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600 backed by a spirit which the armies of the Dual Monarchy sometimes failed to show on the eastern front. The Slav troops which fought with reluctance against Russia displayed a very different demeanour against Italy, and, according to Gen. von Cramon, head of the German Mission at Austro-Hungarian headquarters, this was specially noticeable in the case of the Southern Slavs, whose country was immediately threatened with invasion, and who had ambitions of their own which conflicted with those of Italy. The rest of the Habsburg peoples, moreover, were embittered by Italy's transformation from an ally to an enemy, and both Falkenhayn and Hindenburg bear witness to the fact that the Austrian army showed a very different spirit against its two main adversaries.

Many lessons were learned by the Italian army during the campaign of 1915, and the experience of these months bore fruit also in other quarters. It began to be realized in Rome that the army must have what it needed, that " conservative finance " had to give way before the imperious requirements of modern war, that every idea or estimate regarding numbers of men and supplies of munitions had to be revised in the light of new experience. The winter months were busily employed, especially in the munition factories. A great effort was necessary, for at the end of the 1915 campaign Cadorna had lost half of his small supply of middle-calibre guns through " prematures " or other accidents, and the factories, instead of augmenting his artillery strength, had so far scarcely kept pace with wastage. But the preparatory work was beginning to tell, and as far as artillery was concerned the situation was largely transformed during the winter of 1915-6. The small total of heavy and medium guns was increased sevenfold. But shells were still scarce in proportion to modern requirements, especially as these went on increasing with each month. And if Cadorna's artillery strength was greatly increased, so was that of his adversary.

The supply of men, no less than that of material, required to be replenished and augmented. In seven months the Italian losses in the field were close upon 280,000 66,090 killed, 190,400 wounded, and 22,520 prisoners. This was in addition to casualties from sickness, which were heavy, including as they did the losses from an outbreak of cholera which originated with prisoners freshly arrived from the eastern theatre of war. This outbreak was promptly tackled, and did not spread widely, but there were several thousand deaths in the isolated area. Men had to be found, not only to fill up the gaps but to make new formations, for it was clear that the war was going to make untold demands upon man-power. During the winter the gaps were filled and eight new divisions were ready in the spring, while others were in process of formation; and Cadorna had succeeded, after some difficulty, in having the classes required for drafts called up well ahead of his immediate needs. This was especially necessary, as, owing to the small annual contingent taken before the war, the bulk of each class was practically untrained. It was, moreover, necessary to instruct the trained units in the new methods which the trench warfare was evolving, if these new methods were to be carried out successfully. Unfortunately, the necessity for this methodical training was not generally, or even widely, understood, and the Italian army and nation paid heavily for the absence of properly organized training schools and camps. On the other hand, it must be admitted that, to begin with, at least, except for the drafts there was little opportunity for instruction. The men were fully occupied either in fighting or working at the trenches and shelters which had to be made out of live rock, working at roads or hutments or other necessary constructions. There was not even time for necessary rest in these first months. The front was very long in proportion to the number of men available, and if there were relatively few men required to hold the mountain positions, the number required to supply these few with food and drink and fuel and ammunition, especially in winter, was far greater than in the plains.

During the early months of 1916 there was a good deal of sharp fighting on the Julian front, especially at the Gorizia bridgehead. The long struggle of the autumn and early winter

had left the Italians in possession of an irregular and unsystem- atized line, unsuitable for prolonged occupation, and both sides carried out numerous small operations with the object of " rectifying the front." The Austrians were the more skilful at this game, as they were in conducting raids with the object of securing information, but the work done by the Italians with sap and mine on Monte Sabotino advanced the line by more than 600 yd., and brought it close under the main Austrian trenches, eliminating the wide stretch of open ground, exposed to both frontal and flanking fire, which had led to the failure of repeated attacks. In March, when the German attacks upon Verdun were at their fiercest, and rumour said that Austrian reinforcements might be sent to increase the weight of the offensive, Cadorna opened a big demonstrative action against the Gorizia bridge- head. This was only a demonstration, but brisk fighting took place, and both sides suffered considerable loss. Meanwhile preparations for a real offensive on the Julian front were well advanced, when news came that the Austrians were preparing a big attack in the Trentino. Cadorna was slow to believe in this project, which was first reported to him by Brusati on March 22. He considered that the news was a deliberate attempt on the part of the enemy to distract his attention from the Julian front, but further information convinced him that the Trentino offensive was really intended, and meanwhile he had taken what seemed adequate measures against the threat.

It was not unnatural that Cadorna should doubt the report of a really formidable enemy offensive in the Trentino. The situation on the Russian front hardly seemed to justify an Austrian offensive on the grand scale in a sector so " eccen- tric " (in the literal sense of the word). Conrad, however, had calculated that he could carry out the attack in the Trentino before Brusilov's armies could move. Relying upon his ad- vantage of interior lines and the late passing of winter on the Russian front, he made his preparations gradually and secretly throughout the winter and spring, collecting vast quantities of stores and ammunition about Trento, and sending his reen- forcements piecemeal until March, when troops were hurried to the front with all speed. Conrad had proposed the plan to Falkenhayn in the previous Dec., but Falkenhayn disapproved, and in the end Conrad acted independently, stripping his eastern front, especially of guns, to a dangerous extent. Accord- ing to Falkenhayn, no official intimation of the offensive was given to Germany, and Falkenhayn himself did not know the extent to which Conrad had weakened his forces in the east. On the other hand, Falkenhayn attacked at Verdun without informing Conrad, so that each would seem to have the like ground for complaint.

The Sir aj expedition, as it was termed in Austria, before the event, consisted of 14 divisions of picked troops, with over 2,000 guns, including a large proportion of heavy artillery. It is clear that such a force was by itself insufficient to " knock out " Cadorna's armies, but it is equally clear that a successful drive through the Italian lines in this sector might have compelled a rectification of the whole Italian front, and might have prepared the way for a further offensive in greater strength. And in the worst event there seemed the prospect that Cadorna's programme for the summer would be seriously upset. But the Austrian staff underestimated the resistance of the Italian in- fantry and Cadorna's power of manceuvre; and it was mistaken about the date on which Brussilov could attack.

To meet the Austrian attack Brusati had a sufficient number of troops, but a considerable proportion of these were untried, and he was greatly inferior in artillery. He had 850 guns of all calibres, of which 336 were heavy or medium. Apparently both Cadorna and Brusati considered that the I. Army was sufficiently strong to resist the coming attack, and, though both had underestimated the weight of fire that was actually brought to bear on the Italian lines, their estimate of the situation would probably have been justified if the troops available had been more skilfully disposed, if the defensive positions had been better chosen and adequately prepared. Cadorna has been much criticized for his hesitation to believe