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that they were first to be discharged in an intervening neutral port. By British Order of Council of Aug. 20 and Oct. 22 1914, and the corresponding French decrees, the lists of contraband and free goods in the Declaration of London were rejected, and the doctrine of " continuous voyage " was applied not only to absolute contraband, but also to conditional contraband, if such goods were consigned to order, or, if the papers did not show the consignee of the goods, or if they showed a consignee on enemy territory. The situation as regards German trade has been officially recorded to have been as follows: Direct trade outside the Baltic to German ports had practically ceased. Supplies to Germany were directed to neutral ports, and every effort was made to disguise their real destination. The power the Allies had to deal with the then existing situation was that they had the right to seize articles of absolute contraband if it could be proved that they were destined for the enemy country, although they were to be discharged in a neutral port, and to seize articles of conditional contraband if it could be proved that they were destined' for the enemy Government or its armed forces, although they were to be discharged in a neutral port. On the other hand, there was no power to seize articles of con- ditional contraband if they could not be shown to be destined for the enemy Government or its armed forces, or non-contra- band articles, even if they were on their way to a port in Ger- many, and there was no power to stop German exports.

It soon, however, became clear that the restrictions inter- national law placed in the way of inflicting on the enemy to the full the advantage of absolute command of the sea would deprive the Allies of a powerful weapon. This led to the adoption in March 1915 of more extended powers of intercepting German commerce. The Allied Governments decided to stop all goods which could be proved to be going to, or coming from, Germany. This general blockade swept away all distinctions respecting contraband, and the nature of the commodities in question ceased to be of any importance. Once their destination or origin was established, the power to stop them was complete. 1

The policy adopted in order to enforce the blockade of Ger- many was as follows: (i) German exports to overseas countries were almost entirely stopped. Such exceptions as were made were where a refusal to allow the export of the goods would hurt the neutral concerned without inflicting any injury upon Germany. (2) All shipments to neutral countries adjacent to Germany were carefully scrutinized with a view to the detection of a concealed enemy destination. Wherever there was reason- able ground for suspecting such destination, the goods were placed in the Prize Court. Doubtful consignments were detained until satisfactory guarantees were produced. (3) Under agree- ments in force with bodies of representative merchants in several neutral countries adjacent to Germany, stringent guarantees were exacted from importers, and, so far as possible, all trade between the neutral country and Germany, whether arising overseas or in the neutral country itself, was restricted. (4) By agreements with shipping lines and by a vigorous use of the power to refuse bunker coal, a large proportion of the neutral mercantile marine which carries on trade with Scandinavia and Holland was induced to agree to conditions designed to prevent goods carried in these ships from reaching the enemy. (5) Efforts were made to introduce a system of rationing which would ensure that the neutral countries concerned only imported such quantities of articles as were normally imported for their own consumption. 2

The result of the blockade was that the export trade of Ger- many was substantially destroyed. With regard to imports, some of the most important, such as cotton, wool, and rubber, were practically excluded from Germany. Others, like fats and oils and dairy produce, could only be obtained there, if at all, at famine prices, which led to considerable discontent among the population, and food riots in some of the large towns.

This means of bringing an enemy to sue for peace was on a

1 See British White Paper, Misc., No. 2 (1916), in which the measures in question are fully set out.

2 See White Paper, Misc., No. 2 (1916).

more extended scale only the same in principle as that of the siege of a city and cannot be regarded as a violation of inter- national law. The power of the Allies, as shown by results, to make the blockade effective may be regarded as its justification.

5. The s.s. "China" Case. The s.s. "China" affair was a case of some importance, having led to an examination of the current bearing of the famous " Trent " case, which in its time gave rise to serious friction between Great Britain and the United States. On Feb. 18 1916, the British cruiser " Lauren- tic " stopped the " China " on the high seas, about 10 m. from the entrance to the Yangtsze-kiang, boarded her with an armed party, and, despite the captain's protest, removed from the vessel 28 Germans, 8 Austrians and 2 Turks, including physi- cians and merchants, and took them to Hong-Kong, where they were detained as prisoners in the military barracks. The U.S. Government in the note on the subject to the British Govern- ment alleged that as none of the men taken from the " China " were incorporated in the armed forces of the enemies of Great Britain, the action of the " Laurentic " must be regarded by it as an unwarranted invasion of America's sovereignty over her vessels on the high seas. The U.S. Government referred to the " Trent " case, and expressed surprise at this exercise of bel- ligerent power on the high seas far removed from the zone of hostile operations. The ambassador was directed to present the matter to the Government of Great Britain at once, and to insist vigorously that if facts were as reported, orders be given for the immediate release of the persons taken from the " China." The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs replied that the latest attempt to define by common agreement the limits within which a belligerent naval power may remove enemy persons from neutral ships on the high seas is represented by Article 47 of the Declaration of London, 1909. This article permitted the arresl of such persons if "embodied in the armed forces of the enemy," without regard to the destination of the ship on which they were found travelling. The commentary on Article 45 of the Declaration contained in the Report of the Drafting Committee of the London Naval Conference states that, on practical grounds " apart from reasons of pure law " it was agreed that the term " embodied in the armed forces of the enemy " should be considered as not including reservists not yet attached to their military units.

At the beginning of the war the British Government had adhered to Articles 45 and 47 of the Declaration of London, as interpreted by the Report of the Drafting Committee. They had taken this step as a matter of convenience, being at liberty, as the declaration was an unratified instrument, to cancel at any time their adherence, provided always that their subsequent action did not conflict with the general principles of inter- national law. When the German authorities began to remove able-bodied persons of military' age from the occupied portions of France and Belgium, the British Government felt that they could no longer accept the restrictive interpretation placed for practical reasons on the terms of Article 47 of the Declaration of London by the Report of the Drafting Committee, and that they must arrest all enemy reservists found on board neutral ships on the high seas, no matter where they might be met.

Although the U.S. Government, since their suggestion early in the war that the belligerent Powers should adopt the Decla- ration of London in its entirety as a code of international naval law, did not find general acceptance, had declared that it no longer considered the declaration as being in force, the Foreign Secretary said he had referred to the bearings of the declaration on this question, because Article 47 represented perhaps the only attempt to arrive at a definition, by common consent of the chief maritime nations of the law in regard to the matter. The attempt, however, was necessarily conditioned by the expe- rience of previous wars, and the definition was reached after weighing the claims and the convenience of neutral shipping against the importance to belligerent powers, as shown by the experience of previous wars, of preventing enemy subjects from proceeding to their destination, and pursuing the hostile pur- poses for which they were organized.