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328 Paris to act as military governor when the German summer offensives threatened to reproduce the conditions of the Marne. When the tide turned he actively supported the proposed Salonika advance by pressing its advantages on the War Council, and it was with his aid that Franchet d 'Esperey obtained author- ity to advance. In Oct. 1918 he was given command of the V. Army. He was awarded the Grand Cross of the Legion of Hon- our on July 10 1918 and the medaille militaire on Oct. 3 1918. On Jan. 30 1920 he was appointed to the Superior War Council. GUISE, BATTLE OF. The name of the battle of Guise is given to the battle fought by the French V. Army on Aug. 29 1914, during the first Allied retreat, with the object of delaying the advancing Germans so as to take pressure off the British and to gain time for the debouchment of the newly formed French VI. Army.

By Aug. 25 the succession of battles fought in Lorraine, the Ardennes and on the Sambre had produced an atmosphere of optimism at German general headquarters. The Supreme Com- mand was, however, led astray by the magic of imagination and mistook the shadow of victory for the reality, although it is true that the Germans were somewhat in advance of their time- table. Gen. von Moltke considered that the great decisive battle in the W. had been fought and ended in Germany's favour, and that the moment had arrived when forces might safely .be sent to the eastern front. It was decided to send two corps from France to reinforce the VIII. Army in East Prussia. Gen. von Moltke's first intention had been to take these reinforcements from his left wing, but both the VI. and VII. Armies reported that they were opposed by superior numbers, and it was there- fore decided to send two corps from the right. Accordingly the XI. and Guard Reserve Corps and a cavalry division received orders early on the 26th to proceed to the eastern front.

The bracing atmosphere of optimism breathed by Supreme Headquarters in their peaceful hotel at Coblentz, some 200 m. from the battlefield, had at least one rarefied " pocket " in the front line. On Aug. 26 Gen. von Billow, the commander of the II. Army, was bewailing the fact that the III. Army on his left was not conforming to the south-westerly wheel of the II. Army, and that there was an awkward gap between the two. Further, on the 27th, the I. Army (which since Aug. 20 had been under Gen. von Billow's orders) was suddenly removed from the control of the II. Army by order of the Supreme Command, thereby making the cooperation of the three right-wing armies still more difficult. On the side of the Allies, neither far behind the fighting nor in the front line was there any optimism, and indeed there was little to suggest a roseate view of the situation. Failure had dogged their early efforts, and the whole left and centre were being forced back. This circumstance, however, was not without its advantages, for it ensured that the Allied com- manders-in-chief were in far closer touch with their forces than was the case on the German side. Far from attempting to deal with the situation from a couple of hundred m. in rear, Gen. Joffre and Field-Marshal Sir John French were on Aug. 26 deliberating within sound of the guns, and with the assistance of the French army commander most nearly concerned. The meeting took place in the billiard room of the house at St. Quentin which was serving as the headquarters of the British commander- in-chief. The moment was one of particular anxiety for Sir John French, for while awaiting the arrival of Gen. Joffre and Gen. Lanrezac the commander of the French V. Army the British field-marshal received the news that his II. Corps had not been able to comply with his orders to fall back from the line Cam- brai-Le Cateau, and was now committed, and alone, to a battle. Staff officers were sent to Gen. Smith-Dorrien with peremptory orders to break off the fight and to resume the retreat forthwith. It was now nearly eleven o'clock, and shortly afterwards Gen. Joffre arrived with his chief-of-staff. He was followed by the commander of the French V. Army, and a discussion of the situation immediately began.

During the night which had preceded the conference Gen. Joffre had issued a new directive, to the effect that, the offensive which he had projected having proved incapable of realization,

" further operations would be carried out with a view to forming a mass of manoeuvre on the left flank to carry out an offensive." This mass of manoeuvre was to be made up of the French IV. and V. Armies and the British, plus a new army the VI. to be made up of units moved by rail from other sectors, chiefly from the right. In theory these orders formed the basis of the dis- cussions at the conference, though, as it happened, the rapid march of events had prevented orders being thoroughly assimi- lated by some of the recipients. Nothing very definite indeed seems to have been decided at the meeting beyond the under- standing that the retreat was to be continued as slowly and deliberately as possible, until the Allies should find themselves in a favourable position to make a firm stand and take the offensive. Immediately after the conference Sir John French set out to ascertain the fate of his II. Corps, and, having learnt of the hard fighting which it had experienced at Le Cateau (see FRONTIERS, BATTLES OF: Sec. 5), he issued orders for the British army to fall back to the line La Fere-Noyon, and during the evening shifted his headquarters to the latter town.

From the evidence of his own published account it is clear that Sir John French felt strongly on two matters. The first was the action of the French V. Army on his right. He considered that the British had been placed in a position of isolation both at Mons and immediately afterwards " by the very sudden change of plan and headlong retirement of the V. Army." He had indeed pointed this out to Gen. Joffre, in the presence of Gen. Lanrezac, at the conference at St. Quentin. The other factor on which he had formed decided views was " the shattered condition of the troops which had fought at Le Cateau." In a further interview between the two commanders-in-chief on Aug. 27 Gen. Joffre showed himself most sympathetic and " understanding " in reference to the special position of the British, and promised that the French V. Army would be directed to take energetic action to take the pressure off it.

It was now the forenoon of the 2yth, and the French V. Army, in accordance with Gen. Joffre's directive of the 25th, was retiring over the Oise above Guise; and orders had actually been drafted for the continuance of the retirement next day to the line Mont- cornet-Marles-Ribemont. Shortly before one o'clock on the 27th, however, an officer arrived from French general headquarters with verbal instructions to the effect that Gen. Lanrezac was at once to attack towards St. Quentin with vigour, " sans s'oc- cuper des Anglais." As the V. Army was retiring almost due S., and in several columns, it would necessarily take some time to effect the change of front required for the offensive ordered, and this was pointed out to the envoy. The envoy made an irritating innuendo; a discussion of rather a tart nature ensued; Gen. Lanrezac's exasperation triumphed over his prudence, and he expressed himself rather freely on what he considered the in- different work of French general headquarters.

Nightfall of the 27th found the French V. Army behind the Oise and Thon, with its left below Guise and its right about Rumigny, facing north-east. Before the offensive against St. Quentin could be carried out it was necessary to transfer the bulk of the army below Guise and to establish it opposite its objective; that is to say, facing west. This preliminary move- ment, which would entail a flank march within range of the enemy, and was further complicated by a change of front of more than a right angle, was undoubtedly a most delicate opera- tion. A further difficulty was added by the fact that the Oise would give only a limited protection to the movement, inasmuch as it was not a serious obstacle above Guise. Again, the more the V. Army closed in to its left the wider would become the gap between it and the IV. Army on its right. These factors ruled out of court any prospect of an offensive before the igth.

On the 28th the headquarters of the V. Army were at Marie, and there about noon Gen. Joffre came to see Gen. Lanrezac. The latter described to his chief the dispositions he was making, pointing out at the same time the exposed situation in which his right flank would find itself while his main body was committed to the offensive against St. Quentin. These observations do not appear to have been taken in good part by the commander-in-