Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/182

160

In the centre and on the right the French fared better. On Aug. 19 the XXI. Corps had extended its front to the S.E. of Saarburg, in the direction of Plaine de Valsch-Walscheid, without encountering any resistance; the XIII. Corps, which was in army reserve, had not yet been engaged. Next day the XXI. Corps, violently assailed by the XIV. German Corps, inflicted on it a serious defeat near Walscheid; the XIII. Corps, coming at last into line, attacked N.E. of Saarburg, disengaging the i6th Div. (VIII. Corps), which held the town till nightfall. Gen. Dubail's intention was to entrench himself astride the Saar on the front Kerprich-Soldatenkopf, and thence to resume a methodical advance foot by foot. But the defeat of the II. Army induced Gen. Joffre to order, on the evening of Aug. 20, the withdrawal of both armies. On the morning of Aug. 21 Gen. Dubail ordered the I. Army to retire slowly as far as Blamont. The withdrawal was carried out at first without serious difficulty, but was soon accelerated by the rapidity of the II. Army's retreat and by various untoward and costly inci- dents. On the evening of Aug. 22 the army, which had been joined by the XIV. Corps and 7ist Reserve Div. from the Vosges, held a line from N. of Moudon forest to the Bonhomme pass; on the evening of Aug. 23 it had fallen back a good deal further, and, pivoting on its right, had thrown back its left to Damas aux Bois. At this point Gen. Dubail gave orders to stop the retreat and prepare for the resumption of the offensive. After this series of unfortunate movements the weariness of the French troops was extreme, and the infantry had suffered heavy loss indeed in the VIII. Corps it exceeded 50% of the total strength.

The parallel offensive of the II. Army had been even less fortunate. Its mission was twofold: at all costs it was to pro- tect Nancy, mainly because of the moral effect of the loss of that city; it was also to prolong the attack of the I. Army to the W.,on the front Dieuze- Chateau Salins, with a flank guard fac- ing Metz. The army, under Gen. de Castelnau, at first com- prised the XVIII., IX., XX., XV., and XVI. Corps, three reserve divisions (5Qth, 68th and 7 and two cavalry divisions. But in view of the necessity of parrying the German advance in Belgium by reinforcing the V. French Army, on the left of the line, the XVIII. Corps was sent north-westwards, on Aug. 13, to form Gen. Lanrezac's left. In the middle of the offensive, however, the greater part of the IX. Corps was sent off to ree'n- force the IV. Army. The two cavalry divisions were later incorporated into the II. Cavalry Corps and placed under the orders of the I. Army.

On Aug. 13, on the eve of the Lorraine offensive, the IX. Corps held the northern front of the Grand Couronne de Nancy, 1 with outposts on the Seille; the 7oth Reserve Div. was towards Amance; the XX. Corps in the area Hueville-Laneuveville- Nancy, with forward troops on the Loutre Noire; the XV. Corps at Heraucourt, Drouville-Lerres-Courbcssaux; the XIV. Corps at Luneville-Xermamenil; the spth and 68th Reserve Divs. in second line at Laxose and Vendoeuvre, and four Chas- seurs battalions at St. Nicholas.

The generalissimo having prescribed that the I. and II. Armies should take the offensive, Gen. de Castelnau ordered the XVI. and XV. and the greater part of the XX. Corps to advance on Aug. 14 on Avricourt, the XX. Corps covering the northern front with the rest of its forces. On the evening of Aug. 14 the army held a line between Vuvrecourt and Goud- rexon, facing N.E.; only the XV. Corps had met with serious resistance and been held up at Moncourt. Next day the situa- tion of this corps, after the losses it had suffered, still checked further progress; the XVI. Corps advanced to Igney-Avricourt, the XX. to Bexange-la-Petite, Xanrey, and the northern edge of the Bezange la Grande forest; the IX. from its position on the Grand Couronne sent out detachments to Nomeny, Beni- court and Clemery. On Aug. 16 the German withdrawal con- tinued, and the French followed rapidly; the XVI. Corps reached Mondange-Rechicourt-La Garde; the XV. Donnelay-

Nancy, on the E. bank of the Moselle.
 * A group of steeply sloping hills forming a semicircle around

Maremont; the XX. Vic-Moyenvic, the hills N. and N.W. of Donnelay; the IX. retaining its position.

