Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/646

606

Allies. It was decided to keep to the Paris plan and attack in Aug. without reenforcements. The efforts of the Italian munition factories and depots had provided many new heavy batteries, and there were now 99 British and French heavy guns on the Italian front. Altogether Cadorna could dispose of 2,300 heavy guns for his attack.

The army was strung to the highest point of tension, awaiting the order to attack, when Pope Benedict XV. launched his appeal for peace. A forecast came first, in the clerical press, on Aug. 14. Next day, the festival of Ferragosto, there were no newspapers, but the text was published on Aug. 16. Forty hours later Italian guns began, from Monte Nero to the sea; and on the night of Aug. 18 the offensive began. Parts of the army were shaken. For the Pope in his impartiality placed the two contending groups of Powers on the same level; he held out the hope that Germany and Austria were ready to consider certain territorial questions " in a conciliatory spirit," taking into account " the aspirations of the peoples"; and to the long and weary struggle he attached the label " useless slaughter." The Papal Note in itself was vague, and promised little. But it hinted much, and some of the press comments upon it filled in the gaps. The word ran round that a peace might be arranged which would give Trentino and Trieste to Italy. Some of the commands were anxious about their men when the attack began.

As a matter of fact the troops put aside their questionings, and the blow dealt to the Austrians was a very heavy one. The Isonzo was crossed in many places between Tolmino and Plava, and the greater part of the Bainsizza (Bainsitsa) plateau was occupied by troops of the II. Army, while the southern end of the Chiapovano valley was passed, and a footing obtained on the western corner of the Ternova plateau. No progress was made against the positions E. of Gorizia, and the action in this sector was quickly broken off, but the right wing of the III. Army gained ground, especially on the southern edge of the main Carso plateau and in the Hermada sector. The Carso action was broken off when it was clear that the initial impetus would carry the troops no farther, and guns and men were moved N. to endeavour to make the most of the success gained by the II. Army. The extreme difficulty of the country and, above all, the lack of roads called a halt after 10 days. The infantry had outrun the heavy guns in position on the right bank of the Isonzo, and they found the Austrians, as the pressure relaxed, strongly placed among the hills to the W. of the Chiapovano valley. Capello's II. Army had won a big victory, but at two vital points the Austrians had held their own, on the Lorn plateau S. of Tolmino and on Monte San Gabriele, N.E. of Gorizia. While these positions were maintained the Italians could not obtain the fruits of their initial tactical success in breaking through the lines on the Bainsizza.

Little progress had been made by the left of ihe Italian attack. Austrian reenforcements had been hurried to the spot, and an immediate renewal of the attack, without further preparation, did not commend itself to the Italian command. It was decided to concentrate against the Austrian centre, and attempt the capture of San Gabriele, while the troops on the Bainsizza dug in and roads were made from the left bank of the Isonzo to join those leading to the old Austrian positions. In spite of prolonged and furious bombardments, and infantry attacks renewed again and again, the defenders succeeded in maintaining their principal line of resistance on the battered mountain, though they were driven off more than once. With the failure of the attack on San Gabriele, the hope of finding, at least, a way through the defences of the Gorizia zone was abandoned for the time.

Cadorna hoped to renew his offensive at the end of Sept., when he had rested his troops and replenished his supply of shells, by an attack against the Ternova plateau, in the hope of definitely turning the Gorizia positions from the N. and cutting the main line of communications between the Austrian right and left. The III. Army was to hold the troops on its front and pass to the attack when the right wing of the II. Army had made the necessary ground. The drawback to this plan was

that it left the Tolmino bridgehead in undisturbed possession of the Austrians, and by advancing the Italian right increased the danger which would come from an Austrian drive in this sector. But Cadorna had faith in the natural and prepared strength of his positions opposite Tolmino, and if he were to succeed in his attack upon the Ternova plateau, the chances were that his adversary would be too busily employed to attack his left at Tolmino.

Towards the middle of Sept. news came of increased enemy forces and a probable counter-offensive at an early date, and when Cadorna took stock of his forces he decided that he could not go on. He came to this decision on Sept. 18, and on that day he gave orders to the II. and III. Armies to " concentrate all their activities in preparations for defence." At the same time he communicated his decision to the Allied commanders, explaining his reasons. Unfortunately, there was a misunder- standing caused by a hasty and incomplete transmission of Cadorna's memorandum to the Allies. The first news received by Gen. Robertson did not give Cadorna's reasons for suspending his offensive action, and the result was a telegram which said that the 64 British guns sent to the Italian front had been given for offensive purposes, not for defences, and requested their withdrawal. A similar request came from France, for the return not only of the 35 guns which had been in action already, but of a further reenforcement of 102 guns which were arriving. Cadorna at once ordered the guns to be returned, but he pointed out that he was the only judge of what should or should not be done on the front for which he was responsible, and he took very natural exception to the tone of the communications which he received from England. The arrival of Cadorna's explanator memorandum relaxed the tension, and some of the Britis batteries were left in Italy. The others, however, were sent Egypt, and the French guns were withdrawn. This misunder standing emphasized the drawbacks of the absence of a pe manent inter-Allied war council, which was only to come int being when disaster had taught a further lesson.

Cadorna's reasons for suspending his offensive, or rathe for giving up the idea of a new attack, can hardly be questione The four weeks fighting in Aug. and Sept. had cost him ovt: 166,000 men 40,000 killed, 108,000 wounded, and over i8,c prisoners. His casualties from May to Sept. reached the tola of 92,000 killed and 226,000 wounded. The toll taken sickness had also been very heavy. There had been muc malaria among the troops in the low ground near Monfalcon a severe type of jaundice had made its appearance in variou parts of the front, and the II. Army had suffered severely fron an intestinal epidemic which had been prevalent in the Judrir and Natisone valleys. The units were at a low strength, and the new drafts had not been satisfactorily absorbed. A breathing space was urgently needed.

A number of Cadorna's critics have urged that the best way of meeting the forthcoming enemy attack was to anticipate it by renewing his own offensive. But the weakness of his units and the shortage of ammunition made it very doubtful whether he could win even an initial success. The one thing certain was that he would suffer heavy losses and reduce to danger-point his limited reserve of shells. He had to look forward, and face the fact that if strong enemy reenforcements were already coming from Russia these were only the advance-guard of what was to be expected within a few months. If he were to gain the small amount of ground that seemed all he could hope for, he would find himself in a much less favourable position to meet a later attack from still stronger forces:

The Austro-German success against the II. Army, and the subsequent retreat of the Italian forces to the line of the Piave, and the resistance in the new positions, are fully described in a separate article (see CAPORETTO, BATTLE OP), and only a bare record of facts need to be given here. The Austro-German forces under the command of the German General Otto von Below (XIV. Army), divided into four " groups," attacked the left wing and centre of the Italian II. Army on the morning Oct. 24. The Italian line was pierced between Tolmino an