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Rh Caporetto, and by the afternoon of the 24th the situation was already serious. Owing to a complex of causes the situation grew rapidly worse. The Italian left wing crumbled, and on the night of Oct. 26-7 the order was given to retire beyond the Tagliamento. This was only a first step in the move decided upon by Cadorna. In view of the breakdown of the II. Army and the danger of attack from the N., Cadorna decided that it was essential to shorten his line by a retreat to the Piave. He had already foreseen such a contingency (see ASIAGO, BATTLE OF), and after the failure of the Austrian offensive of May 1916 he had given orders for the preparation of a line of defence on the mountain ridges between the Piave and the Brenta and to the N.E. of Asiago.

By the end of the first week in Nov. the Italians were in line W. of the Piave. The III. Army, reenforced by the VII. Corps of the II., held the greater part of the river line, and was in touch with the IV. Army, which had come down from Cadore and occupied the northern sector of the river line and the moun- tains between the Piave and the Brenta, where it had estab- lished contact with the right wing of the I. Army. The rem- nants of the II. Army and the Carnia force were being reas- sembled in the Venetian plain.

In the meantime France and England had acted with all possible speed. As soon as the gravity of the situation became apparent the order was given for six French and five British divisions to entrain for Italy, precedence being given to the French troops, and Foch and Robertson hastened to the spot. Foch arrived at Treviso, where Cadorna had been for three days, on the morning of Oct. 30, and the situation was fully discussed. Cadorna felt that the troops available for the defence of the Piave line were dangerously weak in numbers, the more so as he was anxious to detach two divisions of the III. Army to reenforce the line W. of Lake Garda, where there were rumours of intended attacks, and he suggested to Foch that as soon as the French troops arrived they should go into line on the Montello, between the III. and IV. Armies. Later in the day, having received further news regarding the threat W. of Garda, he asked that Foch should detach a French division to reenforce this sector. Foch was unwilling to divide the French X. Army, and it was finally agreed that the French, as they arrived, should be aligned between the Mella and the Adige, ready to reenforce the I. Army in case of necessity, the defence of the Piave line being left to the Italian troops. Foch agreed with Cadorna's dispositions for the defence of the Piave line, but he was natu- rally much preoccupied by the appearance which the situation presented: weary disheartened troops, insufficiently provided with guns and ammunition and relatively weak in numbers, facing a greatly superior army flushed with a victory that had exceeded all hopes. And behind these, their only reserve, with the exception of the young boys recently called to the colours and a limited number of troops from the depots, was a great mass of broken troops largely without arms and equipment, who had lost order in the immense confusion of the heavy retreat. These troops, disorganized, worn-out, sullen and bewildered, might well have seemed more of a danger than a potential reserve of strength. There had been a failure in moral among certain units in the first phase of the fight. It had spread during the retreat. None could be sure how far it had gone or would go.

The Italian losses, both in men and material, had been enormous. To the casualties suffered in the enemy attack upon the II. Army, some 10,000 killed and 30,000 wounded, were added some 230,000 missing, who had already surrendered, or were still fighting hopeless isolated actions among the mountains, cut off and doomed. The retreat was not yet over, and the list was sure to be swelled still further. Many guns which had been brought safely as far as the Tagliamento had been lost owing to the premature destruction of the main bridges between Codroipo and Casarsa. When the material losses came to be calculated, the figures were as follows: 3,152 guns, 1,732 trench mortars, 3,000 machine-guns, 2,000 " pistol " machine-guns, considerably over 300,000 rifles, and an immense mass of stores and war material of every kind.

On Nov. 4 Mr. Lloyd George, Gen. Smuts, Gen. Sir Henry Wilson, M. Painleve and M. Franklin Bouillon arrived at Rapallo, and were there met by Gens. Foch and Robert'ion, Signer Orlando (who had just succeeded Signer Boselli as Italian premier), Baron Sonnino, the Foreign Minister, Gen. Alfieri, Minister of War, Gen. Porro, sub-chief of the Italian general staff, and M. Barrere, French ambassador in Rome. From the Rapallo discussions were born the Supreme Allied Council which was to meet, once a month if possible, at Versailles, and the Versailles Military Council, which was to sit permanently. It was agreed that the failure of the Italian armies to resist the enemy attack called for a change in the Italian command, and Cadorna was appointed Italian military representative at Versailles. He was succeeded by Gen. Armando Diaz, commander of the XXIII. Army Corps, and the functions of Gen. Porro, who was also relieved of his post, were divided between Gen. Giardino, who had been Minister of War during the summer, and Gen. Badoglio, commander of the XXVII. Corps. These were all comparatively young men, who had come to the front during the war. Diaz was not yet 56, Giardino was 53, and Badoglio was only 46.

The moment was critical in the extreme, for the reasons given above, but the work done by Cadorna during the last days of his leadership had laid solid foundations for the wonderful recovery that put a term to the enemy advance. Cadorna's conduct of the great retreat was a masterpiece of military skill and cool judgment, and he had long ago made his plans for a defensive battle on the Piave line.

A legend was put about both in France and in England that the Italian command wished to continue the retreat to the line of the Adige, and it was asserted that only Foch's intervention prevented this further retirement. The legend had no basis of fact. Both the Italian and Allied press indicated the possibility of a further retreat, and their opinion was no doubt inspired by soldiers who realized the dangers of the situation and by politicians who wished to prepare opinion for the possibility of a further enemy success. But neither Cadorna nor Diaz had any intention of leaving the Piave line, unless, of course, the step was compelled by a new defeat. The line of the Piave was to be defended " to the last." Cadorna's orders are quite explicit, and he never entertained the idea of a retreat to the Adige unless he were forced back from the Piave line, or had his flank turned by an attack from the north. Diaz was no less resolved that resistance on the Piave line was the only possible course. An order of the day published by Cadorna on Nov. 7 fixed the Piave as the line on which " the honour and life of Italy " must be defended, and this blunt statement unhedged by reservations, frightened the politicians. They feared that after such a statement the effect of further disaster, if it should come, would be more serious. But the soldiers realized the mistake of playing with the idea of a further " strategic retreat," and when Diaz was asked his view, he said plainly that he would resign rather than carry out such a plan.

Both Cadorna and Diaz, who succeeded him on Nov. 9, were convinced of the necessity of standing on the Piave, and they had good hopes that their troops would hold. The Allied commanders were equally against any further retreat, but they were strongly impressed by the uncertainty of the situation. The break-through at Caporetto was universally attributed to a failure in moral. Since that failure the Italian armies had undergone the trial of the retreat, and they were weakened by great losses of men and material. Would they " come again," or would their moral suffer a more widespread breakdown under a new strain? It was natural that both British and French commanders should hesitate to send in the Allied troops to the front to stiffen it by units as they arrived. There was the chance that they might be involved in a fresh disaster, and in the circumstances it was obviously more prudent that both French and British armies should be held intact on a reserve line. The French X. Army stood behind the Italian I. Army, while the British divisions under Gen. Plumer, which began to arrive as soon as the railway communications from France