On Aug. 17 the right of the II. Army was to swing up to the N.W., with the object of reaching the line Delme-Chateau Salins-Dieuze, the first objective fixed by Gen. Joffre. The XVI. Corps pushed forward without difficulty to the region Angviller- Bisping-Guerdemange; the XV. reached the Seille and occupied Marsal without resistance but failed to effect the passage of that river with its main body; the XX. Corps entered Chateau Salins and pushed reconnaissances northwards. The absence of the cavalry divisions was much felt at this time. Despite heavy night fighting at Rorbach, in which a fraction of the XVI. Corps was engaged, it was believed that the enemy was merely fighting rear-guard actions and that his main bodies were retiring, the I. Bavarian Corps on Saarburg, the XXI. and the left of the II. Bavarian Corps on Morhange.

Aug. 1 8 was to be given up to the crossing to the right bank of the Seille, but from the early morning the XVI. Corps en- countered important hostile forces at the exits from the woods. On its right, the II. Cavalry Corps (I. Army) was not in position to support it, being itself held up at Dolving and Gosselming S. of the Saar. To the left the German heavy artillery pinned the XV. Corps to its ground on the Seille between Marsal and Zommange, preventing it even from occupying Dieuze. The XVI. Corps, being too far forward, was compelled to fall back on Angviller; only the XX. Corps advanced to the N. of Mor- ville les Vic and Chateau Salins.

In spite of the departure of the IX. Corps, ordered on Aug. 18, to the IV. Army area, Gen. de Castelnau ordered on Aug. 19 that the offensive should be continued with the utmost energy, both to conform with the instructions of the general- issimo to hold fast as many as possible of the enemy in Lor- raine, and in order to disengage the I. Army, now menaced by strong hostile forces from the direction of Phalsburg and Ober- steigen. The XVI. Corps, while still continuing to cover the II. Army to the eastwards on the canal of Houilleres, was to debouch from the region of the lakes to the N. of Loudrefing. The XV., operating to the E. of the Bride and Koeking forests, was to march on Bensdorf, and the XX. Corps, to the W. of these forests, on Morhange.

In order not to risk being taken in the flank by an attack from Metz, the II. Army was ordered for the moment not to cross the line of the Lower Albe below Bening Virming and Morhange. Thus the offensive of the right and not that of the left was limited, though the contrary was more natural.

On the morning of Aug. 19 the French right was checked by the enemy. As regards the XVI. Corps, the 3ist Div. could not debouch to the N. of the Salines canal and had to be re- lieved by the 32nd; the XV. Corps captured Zommange and Vergaville, but could get no farther; only the XX. Corps made a considerable advance, reaching the northern edge of Chateau Salins forest, occupying Oron and pushing a brigade well forward on Morhange. The 68th Reserve Div., which had relieved the IX. Corps in its positions, covered the left flank of the XX. Corps very insufficiently at Frcsnes en Saulnois-La Neuveville. The 7oth Div., in the Seille around Manhoue, and the 59th on the Grand Couronne from Leyr to Ste. Genevieve, assured the immediate protection of Nancy. The enemy's intentions were still obscure.

In these circumstances Gen. de Castelnau deemed it advisable to clear the passages for the XVI. Corps over the Salines canal as soon as possible, and ordered that corps and the XV. to carry out a united attack on Aug. 20 against the line Cutting- Domnom-Bassing, and to drive back the enemy as far as the Saarburg-Bensdorf railway. The XX. Corps consolidated its positions taken the previous day, and prepared either to con- tinue its advance to the N. or to the N.E., or to face any possi- ble attacks coming from Metz.

On the morning of Aug. 20 mist delayed the offensive of the XV. and XVI. Corps, which were in fact later violently attacked themselves and checked and even forced back. The XX. Corps had received from its commander, Gen. Foch, orders inspired,