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444 are left in the Act to be dealt with by rules, and indicated the principles by which the authorities entrusted with the working of this novel and intricate system of government should be guided. Their report is a most valuable constitutional document and is indispensable to a study of the Act. The bill passed both Houses substantially as amended by the committee, and received the Royal Assent on Dec. 23 1919.

In their preliminary remarks on the bill the Joint Select Com- mittee expressed themselves satisfied that the plan of the bill inter- preted the declaration of Aug. 20 with scrupulous accuracy and that it was the best way of giving effect to the policy of the British Government. They approved the plan of a dual government or " dyarchy " for the provinces, but refused to adopt the proposal pressed upon them by Indian witnesses that it should be extended to the central Government. They considered it essential that, during this first stage of a measured progress towards responsible govern- ment, the central Government, except so far as it might be released from responsibility as regards subjects transferred to " ministers " in the provinces, should remain in undisturbed responsibility to Parliament and fully equipped with the necessary powers to dis- charge that responsibility. They also considered it essential that in the provinces, while the " ministers " should be given the fullest opportunity of managing the field of government entrusted to their care, the provincial governor in council, as regards the field of govern- ment in which Parliament continued to hold him responsible, should remain equipped with the sure and certain power of fulfilling that responsibility. They regarded it of the highest importance that the governor should foster the habit of free consultation between the two halves of his Government. But this should not confuse the duties or obscure the separate responsibility of each half. Neither should control or interfere with the other. Each should be given under the Act and rules adequate power to fulfil its respective charge.

The Joint Committee accepted with some alterations the proposals of the Functions Committee for the distribution of functions or subjects between the central Government and the provincial govern- ments. The line of demarcation was sufficiently obvious as regards the great majority of subjects. The army and navy, foreign affairs, currency and coinage, the public debt of India, the civil and criminal codes, customs, income tax and other sources of all-India revenues, posts and telegraphs, are subjects which clearly appertain to the central Government. Administration of law and justice, police, prisons, local self-government, medical administration, public health and sanitation are the natural functions of a provincial Government. But there are border-line subjects and cases of overlapping for which provision had to be made. It was also necessary in respect of some subjects provincially administered for the central Government to retain an over-riding power of legislation. The subdivision of the corpus of provincial subjects into " reserve " and " transferred " involved the question of the extent to which the provincial adminis- tration should at the outset be made over to non-official control, and gave room for considerable diversity of opinion. Broadly speaking, subjects appertaining to law and order, police, the ad- ministration of justice, the ports, factory Acts, the provincial reve- nues, are ref ained by the official half of the provincial Government, while local self-government, public health and sanitation, the liquor and drugs excise, education (with minor reservations), and other similar social services are transferred to " ministers."

The Joint Committee closely considered the much-debated question of the allocation of the provincial revenues between the two halves of the Government. Was each to have its own sources of revenue which it would develop and extend? Or were the provincial revenues to form a common fund from which each side of the Government would help itself? The first method, known as that of separate purses, would tend to keep the two parts of the Government apart. The second or " joint-purse " method might generate frictions and disputes. The Government of India advocated the former. There was a strong body of opinion in support of the latter. The Joint Committee decided in favour of the " joint-purse." They were hopeful that the matter could be readily solved by the exercise of common sense and reasonable give and take, and that the governor would ordinarily be able to propose an allocation acceptable to both sides. If he failed to secure an agreement, he should be empowered to refer the matter for decision to such authority as the Government of India might appoint.

The committee gave much consideration to the constitution of the electorates and made a number of recommendations. The most im- portant of these touched the vexed question of the separate represen- tation of special classes and interests. The Montagu-Chelmsford report reluctantly conceded it to the Mahommedan community and the Sikhs, and refused it to other classes. The Franchise Committee proposed its extension to Europeans and Anglo-Indians in certain provinces and to native Christians in Madras. The Joint Select Committee further extended it to the non-Brahmins in Madras and the Mahrattas in Bombay. They also recommended increased representation by means of nomination for the depressed classes and special provision for the representation of landholders and of Euro- peans in Bengal. The electoral system is largely coloured by the principle of separate representation of classes and interests.

