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which the Austrians made a great attempt to push the Italians back across the river near Sagrado, the struggle came to an end with the latter firmly established under the crest of Monte San Michele and the village of San Martino del Carso, and in possession of most of Monte Sei Busi. Similar attacks by the II. Army made little impression on the Austrian lines, and losses were heavy, but the Austrians also suffered severely, losing more than 10,000 prisoners. The lesson of two months' fighting, apart from the necessity of learning the business of trench war- fare, was that the artillery, and especially the heavy artillery, at the disposal of the II. and III. Armies was altogether inade- quate. There were not enough heavy guns and not enough shells, and much of the ammunition was defective. The bursting charge was weak, and there were a large number of " prematures." It was essential to increase the weight of artillery fire if the infantry were to have a chance. It was clear that developments in artillery technique were necessary, and the importance of counter-battery work began to impress itself upon some of the commands. But shells were few, and observation from the air was not taken seriously, so that it was long before the advocates of counter-battery work made any headway.

After two months' preparation a fresh attempt was made to break through on the Julian front. This action was preceded by various attacks in other sectors of the front, some of which resulted in useful territorial gains, while others carried the line forward without improving the general position or even with the result of weakening it. By his main attack Cadorna hoped to turn the Gorizia positions both from the N. and the S., and as a secondary operation, after crossing the middle Isonzo, to threaten Tolmino from the S. while the bridgehead and the town were attacked from the W. and N. It was also hoped to gain ground on the southern Carso, in the direction of Trieste. Cadorna had a great numerical superiority in men. The II. Army now consisted of 12 divisions and the III. of 7, while a reserve of 5 divisions lay ready in the Friuli plain. In all, Cadorna could dispose of 312 battalions on the Julian front. When the attack began Boroevich had about half this number of troops, but within three weeks he had the equivalent of 15 divisions at his disposal. It was on the II. Army front that the Italian supe- riority in number was great; on the Carso indeed the Duke of Aosta had no great advantage in numbers over the Archduke Joseph, who had assumed the command in this sector in July. But the terrain on Boroevich's right was such that he could expect to hold with greatly inferior forces, especially in view of the Italian weakness in artillery. Cadorna had put upon the Julian front every piece he could collect. He reduced the guns in the other sectors to the barest minimum; he dismantled the forts at Mestre and the lines of the Tagliamento, and so was able to form 20 batteries of medium-calibre guns, of old pattern. Altogether he had been able to give to the II. and III. Armies some 300 medium and heavy guns, but many of these were obsolete. And the supply of shells was very meagre, 25-30 per gun per day. The III. Army had the bulk of the heavy artillery, only 125 pieces being given to the II. Army, which had to attempt, by sheer superiority in infantry strength, to make up for its deficiencies in material. Along the whole Julian front there were some 1,250 guns of all calibre, and a million shells had been collected by the date fixed for the attack Oct. 21.

The offensive went badly, like all the Allied offensives of those days. The means were insufficient for the width of front attacked; the artillery technique was not adapted to modern requirements, nor, as was natural at this stage, had the staffs as a whole, army, corps or divisional, fully realized the necessity of minute preparation and strict attention to detail. And a tendency noticeable during the first months of the war, especially in the II. Army, to use men in isolated petits paquets, first one detachment and if that failed then another and another, was still observable. The attempt to cross the river between Plava and Tolmino never promised success, for the preparations were insufficient and the crossing-points not well chosen. Although some successes were obtained N. and W. of Tolmino the attack in this region was not persisted in, owing to the failure farther

south. The attempt to extend the Plava bridgehead and so gain room to threaten Gorizia from the N. was equally unsuc- cessful. After various attempts both these actions were broken off, and the battle was concentrated upon the Gorizia bridgehead and the Carso. Sabotino had been taken by direct assault on the first day of the battle, but, owing to defective staff work and an attitude on the part of the army command that can best be described by the phrase " laisser alter," this success was not promptly backed up, and a fierce counter-attack drove the Italians off the ridge they had so gallantly stormed. All subsequent attempts to retake Sabotino failed, and the prolonged struggle for the hills about Oslavia and the battered hog-back of Podgora was little more successful. The Italians gained ground here and there, eating into the Austrian lines, but they could not break through. Farther S. the attacks of the III. Army met with similar fortune. Ground was gained, a trench here, a trench there, and the Italian line was carried almost to the summits of Monte San Michele. The attacks were renewed again and again, and the troops displayed remarkable gallantry and resolution. They were met by a resistance no less determined, and the losses on both sides were very heavy indeed. Early in Dec. the offensive died down. Cadorna's battalions were worn out by their prolonged and gallant efforts, and drafts were not forthcoming to fill their terribly depleted ranks. During the six weeks' fighting Cadorna lost nearly 140,000 men, and he had little to show in the way of tangible prize. Nor did the mere figures of the casualty list give the measure of the loss suffered. The gravest loss was that of the trained officers and under-officers, who could not be replaced. Cadorna could not claim a victory, but he had reduced the forces of Boroevich to the last extremity. He had come very near performing what he had not means to perform, and only stubborn valour and an ample supply of machine-guns saved the Austrian lines. Boroevich had his back to the wall when the Italian offensive came to an end. He had lost nearly 0,000 prisoners; his bat- talions were worn out and his reserves were exhausted; but Cadorna had no strength left for a further attack.

The results of the first seven months' campaigning were disappointing to those and they were many, both in Italy and in the Allied countries who had hoped for far greater effects from Italy's intervention. Some of the reasons for Cadorna's comparative lack of success have been indicated in the course of the narrative and some are illustrated more fully in other articles. First of all stands the fact that in May 1915 the Italian army was very meagrely provided with the material necessary to modern war. Cadorna's only chance of early success on the lines expected by the optimists lay in quick movement against an enemy unable to man the passes and defensive lines that lent themselves so well to resistance, even in face of greatly superior forces. The southern half of the Julian front offered a far better chance of an Italian success than any other sector. There was no comparison as regards terrain or communications. Yet it was the Austrian positions in this region that Falkenhayn described as " ideal for defence against superior numbers." When, for the various reasons which have been given, Cadorna's first move failed to secure the results hoped for, the Italian armies were forced into a warfare for which they were very badly prepared. It is true that they were badly prepared for any kind of warfare, and would hardly have fared better in a campaign of movement. In any case, a new technique had to be learned and the means for developing it were not available. The story of the first seven months of the Italian campaign is the story of a magnificent attempt to supplement deficiencies in skill and material by resolution and heroism. Not that resolution was always evident. Instances of the contrary have been given, and there were others: the long tale of general officers dismissed by Cadorna during the first months of the war bears witness to failures.

During these early months the Austrians, both officers and men, were clearly superior in skill to their opponents. They had the advantage of nine months' experience when Italy took the field, and they made good use of it. And their superior skill was