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Rh must analyse and understand fear, in order that we may exploit it in our enemy and remedy it in our own infantry. The excep- tional man may not feel fear, but the majority of men do. Their nervous self-control alone stands between them and yielding to fear. How to cause this collapse of our enemy's nervous control and strengthen that of our own men offers a wide field of investiga- tion to future trainers of all arms, but especially of infantry. This nervous control by which the weakness of human flesh is subdued may be upset in two principal ways. It may be worn thin by continued strain or it may be shattered in a single instant by a shock. Usually it gives way under a combination of these two influences. The nerve control can be worn away impercepti- bly by the anxiety, the suspense of waiting for an enemy's blow, or by the noise and effect of shell-fire, or by the loss of sleep which renovates the tired will. Then, without warning, the shock of a surprise snaps the fine-drawn thread of our will to resist. Stub- born resistance may then change in a moment to panic flight, and its frequency will depend on inherited racial temperament.
 * Destruction of the Enemy's Moral. To wear down the enemy's

nerve control is the role of the commander, of the artillery, of bombing aeroplanes. When opposing armies are in close contact the infantry shares in the process by raids and false attacks. In the battle, the part of the infantry is to snap, not wear down, the enemy's control over his fear. The fracture is effected by the enemy's sudden realization that he is powerless to ward off his assailant's blow. To accomplish this we must pass a sufficient, though not necessarily a larger, proportion of men through the curtain of his fire, to a point so close to him that they can assault, or offer the threat of an assault which he realizes he is powerless to prevent. The key to this assault is fire at short range, to pave a way for the onslaught. Hence formations which avoid loss by taking advantage of cover and conserve the will to close with the enemy are necessary. Surprise, the simpler, more certain and less costly method, is effected by assault from an unexpected direction against an unguarded spot at an unexpected moment. The key to infantry success is therefore movement, or, in military language, manceuvre. Fear, above all, is caused by uncertainty and apprehension of the unknown, which breaks down the will to resist and gives to the assault in flank or rear its supreme value. Thus at close quarters mere numbers are not the deciding factor, and assaults are better launched by platoons than by battalions.

Strengthening of our own Moral. What are the factors which enable the average man to fight down fear? First, undoubtedly, comes confidence confidence in his superiority to the enemy, based on his own skill in handling his weapons; faith in his leader's skill and judgment, combined with devotion to him as a man; trust in and comradeship with his fellows the assur- ance that he will be backed up, that his efforts will not be in vain. Secondly, esprit de corps which is allied to confidence. Thirdly, discipline the power of association to overrule instinct. Lastly, action to minimize reflection on the dangers to be faced.

If a man is engaged upon some definite act or task, his mind is occupied. Hence the advantage of attack over defence. Move- ment helps to drown fear. So in the attack the moral factor indicates that we should not check the rate of advance in order to obtain uniformity or well-dressed lines. Every time a man stops he offers an opportunity for fear to assert itself. Let him push on to close with the enemy as quickly as he is able, stopping only to regain breath. As soon as he sees an enemy at close range, let him open fire. Not before. Under modern condi- tions of armament, with the overhead fire of machine-guns and artillery superposed on the fire of the defenders of trenches, attacking infantry has a harder task than in Frederick the Great's day. To demand of it, therefore, a slow advance in line is to strain the nerves unduly. It indicates the presence of leaders whose teachings are based on mechanics, not human nature. Thus movement is the safety valve of fear. We should force the pace of the attack, for the sooner the man closes with his enemy the less chance he has to be apprehensive of what awaits him. But we cannot force the pace if we stop to fire at long ranges. Discipline no longer implies an unthinking obedience. The dis- cipline which dominated fear by inspiring a greater and nearer

terror is not advisable now that fire units are widely scattered in battle. Even if still attainable it would not be effective under conditions wherein men must disperse if they are to survive and victory depends on the skill and initiative of subordinate leaders. The mechanical discipline of the past is an anachronism in battle. The need is for intelligent discipline a discipline compared by the late Col. G. F. R. Henderson to that of " a pack of well- trained hounds, running in no order, but without a straggler, each making good use of its instinct and following the same object with the same relentless perseverance." Infantry disci- pline should be based on that pride and self-esteem which comes from esprit de corps. Man does not dare to show himself a coward under the eyes of the leader he knows, the comrades with whom he shares his duty and recreation. This discipline is based on the confidence that unity gives strength.

Confidence is born of training the training of each individual, the training of the leader, the training of the unit. These suc- cessive trainings forge the infantry weapon and make it fit to act its decisive part on the battle-field. Moreover these various train- ings of human beings symbolize the truth that man is still the master of the machine. But no greater error is current to-day than that infantry is the most easily trained arm. None needs more care, more skill, if it is adequately to play its part. For it is the least mechanical and by far the most human arm in existence. Yet experience of the World War indicates that of all the arms and services, infantry, the backbone, was the least trained. This defect was due not so much to the reason that less care, less research and thought were devoted to it though these factors counted but to the reason that it is the most difficult arm to train, because it possesses so few concrete elements. It is con- cerned with tactics and ground, not with material and stable equations. To train infantry is to exercise an art, whereas to train gunners is to apply a science; the one requires an artist, the other a calculator. The man in the ranks of the artillery, the tank corps, the air service, is often a mechanic executing a concrete task in a definite manner. Initiative is the province of the officer, but even he, in the subordinate ranks of other arms, is concerned with producing a material effect. The infantryman's use of material his weapons is only a means to an end not an end in itself. He himself survives the scientific developments of countless wars because his human value remains unchanged. Even in the employment of his weapons he is guided by variable factors and conditions. But the use of his variety of weapons is only complementary to the use he makes of tactics and ground before he gets to grips with his enemy. The variety of elements with which he has to deal has led as a rule to each different unit being trained too often mistrained according to the whims and prejudices of its temporary commander, who is apt to confine himself to such parts of the subject as he himself knows best. Hence a tendency towards over-emphasis of such matters as drill, musketry, bayonet fighting, which can be easily mastered by the intellect of the average officer. Hence also the neglect of tactical training, which demands thought and is difficult to learn and teach because it deals with moral and variable factors and re- quires a modicum of imagination.

Minor Tactics and Fire Tactics. Right tactics are above all the source of the man's conviction of superiority. The tactics of infantry must be based on human nature and not on mechanics or geometrical perfection. Yet it is almost incredible how in the past the complex of showy evolutions deduced from the parade- ground have persisted on the battle-field. It is a truism to say that a revolution has been wrought in infantry tactics by the inventions which mechanical science has brought to bear on war. But it is no less true that the consequences of this revolution take years to understand. This lesson may be summarized in the phrase " the power of manceuvre." It needs a complete reorientation of military thought and fresh views before we begin to extract right methods from the melting pot of war. Yet that infantry which soonest learns its lesson will be supreme.

A mastery of elementary tactics is essential if infantry is to attain its goal in battle and justify its claim to be the decisive arm. It must be permeated by the best doctrine which the last war can