could negotiate about the flagrant outrage on Japan's prestige at Nikolaievsk, the Japanese forces would occupy certain places in Sakhalin prov- ince, pending the establishment of a legitimate Government. At the same time, it was made known that Japanese contingents would soon be withdrawn, as in fact they were, from Trans- Baikalia, inasmuch as the Czechoslovak troops had been success- fully assisted on their homeward journey (the last troops left Vladivostok in Sept. 1920), but that Vladivostok and Khaba- rovsk would still have to be garrisoned -by a small military strength. Upon inquiry from the Washington Government, it was explained by the Japanese Government that Vladivostok was the prolific hatchery of Korean revolutionary plots, and further the safety of the Japanese residents had to be provided for, and that Khabarovsk was a point in close strategic relation with Nikolaievsk. As soon as signs became visible of the growing stability of Khabarovsk, in Sept., evacuation of that region was immediately started. Meantime, the Bolshevists at Verkhne Udinsk began to style themselves the " Far Eastern Republic," and in concluding an agreement as to the suspension of hostilities with the Japanese military authorities in July 1920, formulated a memorandum to the purport that the Republic would follow democratic and not communist principles of administration and would constitute itself a buffer state in the interests of a speedy resuscitation of peace and order in Siberia. Then the movement for the unification of the several " Governments " in Eastern Russia was started, and in Nov. the so-called Amalgamation Assembly at Chita declared the independence of the " Far East- ern Republic " adopting the name at first conceived at Verkhne Udinsk holding as its territory the Russian provinces E. of the Selenga river and professing anti-communist democracy as its basic political principle. The coup d'etat carried Out by the reactionary Kappelists in Vladivostok on May 26 1921 showed that the Siberian situation was still very unstable.

Anti- Bolshevist Agreements. In view of the Siberian situation, military and naval agreements were concluded between the Governments of Tokyo and Peking in March 1918 for the pur- pose of coordinating the forces of the two countries to oppose the probable invasion by the Bolshevists from the Siberian direc- tion. China inaugurated an Office for Joint Military Action under the directorship of Tuan Chijui, to give effect to the terms of the agreements, receiving from Japan a supply of capital to the amount of 20,000,000 yen for the upkeep of the forces and 33,000,000 yen for purchasing munitions of war. Whilst the arrangement proved to be of considerable service in impeding the Bolshevik advance to the S., the incidental increase in the power of Tuan's party the Anfu Club gave rise to considera- ble misgivings and misunderstandings, at the expense of Japan's good name. It was, therefore, decided by Japan in March 1919, to furnish no further supplies of money and arms. After the down- fall of Tuan and his friends in July 1920, the Peking Cabinet expressed their desire to discontinue the pact, and, but for the unfortunate state of affairs in Eastern Siberia, it would have been early terminated. As it was, the annulment was agreed upon by Tokyo and Peking on Jan. 27 1921.

Japan at the Peace Conference. At the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, Japan was represented by Marquis (afterwards Prince) Saionzi; Baron (afterwards Viscount) Makino; Viscount (afterwards Count) Chinda; Mr. (afterwards Baron) K. Matsui; and Mr. (afterwards Baron) K. Ijuin. The plenipotentiaries went to France with the firm conviction, as Baron Makino had made unmistakably clear before he left Japanese shores, that

the attitude of Japan at Paris should be, not so much to advance her own case before the comrade nations in the war, as to take counsel with them in the creation of a new world in which justice and humanity would reign supreme and which would assure an enduring peace. The first claim laid on the peace table by the Japanese delegates was for the recognition of racial equality. The public opinion of Japan demanded that, if a new era of righteousness and fairness was to be established and peace and good-will among men were to be assured for all time, one of the postulates should be the principle of the equal dignity of races. The Japanese nation had been deeply conscious of the discrim- inatory treatment meted out to its nationals in various parts of the world. It recognized that differences in ability, power and character among men always exist; but it appeared wrong that there should be inequality of opportunities inequality before the law. The present state of human civilization having been achieved by a series of social, religious, political and economic emancipations, it seemed certainly to bo time that racial emanci- pation should, in the interests of the real progress of civilization, be foreshadowed and approved at least in principle. The original Japanese proposal for insertion in the Covenant of the League of Nations read:

" The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of the states members of the league equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality."

In explaining the Japanese position, Baron Makino made it clear " that the question being of a very delicate and complicated nature involving the play of a deep human passion, the immediate realization of the ideal equality was not proposed, but that the clause presented enunciated the principle only and left the actual working of it in the hands of the different Governments con- cerned." Every national of the States in the League was ex- pected " to share military expenditure for the common cause and, if need be, sacrifice his own person. In view of these new duties . . . arising before him. . . each national would naturally feel, and in fact demand, that he be placed on an equal footing with the people whom he undertook to defend even with his own life." The Japanese proposal, which was later somewhat modified in terminology in an attempt to meet objections, obtained u votes out of 17 in its favour, but it was ruled that unanimity was necessary. Japan abided by that decision, reserving the right to raise the question again at an opportune moment.

The disposition as regards Kiaochow was the next question with which the Japanese delegates had to grapple. When the Japanese people gave a hearty send-off to their plenipoten- tiaries, they had no shadow of doubt as to the final issue of this question. The greater, therefore, was their disappointment, if not stupefaction, when the Chinese delegates came out with a demand for the direct restitution of the ex-German stronghold. Japan claimed Kiaochow in recognition of all her military and naval services, by which, with British assistance, the German Far Eastern base had been reduced, by which trade routes in the Orient had been kept unmolested and by which Allied troopships had safely been convoyed to various fronts. It was at the same time made clear that Japan would be content, having once se- cured Kiaochow in her hand, not to retain it in her possession, but to offer it to China as a mark of good-will and friendship. " A cordial friendship between Japan and China " had been a slo- gan on the lips of thinking Japanese, and it was expected that a new leaf in Japanese-Chinese relations would be turned by this timely offering. The Chinese delegates, however, insisted that the declaration of war by China against Germany on Aug. 14 1917 had abrogated all her treaties with Germany, including that of the lease of Kiaochow. Whether a lease treaty is not a sort of pacta transiloria is, to say the least, a moot question; it would appear to be contrary to common sense to contend that a paper declaration of war could constitute a magic wand to trans- fer to her possession a formidable fortress which China could never have reduced with her own resources, and which, if it had not been captured beforehand, would have been a potential