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476 behind carefully selected cover. Unless each forward infantry section is imbued with a determination to press forward, the posts of the defence may be able to bring cross-fire on groups which have penetrated the position. But there is still a further means by which the enemy can be fixed. The last war has added a useful weapon to the infantry armament smoke. This new element gives the user the conditions of day but imposes on his adversary the conditions of night. Mist or fog has often been a decisive but accidental factor in battle, but with the introduction of artificial fog which can be projected at the will of the user, the enemy's view is impeded whilst his own movements take place in day- light. In attack, the forward sections may fix the enemy posts more effectively by firing smoke to windward of them, than by rifles or Lewis guns. Thus smoke helps small local assaults.

Decisive Manceuwe. The manoeuvre body of an infantry company follows close behind its forward platoons and remains under the hand of the captain. If and when the whole of a forward platoon is held up by the fire of an enemy centre of resistance, the captain uses his manoeuvre body to turn a flank. To achieve this he might have to quit his allotted sector and follow in the wake of a more successful unit on his flank. Passing through the gap he turns and assaults an exposed flank of the centre of resistance. Such a blow has the moral effect coming as a surprise and threatening the line of retreat which is the key to victory. But if the defenders of the post turn to meet this flanking attack, the forward body should rush in and assault them from the front. Such combinations are simple if peace training is staged on the basic principle of " fixing and manoeuvre " as the key formula of fire tactics. This combination of fixing and manoeuvre is the bed-rock principle of every street fight. Watch a couple of small boys tackling a bigger one. What happens? One of the small boys rushes straight at the big boy, and when his attention is fixed the other runs in from behind and delivers a blow. The first small boy puts all his energy into this effort, for he knows instinctively that if he fails the opponent will beat them each separately. But if the big boy attacks one of the small ones, the other in like manner rushes in from behind. Thus " fixing " and " decisive manoeuvre " should become a formula engraved on the mind of every infantry corporal and subaltern, and he should also be trained to act upon it instinctively. It has won general acceptance since the end of the war, and concerns above all the tactics of the platoon, which is the smallest unit which can fix and manoeuvre without waiting for orders from a superior. Hence the paramount importance of training pktoon command- ers to act without hesitation when leading an attack. Hence also the desirability of rewriting the training manuals with some regard for the principles which govern every fight and of dis- carding fire tactics invented only for parade purposes. Fortu- nately, there is reason to believe that the post-war training manual of the British infantry will fulfil this condition.

Exploitation. The principle of exploitation is fulfilled by maintaining an unrelenting pressure on the enemy until his retreat spreads and gains in momentum. This is done by fresh units coming on behind the original front.

Defence. From our glance at the street fight between, the three urchins we realized that defence resembled the attack halted. Any infantry unit is capable on account of its open formation of offering immediate resistance to hostile attack or counter-attack. It only remains for it to consolidate the ground on which it has halted, so as to gain the most cover and the best field of fire. The adjustment and entrenchment of its posts to this end depend on the time available for surveying the ground, digging in and, erecting entanglements. The battle principles which have been discussed as regards the attack are also applicable to the defence. Its protective formation is similar to that for the attack. The posts of the defence are distributed in depth and so disposed that they mutually support each other by fire. Reconnaissance in defence is carried out by patrols who watch approaches, or if in contact with the enemy go out at night or in foggy weather to discover his dispositions and move- ments. In defence, fixing is carried out by the fire of the forward bodies from their previously sited posts. Their r61e is to break up

the enemy's organized attack. If the attacker makes a gap or effects a lodgment into the position of any forward bodies, the manoeuvre bodies counter-attack to throw him out. Should the attack break through the forward positions on a broad front, the manoeuvre bodies take him in flank by fire. Just as manoeuvre is superior to frontal attacks, so is defence-fire which enfilades from a flank the more damaging to the attackers' moral. In this as in all cases the training and determination of the better infantry wins the day, but the great advantage possessed by the defence almost its only advantage is that its action can be thought out beforehand. Its manoeuvre bodies can be placed on a flank in readiness for action, and can be practised on the actual ground to counter-attack from favourable positions with aux- iliary arms to help them.

Picture of an Infantry Battle. Who is there with experience of big attacks embracing miles of country in France, that has not seen the most resolute infantry suddenly assailed by a burst of surprise-fire from the flank or rear? Its self -forgetting determina- tion grows uncertain; it ceases to move and looks furtively for cover. If the surprise-fire continues from invisible shooters, the men become irresolute and nervous. The will to advance is gone. If the threat of a counter-assault from a flank should immediately follow they look to their rear and break or dribble away. Unless their own commander coming on from behind can throw in an opportune reserve to counter the counter-attack and restore the local situation, the attack is stopped. That is how, so often in France, one German machine-gun nest just one little group inspired by the will to resist, nourished in the principle of sur- prise would hold up the attack of a company and sometimes of a whole battalion. It is thus we learn to visualize the infantry unit battalion, company or platoon in the battle of to-day. It possesses the power of offensive movement and yet is protected by its open formations. Its articulation into interdependent moving bodies, capable of manoeuvre, is the main infantry feature developed by the World War. The illimitable extension of fronts, brought about by the vast numbers which nations in arms put into the field, forced the military leaders to seek and discover a solution to the deadlock and they found it at last by the gift of the power of manoeuvre to infantry units down to the platoon. By 1918 we had travelled far from the fire tactics of King Edward at the battle of Cr6cy (1346), where he was posted on top of a windmill and was practically the fire-unit commander of his army. This revolutionary idea began to emerge in the Flanders attacks of 1917, but was still only in its chrysalis stag when the war terminated in 1918. It still lacks a clear, simple working formula which can be understood by lance-corporals and practised in their daily exercises.

Let us for a moment try to picture the infantry fight of to-day in a European campaign between nations in arms, the description being invented merely to emphasize the salient points.

A battalion is advancing towards the fighting front, which is gradually receding eastwards. It is a hot summer morning. The division attacked soon after dawn, and the advance has been going well. To the trained ears of those in command posts be- hind the front its success is audible because the noises of battle are rolling ever farther away. The shell-fire dies down spasmodi- cally part of the guns are being pushed forward to back up the infantry progress then flares up again and swells the volume of sound. The eye also notes that the line of observant kite balloons on the enemy's side is moving back occasionally one collapses in flames, destroyed by the intrepid pilot of an aeroplane, or is hastily hauled down to avoid destruction. Our own kite balloons are moving forward behind our advance.

The brigade of which the battalion forms part is in support, and is moving up to " leapfrog " through one of the leading brigades and carry the advance a further stage. The battalion we are watching is one of the forward battalions of this brigade, and is still in column of fours on a road. Already long-range shells are bursting near and on the road ahead. To avoid loss, the battalion opens out first into company columns, resembling an open square; then as the shells grow more frequent into platoon columns off the road. Suddenly a flight of enemy bombing aero-