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474 teach, and its junior commanders must no longer be subjected to the whims or prejudices of whoever happens to be in temporary command. Moreover the doctrine should be adopted by au- thority, and be expressed in language so simple and by metaphors and illustrations so clear, that it can be as readily grasped by subalterns and. corporals as by general officers. Its manual of instructions should be as intelligible to the Australian bushman as it is to the staff college graduate.

In 1806-1 5 the British were capable of a sustained effort in the theory of tactics as originated by Sir John Moore, and there is reason to believe that British infantry could to-day be trained to as high a pitch of comparative excellence but not without a definite doctrine of minor tactics and some evidence of leadership to inspire its wholesale adoption. This quality of leadership in peace-time needs the special ingredients of spirit, intelligence and human sympathy together with sufficient character and determination to carry conviction to the mass. Just as Sir John French inspired a new doctrine of peace training at Aldershot after the S. African War, so now could a leader develop the experiences of the last war and reduce fire tactics to simple exercises for platoon and company commanders. Such a doctrine would probably be based on the little group of six men following a corporal whom it knows because he has trained it. In the hurly-burly of modern war, these little groups retain cohesion because men will follow a leader whom they see close to them, whose voice they can hear and whose presence is familiar. These groups (named sections), trained by higher leaders whom they trust, will forget themselves and accept any risks in battle if they are convinced by habit that their effort will not be in vain, that their successes will be immediately supported. A fire unit which forms part of a trained team will sink itself unhesitatingly if it knows that the rest of the team will not leave it in the lurch or allow it to bear the brunt alone: that, when it has spent itself to make an opening, others will relieve it of the burden.

Therefore infantry should be distributed in depth, not in lines. Every man should be able to see near at hand behind him a body of troops ready to back up his movements. Better still, let this body be trained to support him by diverting the enemy's fire to another direction. A mere reenforcement may fail to inspire him with an access of confidence, for it is probable that some infection of discouragement might communicate itself to those who merely add to his numbers in a hot corner.

For decades the infantries of all countries attempted to pro- duce tactics adequate to the new weapons at their disposal by multiplying the lines which were so successfully used by their forerunners in the days of the musket with its short range and slow rate of fire and the case shot and solid shot of the artillery. They moved shoulder to shoulder with intervals. The idea of manoeuvre was absent. Even down to the closing stages of the World War the action of infantry units in battle as distinct from a skirmish or an affair of outposts -was confined to frontal attacks. Manceuvre was the weapon of the higher commanders only. A division or a brigade moved as a body ; hence it was its commander alone who had the power of striking an enemy force at two or more different angles concurrently. We have already seen how slowly the idea of decentralized fire orders developed. It was the same with decentralized power of manoeuvre.

When in the middle of the i8th century armies began to be distributed in separated columns, the lead of the French under De Broglie brought about a revolution in strategy and tactics. The limbs of the army its columns moved independently though animated by a common plan. Intervals sufficient to be penetrated were left between them; and therefore their com- manders gained facilities for manoeuvre. But since the middle of the iyth century the smaller infantry units had continued to move and fight in bodies presenting a continuous front. Indeed down even to the last stages of the war of 1914-8 the rule of a continuous front held good. Exceptions occurred in frontier skirmishes or on account of accidental or enforced disorder inside a defender's position. One corps of an army might attack an enemy in front while another might turn his flank, but for the infantry units of each corps attack, as likewise in defence, the

manceuvre was usually frontal. In any large action each of the infantry units was necessarily allotted only a fraction of the frontage of the force of which it formed a part. This narrow sector was at first hedged in on either side by neighbouring units of a corresponding size. How then was it possible for attack or defence on the part of infantry units to be aught but straight to their front? How can they possibly manceuvre if they have no space to move in? And how can they be expected to move to a flank if they possess no intervals and no flanks? But at last a change became imperative, through losses due to the range and deadliness of missile weapons. These have enforced a wide dis- persion of small combatant units on the battlefield and inter- vals between adjoining units. These intervals are usually 100 yd. between each leading section. The lesson was stubbornly resisted until the toll of loss could no longer be burked by au- thority. Similarly in each succeeding war after the middle of the igth century such lessons were emphatically impressed on the imagination of nations, and towards the end of each war wider intervals between the men were accepted. Thus extended order in which bodies of infantry moved to the attack de- ployed in successive waves or lines, with intervals of several yards between each man and his neighbours was the out- come of the S. African War of 1899-1902. But, as the years of peace rolled on and recollection of the effects of fire faded, the pendulum swung back and the intervals between men wer reduced. More especially was this so on the continent of Europe, where tacticians clung to Napoleon's tactics rather than attempt the more difficult task of adapting the spirit of his principles to conditions imposed by accurate firearms.

The Continuous Line. Thus it came to pass that, in spite i the fire effect produced by scattered Boers sitting on distant kopjes in S. Africa (1899), and in spite of Japanese losses in assaults at Port Arthur and elsewhere in Manchuria (1904), European tacticians failed to shake off certain notions about continuous lines and storming masses. They fully appreciated the importance of putting what they called " weight " into the decisive attack, but failed to realize that the weight or forceful- ness of an attack no longer increases in proportion to the numbe of infantrymen thrown into it. In S. Africa wide and premature extensions were adopted to minimize losses on the flat veldt, but such extensions did not lead to any idea of manceuvre. On t contrary, the unmanageable thin lines, one behind the other, were incapable of any intelligent manceuvre as was discovere in peace training after the S. African War. But even then tb idea of a manceuvre to a flank by a small body was not graspe or at any rate it was not taught as a definite doctrine. Skirmish- ing lines in extended order made rushes and utilized ground; they fired in small bodies and opened at long ranges; at decisive points they were gradually thickened up into a crowd These crowds surged forward at a given signal and assaulted their front. But the infantry soldier was so near his neighbour ir these sham battles that he had scarcely sufficient .space to loa and fire his rifle without hitting one of his friends; the unit became so mixed together in the process of thickening up that neither the corporal nor the subaltern could exercise control ove his own men or any unit; often he could not find them during the decisive stage of the battle. Fortunately the " cease fire " soon sounded and reorganization took place; but in 1914-8 there wa no cease fire and no umpires, and the warring infantries wer slow to learn. This was no doubt inevitable, and is a sufficient reason to try to gather now the best experiences from 1918.

Moreover, it was not realized so clearly as it might have bee that it enhances the moral of the defenders to see waves of tb enemy crumpling up under the fire of the new weapons whic invention has introduced. The greater the visible effect of on the attacking infantry the firmer grows the defender's fait in himself, whilst a conviction of the impregnability of the de fence is intensified in the mind of the attacker. Close ranks not even make for greater fire effect. The moral influence of fire is produced by that which has physical effect, and the experience of 1914 demonstrated that cool, deliberate shooting by indi- viduals produced this material effect. Volleys from dense waves