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The World War.

and burnt, but not much violence was done to persons, except to the soldiers and police, many of whom were wounded and a few killed. Several of the arrested persons were found guilty and condemned to varying terms of imprisonment, but Malatesta escaped abroad. The Government came in for much criticism on account of its slackness in dealing with this criminal outbreak.

Sig. Salandra's position was not very secure, and while the Socialists lashed themselves into a state of hysteria in their mock indignation over his " reactionary " methods, a group of Giolittian deputies, led by Signori Orlando and Schanzer, tried to make political capital out of the recent disorders and conspired to bring about his fall. But the premier parried the stroke with skill, and the Chamber howled down the plotters. On a vote of confidence the Government obtained a majority of 254 against 112, and the Chamber rose on July 5. The mun- icipal and provincial elections, which had begun in June 14, resulted in some important constitutional victories in Rome, Turin, Genoa, Venice, etc., whereas in Milan and Bologna Socialist town councils were elected. The railway syndicate now threatened another strike if the railwaymen guilty of participating in the June disorders were punished, but this time the Government held firm and let the law take its course, with the result that some 50 railwaymen were dismissed and many others received lesser punishments. At the same time the class of 1891 was called back to the colours.

There now seemed to be some chance of a quiet spell, after all the recent agitations, when suddenly the international situation began to assume an alarming aspect. On June 28 the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were murdered at Serajevo. Although it was realized that the Austro-Hungarian Government would demand serious guarantees against anti-Austrian propaganda and plots conducted from Serbia, the famous Note of July 23 burst like a bombshell on the Italian as on most other Foreign Offices. The gravity of the situation was grasped at once, for few in Italy doubted that Austria was spoiling for a quarrel whereby she might regain her lost prestige in the Balkans, that she would be sup- ported by Germany, and that Russia would not allow Serbia to be humiliated and perhaps dismembered. The Italian Government cooperated heartily with that of Great Britain in the last desperate efforts to avert a catastrophe. The terms of the Triple Alliance had been kept secret, but, while public opinion realized that if a casus foederis were to arise Italy would be in honour bound to stand by her Allies, the idea of siding with Austria, especially in so unpopular a cause, was profoundly repugnant to the immense majority of the nation. Events now moved rapidly.

To the relief of practically the whole of Italy, the Italian Gov- ernment on Aug. 3 issued its declaration of neutrality. The grounds on which this decision was based were the following. ( i ) According to the terms of the Triple Alliance none of the con- tracting parties might undertake an action likely to compro- mise the common interests of all without first notifying the other two and coming to an understanding with them; this Austria had failed to do. In the case of Balkan affairs this principle had been reconfirmed by special agreements between Austria and Italy. (2) The Austrian Note to Serbia not hav- ing been previously communicated to Italy, the latter had had no opportunity of exercising diplomatic action in favour of peace. (3) The Triple Alliance being essentially defensive in character and based on the maintenance of the territorial status quo, Italy was not bound to assist her Allies in an aggressive policy. (4) Not having been warned in time of the intentions of her Allies, Italy had been unable to take the necessary mili- tary measures even if she had been willing to assist them. The relief at the proclamation of neutrality was further enhanced when Britain entered the lists against Germany, for it would have been as repugnant to the enormous majority of the Italians to be at war against Britain as to be on the side of Austria. It was afterwards officially announced in Italy that no casus foederis could arise in the event of Britain being in the conflict, but at the time the public did not know this.

It was felt, however, that at any moment Italy might herself be involved in the conflict, so that it was necessary to prepare the defences of the country. The classes of 1889 and 1890 were called out, so that, with that of 1891, previously summoned, and the two regular classes of 1892 and 1893, there were five classes under arms, to which the recruits of 1894 were added in the autumn. But the stores had to be replenished, immense quantities of arms and ammunition manufactured, and everything reorgan- ized, as the army had been left in a deplorable state after the Libyan War, because the Giolitti Government had not wished to risk unpopularity by asking for the necessary funds. The work of practically re-creating the army was colossal, and that it was achieved in a few months is chiefly the merit of the chief of the general staff, Gen. Cadorna, appointed on July 27 1914.

The question which now preoccupied the public was no longer whether Italy should intervene in favour of the Central Empires or not, but whether she should remain neutral until the end of the war or intervene on the side of the Entente. The Triplicisti were fairly numerous among the diplomatists and in a part of the army, but hardly anyone went so far as to advocate intervention on the side of Germany and Austria; German viola- tion of Belgian neutrality and the German atrocities in their con- duct of the war had alienated many sympathizers. The Nation- alists, Radicals, Republicans, Reformist Socialists and a large sec- tion of Liberals of various shades, realizing that this war would be the last opportunity for completing Italian unity, were in favour of intervention against Austria with the primary object of liberat- ing the Italian territories of the Dual Monarchy. The Official Socialists declared for absolute neutrality, on the orthodox Socialist theory that all wars are wicked (except class war) and waged only for the benefit of the capitah'sts; the party afterwards developed this theory into a more or less avowed sympathy with Germany and Austria. On the other hand a large number of Socialists rejected this policy and favoured Italian intervention, provided it was on the side of democratic France; even Benito Mussolini, the fiery editor of the Socialist Avanli, resigned his appointment when the party voted for neutrality, became one of the more ardent interventionists, and fought himself as a volun- teer in the war. The Catholics were opposed to intervention against the Central Empires because they disliked France as the " atheist " nation, admired Catholic Austria and feared the triumph of Orthodox Russia. A good many people, even in the upper classes, were opposed to intervention, apart from any question of sympathy, because they were afraid of Germany and thought she was bound to win. A still larger class, belonging to all parties and representing perhaps the bulk of public opinion, hesitated on the ground that though Austria had not shown much regard for Italy's interests or feelings, it would be wrong to attack an ally without a definite casus belli; they felt that it was advisable to wait for fresh developments of the situation and only intervene when there should be a real danger that the unredeemed provinces might be annexed by some other Power. This view prevailed until about the end of March 1915, and the Government was supported on this understanding.

The economic effects of the war were at first severely felt. Prices did not rise to any great extent, but there was a run on the banks which necessitated a moratorium. For a few weeks many factories had to shut down owing to lack of funds, while large numbers of temporary the War, emigrants (estimated at 350,000) in Central Europe were forced to return home on the outbreak of hostilities. All this produced a considerable amount of unemployment. But the measures adopted by the Government and the ac- tivity of many private committees alleviated the distress, and more or less normal conditions were gradually restored. The moratorium was made less stringent, and an agreement with Britain averted the danger of a coal famine, although in the spring of 1915 the price of coal rose considerably; other raw materials were again imported after a short suspension due to the interruption of maritime traffic, and the Italian steamship lines did profitable business. The export of food-stuffs, of certain other goods and of war material was prohibited; in Oct. 1914