Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/185

Rh

Crevic and the wood of the same name. Next day a German force advancing from Pont a Mousson violently assaulted the N. front of the Grand Couronne; the commanding village of Ste. Genevieve was for a time evacuated, but was reoccupied by the French on Sept. 8, 2,000 enemy dead being counted on the ground. On Sept. 7 also another attack was delivered on the eastern front in the direction of Mont d'Amance and Laneu- vellotte, and the 68th Reserve Div. fell back into the defile of La Bouzule between the two ridges in Champenoux forest. The French line was forced back to its western edge, and had also to be withdrawn from the forward positions to the S., towards Courbessaux and Drouville.

The German attacks continued in the night of Sept. 7-8, and on Sept. 8, but on neither occasion did they meet with any success. Violent fighting occurred on Sept. 9 on the western border of Champenois forest, but the French maintained their positions. To the S., in order to relieve the pressure on the 59th and 68th Reserve Divs., the XX. Corps undertook an offensive in the direction of Drouville and Courbessaux; some ground was gained, including Crevic wood, which had previously been lost, and the French line was pushed forward to the centre of St. Paul forest. Gen. de Castelnau ordered a vigorous offensive on Sept. 10, by the sgth and 68th Reserve Divs., in Champenoux forest and on the Bouzule, by the XX. Corps on Remereville, and by the XVI. Corps towards Luneville; although the results achieved were incomplete, the enemy's resistance appeared to be weakening all along the line, and on Sept. n the French suc- ceeded in retaking the eastern edges of Champenoux forest, St. Paul forest and Haraucourt wood. Next day it was learnt that the Germans were retiring, abandoning large quantities of arms and ammunition at Luneville; the left of the I. Army was advancing northwards without encountering any resistance. The II. Army began the pursuit on its front, occupying Fraimbois, Luneville, Drouville, Courbessaux, Remereville, Nomeny, and Pont a Mousson; the cavalry pushed forward to Einville, Serres and Morville.

On Sept. 13 the French occupied the heights of Crion and Sionviller, and those to the N. of Serres, together with the wood to the W. of Sorneville. The I. Army's left was at Vathimenil, and the line of the Meurthe had thus been definitely and com- pletely secured, never again to be lost. Meanwhile another German offensive was in preparation W. of Nancy, in the Woevres and on the Meuse, and the II. Army had to dispatch in this direction to meet it, first the 2nd Cavalry Div., then the 73rd Reserve Div. from Toul, and finally, on Sept. 13, the XX. Corps. This new development brought to an end the pursuit which had been begun after the battle of Nancy, and in a few days the II. Army was broken up, to be reconstituted anew on the left of the French VI. Army during the " race to the sea."

Thus, after a difficult beginning, with a defeat resulting from an inopportune offensive, the I. and II. Armies had been success- ful at first in checking the enemy's progress, and then in driving him back practically as far as the former French frontier. Their role, in itself no easy one, had been rendered even more difficult owing to the constant weakening of their effectives by the re- moval of their best elements to other parts of the front. During the battle of the Marne they formed the unshakable pivot of the centre and left of the Allied armies, and freed them from all anxiety as to their right flank. If, thanks to the memorable initiative of Gen. Gallieni, Gen. Joffre succeeded in carrying out on the Marne and on the Ourcq the manoeuvre which caused the enemy's retirement to the Aisne and completely ruined his original plan of campaign, it was because of the efforts and sacri- fices of the I. and II. Armies. By holding fast on the Meurthe and before Nancy, three hostile corps and numerous reserve formations, the II. Army had fulfilled, as had the I. at the foot of the Vosges, a task indispensable to the strategic reestablish- ment of the whole of the Allied forces. The price had unhappily been a great one. Between Aug. 24 and Sept. 1 2 the 74th Reserve Div. (to take only one example) lost 140 officers and over 5,000 other ranks, practically a third of its effective strength, and the casualties in other units had been even heavier. (B. E. P.)

