Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/166

146

tions Commission. The last days of Feb. a strike starting on the P.L.M. was extended by a miners' strike in the northern coal- fields. Both movements were due to the high cost of living. These partial strikes were very largely test movements organized in a more or less underground manner, without the full approval of the C.G.T. in whose directing committee Communists were struggling to obtain the ascendancy. May-day passed quietly, but was followed by a series of strikes ordered by the C.G.T. The programme of action which was then put forward showed that the Communists had carried the day. It included the formation of a national economic committee for the reorganization of produc- tion; the constitution of an international syndicate for the distri- bution of raw material; and the formation of an international fleet with a view to the regulation of freights; control of imports; re- organization of rail transport; international distribution of war burdens; the stoppage of Colonial expeditions; and disarmament. The seamen, dockers and miners were called out in support of the railwaymen. The strike was never popular, and the Govern- ment's action in arresting leaders was well supported by the public. On May 9 the C.G.T. mobilized more strikers, calling out the metal-workers, builders, underground railway and omnibus employees, aeroplane-workers, and all dockers. By that date the defeat of the strike was certain. Men were breaking away in very large numbers from their unions, and in spite of terrorism were returning to work. Evidence having been obtained of Russian participation in the movement, a large number of arrests was made. On May 21 the C.G.T. decided by 96 votes to n to admit defeat, and work was resumed on the following morning. The defeat was the worst ever inflicted on a big Labour organization, and it was calculated that over half a million members were lost by the extremist nature of the action.

Millerand and the Presidency. No sooner was this crisis over than the Government was faced with one of an unusual and perplexing nature. M. Deschanel, President of the republic, while travelling by night to Montbrison, fell from the window of his compartment on to the track while the train was travelling at a good speed. No one noticed the accident, and it was not until Montargis was reached the next morning that the absence of the President was discovered. M. Deschanel was fortunate in not being seriously injured in his fall, but the shock, together with the effect of months, if not years, of life at high pressure, made it impossible for him to resume his functions. By the middle of Sept. after a further relapse, it became clear that he would have to resign his office. This was done formally on Sept. 16.

The course of events during the period which elapsed between Deschanel's accident and his resignation, was such as to favour the candidature of M. Millerand to the presidency. The prime minister's handling of Labour troubles had given him a great hold upon the Chamber; and although the growing friction with Brit- ain and Mille rand's attitude towards peace problems both roused discomfort in Parliament, the trend of events, especially after the Spa conference and the brilliant success of the French aid given to the Polish army in Aug., more than made good any gaps in his prestige. He accepted candidature, after issuing a statement that if he were sent to the Elysee he would pursue the policy he had advocated as prime minister. M. Millerand's action in boldly stating a programme shocked constitutional purists among the revolutionaries. After his election on Sept. 23, when he obtained 695 out of 892 votes, Millerand explained in further detail that he intended to play a larger part than had hitherto been taken by presidents of the republic in the field of foreign affairs; and that he contemplated constitutional reform the tendency of which would be to increase the usefulness of his office. The ministerial crisis resulting from this change in the presidency was settled by M. Georges Leygues stepping into Millerand's vacant place, the Cabinet remaining otherwise unchanged.

The new Government's statement of policy was naturally approved after a very brief debate. At the same sitting a presi- dential message was read, in which Millerand again referred to the advisability of constitutional reform, and dwelt upon his intention to act as guardian in the application of the Versailles Peace Treaty, Andre Lefevre, the Minister of War, resigned his

office on Dec. 16, in order to have his hands free to press for the rigorous disarmament of Germany. He was succeeded by M. Raiberti, president of the Finance Committee of the Chamber.

This Ministry of M. Leygues was never intended to be any- thing but a stop-gap. It enabled Millerand to get his feet into the stirrups without receiving too much advice as to how to ride the horse of state from former presidents or prime ministers. M. Leygues' chief task was to follow closely the lines laid down for him by M. Millerand in the various meetings which were still taking place with regard to peace between allied statesmen. He fell from power at precisely the moment when it seemed fit that M. Briand should take the reins. This he did in the middle of Jan. 1921. His chief concern was Franco-British relations, which, ever since the Armistice, had been drifting into troubled waters.

Franco-British Relations, 1919-21. With the disappearance of Germany as a world-power, it could not but be that a principal factor in the Franco-British Entente had ceased to exist. Even during the war, in meetings between statesmen and soldiers of the two countries, there were many differences of opinion. Yet, when the Armistice was signed, relations between the two countries were excellent. It was inevitable, however, that in the sharp exchange of views at the Peace Conference, when not only the vital interests of the moment but also the far-distant future of nations was at stake, individual interests should tend to supplant the common sacrifice of war-days. French public opinion, when it studied the conditions of peace, became persuaded that in the Peace Conference the British delegation, and Mr. Lloyd George in particular, were there not so much as statesmen settling the world's affairs from the high mountain of humanity, but as political travellers who had to show results to the house which employed them. This French point of view is stated here without the criticisms, comments and corrections, which might be aroused by it. There were two great crises during the Paris Peace Con- ference, and the solution accepted by Clemenceau in each case formed the subject not only of diplomatic action and discussion abroad, but of political agitation and criticism in the French Parliament itself. They were due to marked divergencies of views between France and Great Britain as to the future of the left bank of the Rhine, the Saar Valley, and reparations. In the discussion of these three questions two main tendencies soon became apparent. Mr. Lloyd George, according to Andre Tar- dieu, was anxious lest the conditions to be imposed upon Germany would be such as would lead her to refuse to sign. This anxiety and the dread of the possible extension of Bolshevism throughout Europe found their most direct expression in a memoir Mr. Lloyd George drafted on March 26 1919, in which he enjoined modera- tion upon himself and upon his allies. To this memorandum the French Government replied that it was in complete agreement with Mr. Lloyd George in desiring to make a lasting and there- fore a just peace, but that it did not think that, by softening down the European territorial clauses, his object would be obtained. It pointed out that the great war for Germany had not been a European war but a world war; that all her colonies, all her navy, a large portion of her merchant fleet, and her foreign markets were to be taken from her. It was these clauses which would hurt her, and it was an illusion to believe that she would be soothed by giving to her better European territorial conditions. The Xote drew the attention of the British Government to the fact that if its suggestions were accepted a certain number of complete and definite guarantees would be given to maritime nations which had not suffered from invasion, such as Great Britain; forinstance, the cession of the German colonies, the handing over of the German war fleet; the surrender of a large part of Germany's merchant marine, and for a time, the exclusion of Germany from foreign markets. To continental countries, on the other hand, to those which had most suffered from the war, partial and limited solutions of their difficulties were offered, such as the reduced frontiers of Poland and Bohemia, the limited defensive under- taking with regard to the protection of France, and the limited exploitation of the Saar coal-fields. With a foresight justified by subsequent events, M. Tardieu, who drafted this Note, pointed out that the inequality of the proposed solutions would be likely