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the evening of Aug. 29, was no longer the French army of Aug. 22; it was soon to become the army of the Marne. (V.L.E.C.)'

(4.) BATTLE OF CHARLEROI

On Aug. 21, 22, and 23 1914 the French V. Army fought the battle of Charleroi, E. and W. of that place, in the angle formed by the rivers Sambre and Meuse.

By Aug. 20 1914 the forward movement of the German right- wing armies into Belgium, and the failure of the offensive of the French I. and II. Armies, had caused a modification in Gen. Joffre's original plan of campaign; and the plan of operations, after being adapted each day to the general situation, finally took a definitely new shape. Broadly speaking the intention now was to make the principal attack through Luxemburg and Belgian Luxemburg with the object of threatening the com- munications of such German forces as had crossed the Meuse between Namur and the Dutch frontier. This duty devolved primarily on the III. and IV. Armies of the French. In the S. the I. and II. Armies were to make a secondary offensive between Metz and the Vosges to hold the enemy, who might otherwise be able to take in flank the French advancing through Luxem- burg; and the French V. Army and the British army were to act upon the offensive, though this offensive would depend almost entirely on success by the III. and IV. Armies to their right. The offensive of those armies, however, collapsed, and this had an immediate effect upon the French V. and British Annies in the zone Charleroi-Mons, for they were then left in an isolated state some 40 m. to the N. of the remainder of the French battle- front. It has been said that " the battle of Charleroi was lost before it was fought "; and though this statement may be demurred to, the peculiar situation of the V. Army must be borne in mind in studying the battle.

On the evening of Aug. 20 1914 the situation of the V. Army was as follows: Of the I. Corps (reenforced by the 8th Infantry Brigade) the main body was W. of Dinant, with detachments on the Meuse from Revin to Namur, and on the Sambre from Namur to Floreffe; the 5ist Reserve Div. attached to the corps was about Rocroi en route for Dinant. TheX. Corps (reenforced by the 37th Div.) had its main body in the area Fosses-Philippe- ville, with detachments along the Sambre from Ham to Tamines. The III. Corps (reenforced by the 38th Div.) had its main body in the area Gerpinnes-Joumioux-Gourdinnes, with detachments on the Sambre from Rosalies to Marchiennes. The cavalry corps of Gen. Sordet was behind the Brussels-Charleroi canal, with detachments holding the passages from Gosselies to Seneffe. The head of the XVIII. Corps which had been transferred from the II. Army had reached Beaumont in its march to Thuin. The 53rd and 69th Reserve Divs. of Gen. Valabregue were in the area Vervins-Hirson. Army headquarters were at Signy-le- Petit. The V. Army was commanded by Gen. Charles Louis Lanrezac, an officer with an extremely high reputation in France. On April 10 1914 he had been made a member of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre.

Throughout the 2oth the French cavalry had been in contact with that of the Germans. North of the Sambre this contact had been gained by the cavalry of the I., X. and III. Corps, while the cavalry corps of Gen. Sordet was in touch with German mounted troops on the line Charleroi-Nivelles. It was on this day that there arrived from G.H.Q. the orders for Gen. Joffre's new offensive. The orders were to the effect that all information pointed to the intention of the Germans to carry out an outflanking movement in the north. The French III. and IV. Armies had been ordered to march against the line, Neufchateau-Arlon. As for the V. Army, its task was to pivot on Namur and the Meuse, and to seek out the main enemy mass in the north. On the left of the V. Army the British army would advance towards Soignies in the direction of Nivelles.

Gen. Lanrezac considered that it was not possible to carry out the order, so far as it affected his V. Army, at once. To begin with, the I. Corps, to be made available, must await relief by the sist Reserve Div., marching up from Rocroi to Dinant, and this relief could not be effected until the evening of

the 22nd. The XVIII. Corps on the left might, it is true, be up by the afternoon of the 2ist; but even with this reenforcement Gen. Lanrezac considered it imperative to wait until the I. Corps his best troops should be available. Then it had to be borne in mind that the British had not yet come up on the left, and that the action of the V. Army would also depend upon the success of the French IV. Army on the right. Gen. Lanrezac therefore confined himself for the moment, while awaiting the opportunity of assuming the offensive, to issuing orders for the occupation of a defensive position by the X. and III. Corps S. of the Sambre.

On the side of the Germans a combined attack had been arranged in which the II. and III. Armies were simultaneously to attack the French V. Army, from the N. and E. respectively. This operation had been ordered on Aug. 20 by Supreme Head- quarters, who had directed that the I. and II. Armies were to close up to the line reached on that day, and that an offensive against the enemy W. of Namur was to be carried out in coopera- tion with an attack by the III. Army against the line of the Meuse between Meuse and Givet, details being left for decision by the Army headquarters concerned. It was stated that at least three French corps were between Namur and Givet, and that more enemy columns were advancing northwards between Namur and Maubeuge. As regards the British the German Intelligence Department was woefully at fault, for it was stated that " a disembarkation of the British forces at Boulogne and the neighbourhood must be taken into account. It is the opin- ion here, however, that a landing on a large scale has not yet taken place." At the time two-thirds of the British force was within 30 m. of Gen. von Bulow a striking testimony to the celerity and secrecy with which the transport of the British army to the continent had been accomplished.

During the day the Germans attacked the French detach- ments on the Sambre. Tamines and Rosalies were taken, and early in the afternoon some of the Prussian Guards crossed the river at Auvelais and held it against French counter-attacks. Farther W. the cavalry of Gen. Sordet was also attacked about half-past three in the afternoon, and it was found necessary to send an infantry brigade to its support. Thus Charleroi was threatened from both E. and W., and during the night shells fell upon the railway station in the town. The events of the day had resulted in dislocating Gen. Lanrezac's preparations for the offensive, and at 12:30 P.M. he wrote to Gen. Joffre as follows: " I consider it dangerous to let the V. Army cross the Sambre during the 22nd minus on the one hand the I. Corps, which must hold the Meuse until the IV. Army has made sufficient progress N. of Semoy, and minus on the other hand the English who on the 22nd will not be able to get farther than Mons." During the evening a reply came from Gen. Joffre to say that Gen. Lanrezac could choose his own time for the offensive, and he accordingly decided that it would be launched on the 23rd.

Early on the 22nd fighting was resumed all along the French front on the Sambre. The X. Corps was forced back, and during the afternoon the road from Fosse to St. Gerard was crowded with artillery, infantry and transport moving southward, which was probably the disquieting incident witnessed by Sir John French in his visit to the zone of the V. Army on this day. Fosse was occupied by the Germans about 8 P.M. Farther W. the III. Corps had likewise to give ground. Severe fighting took place early in the afternoon round Chatelet, and both divisions had to retire, the sth towards Tarcienne and the 6th to Nalinnes. By one o'clock the III. Corps had definitely to renounce its grip on the southern outskirts of Charleroi. The city had witnessed fighting of extraordinary severity, and according to some accounts it was lost and won five times before the Germans were permanently masters of it. In the narrow streets between the Sambre and the canal the carnage was almost indescribable, and in places the dead and wounded blocked the way to those who were still unscathed. Here and there the bodies of the slain formed ramparts from which sharp- shooters kept up a murderous fire; and the Germans as they pressed on marched on a veritable chaitsste of corpses. A