The Joint Committee dealt as follows with the difficult question of the relations of the provincial governor towards his Legislative Council when it reduces or withholds supply asked for, or refuses to pass laws proposed by his Government. As regards supply the com- mittee considered that the governor should have power to restore the provision made in the estimates for a " reserved " subject, on his certifying that the amount asked for was essential to the proper administration of the subject. With regard to legislation the committee rejected the expedient of referring a bill relating to a " reserved " subject which the Legislative Council had refused to pass to a Grand Committee, and recommended that the governor' should have power to pass the bill on his sole authority on certifying that it was essential for the discharge of his responsibility. An Act so made was to be reserved for the King's assent.

With regard to the clauses of the bill relating to the Government of India the Joint Committee transformed the Council of State fro a chamber in which the Government would have had an offic majority into a real second chamber, having a majority of memb returned by some method of election. They proposed that th governor-general should be empowered to pass on his sole respon- sibility Acts which the Legislature had refused to enact, on his certify- ing that the law was essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India. They recommended that the Legislative Assembly should be elected directly by suitable constituencies, and not by the indirect method proposed by the Franchise Committee; that the Indian budget (certain charges being excepted) should be submitted to its vote, but that the Governor-General in Council should hav power to restore any demand which the Legislative Assembly refused, on certifying that it was essential to the discharge of responsibilities. This power was meant to be real and to be used i and when necessary, since no measure of responsible government was to be introduced into the central administration. The committee considered that the governor-general should not be a member of, though he should have the right of addressing, either Chamber. He should appoint the president of the Legislative Assembly during the first four years, after which time the Chamber would elect its own president. The governor-general should also appoint the president of the Council of State from among its members. The first president should be qualified by experience in the House of Commons and knowledge of parliamentary procedure, precedents and conventions. Minor changes were made in the composition of the executive coun- cil. The limit on the number of its members was removed. Three members must be public servants, or ex-public servants, having not less than ten years' experience in the service of the Crown in India one member should have definite legal qualifications, and not le than three members should be Indians.

With regard to the India Office the Joint Committee accepted 1 recommendation of Lord Crewe's committee that there should be ; high commissioner for India, to be paid out of Indian revenues, wh would perform for India functions of agency, as distinguished fron administrative and political functions, analogous to those performe by the high commissioners of the self-governing Dominions. The agreed that all charges of the India Office, not being "agency" charges, should be paid out of money to be provided by Parliament They were not in favour of the abolition of the Council of Indir differing in this respect from the Crewe committee. But the recommended the introduction of more Indians into it, and th shortening of the period of the service upon it so as to ensure continuous flow of fresh experience from India. The period has h reduced from seven to five years.

The Joint Committee made a highly important pronouncen on a question of great practical moment. Under the new constitution, notwithstanding the creation of an Indian Legislature deriving its authority from a large electorate, with a large elected majority and with enlarged powers, the responsibility of the Governor-General in Council to Parliament will remain statutorily unimpaired. This responsibility is enforced through the Secretary of State for India. In the past Secretaries of State have not hesitated to require the governor-general to carry out a policy approved by Parliament, or by powerful interests in Parliament, in opposition to the views of the Indian Government and of the Indian people. Especially has this been the case in tariff questions, where the Indian Government has sought to impose customs duties on cotton piece-goods and other imports in which the British manufacturer is interested. Is inter- vention of this kind to continue, or, in view of altered circumstances, should it be restricted by statute or convention? The committee considered that no statutory change could be made, but that it should be an understood rule that only in exceptional cases should the Secretary of State intervene in matters of purely Indian interest, where the Indian Government and the Legislature of India were in agreement. In the particular case of fiscal policy they recom- mended that the Government of India should have liberty to devise those tariff arrangements which seemed best fitted to India's needs as an integral part of the British Empire. India should have the same liberty as Canada, South Africa, and Australia. The Secretary of State's intervention, when it does take place, " should be limited to safeguarding the international obligations of the Empire or any fiscal arrangements within the Empire to which H.M. Government is a party. If future Parliaments abide by the convention which the Joint Committee have suggested and do not force the hands of