(3.) BATTLE or THE ARDENNES

Directly the large concentration transports, which were at their height from Aug. 8-14, began, the III. French Army was formed in the region of Verdun under the protection of the VI. Army Corps, which took up protective duties on July 31 1914. Gen. Ruffey, with Gen. Grossetti as his chief-of-staff, was in command. On Aug. 14 that army consisted of the IV. Corps, to the E. of Damvilliers; the V. Corps, to the W. of Etain; the VI. Corps in the Woevre to the E. of Fresnes-en-Woevre, Vig- neulles and St. Baussant. A group of reserve divisions, com- manded by Gen. Pol Durand, was then under the orders of Gen. Ruffey, but they were not all completely disembarked by that date (Aug. 14). The 7th Cav. Div. (Gen. Gillain), attached to the

III. Army, covered the right wing of that army towards Metz. The IV. French Army was at first designed to form a general

reserve in the hands of the general-in-chief ; and, with a force of three army corps and one cavalry division, was grouped in the region between Vitry-le-Francois and Ste. Menehould. But on hearing of the German attack on Liege Gen. Joffre decided to send the IV. Army in the first line, to the left of the III. Army, in the region of Stenay (Aug. 8 1914). The II. Corps, which protected the V. Army to the E. of Stenay, as did the VI. Corps to the E. of Verdun, remained on the spot, while the V. Army (Gen. Lanrezac) returned farther to the N.E., first in the region of Vouziers-Auberton, and then towards Charleroi.

Directly it entered the lines the IV. Army commanded by Gen. de Langle de Gary, with Gen. Maistre as chief-of-staff was considerably reenforced. The II. Army Corps was the first to join it, followed by the XI. and IX. Corps, and the 52nd and 6oth Reserve Divisions. In the Ardennes the 4th and 9th Cav. Divs. were at its disposal. This IV. Army was, on Aug. 22 1914, by far the strongest of all the French armies.

According to Plan 17, which regulated the concentration operations, there would be little more than protective corps on the frontier until Aug. 8. Between Aug. 8 and 14 the concentra- tion transports, working with their maximum efficiency, were to bring all the army corps stationed in the interior to the con- centration zone of their armies. It was not before Aug. 15 or 16, therefore, that Gen. Joffre would have all his resources at com- mand. But the general-in-chief was determined to keep to the defensive, even a yielding defensive, which would be willing to lose ground until the concentration of all the French forces had been effected. Owing to this decision the protective corps formed a rigid cordon, with only very small detachments rifle and cavalry battalions ahead of it.

On the other side the Germans were proceeding in the same way. They were determined to fight with extreme violence everything that opposed the bringing into position of their armies, but would make no efforts to thwart the enemy's con- centration, or even to know how the French High Command organized its distribution of forces.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the first great battle was the "battle of the two blind men." Neither belligerent knew ex- actly where the encounter would take place, nor what forces they would have to fight. On Aug. 10 1914, when the IV. Army 6orps had only just joined the lines, to the left of the IV. Army, a Ger- man mixed brigade, starting westwards at a venture from Thionville, had the mad idea to attack at Mangiennes, the spot where the junction of the III. and IV. Armies was taking place. Without thinking, it engaged a fond. Then it was that Gen. Cor- donnier came and took this brigade in reverse, after it had already been roughly handled in the frontal attack, and destroyed it. The Germans did not try to avenge their defeat; they made no further attempt against the protective troops of the III. and IV. Armies. The Germans were absorbed in the deployment of their armies: theV., to theW. of Thionville as far as Tintigny; the IV., from Tintigny to Dinant; the III., from Dinant towards Charleroi; the II., on the Sambre; the I., towards Mons, in accordance with a plan mathematically determined in the pre-war period.

The French, bringing into play the variant which placed their

IV. Army between the III. and V. Armies, formed up ladder- wise. If the III. and IV. Armies faced eastwards, the VI.