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in fact ceased to be a bogey. It still kept all its pre-war revolu- tionary formulae, but they had ceased to have any real meaning. During the war labour had been given many opportunities of studying the intricate mechanism of State affairs and of appre- ciating that Karl Marx had perhaps not said the last word upon modern economic problems. Many of them began to ask them- selves whether they were after all able with their experience and with existing labour organizations to take over, as they desired and hoped to do, the responsibility of national production. Without, therefore, throwing overboard their theoretical con- ceptions, they nevertheless began to see the need of caution and further knowledge if they were not to fall when their time came to take power. Moreover, they clearly saw that war had left the country in such a condition that ill-considered action might lead to general chaos. Proudhon thus took Marx's place. While Jouhaux in 1919 declared that revolution was " the work- shop taking the place of Government," Merrheim maintained that the only chance of success for syndicalist ideas lay in care- fully prepared economic revolution, and began to fight Bolshevism. This doctrine aroused the sympathy of the professional classes, who came to the assistance of the C.G.T. when it formed an Economic Labour Council for the elaboration of its new pro- gramme. It was composed of civil servants, engineers, tech- nical experts, men of science and cooperative workers. Civil servants who had obtained the right of forming a union of their own adhered to the C.G.T. The Eight Hours' Day bill became law, and Clemenceau, speaking as prime minister to the C.G.T. leaders, told them that the time had come to take their place in Government. The movement was at its topmost height.

While the leaders were thus daily increasing their prestige and influence in the country at large their position with the rank and file was being equally steadily undermined by the " extremist " opposition. Strike followed upon strike, and wage demands continued to soar. The revolutionary elements, who reproached the C.G.T. with having failed to launch a revolu- tion during the war or during demobilization, got ready for open warfare. Extremists organized demonstrations on May i 1919, which ended in fatal rioting. Jouhaux at once gave ground to the revolutionaries, and resigned from his post at the Peace Conference. A general strike, prepared for July 21, failed owing to the firmness of the Government. The C.G.T. then retired into splendid isolation. Its chief concern was the elaboration of schemes for the nationalization of railways, mines and motive power. In April 1920 the extremists, with the growing support of Socialist Communists, captured control of the railwaymen's union and proclaimed a strike the second within three months. Instead of disavowing it the C.G.T., in support of the movement, decreed a number of successive strikes, calling out miners, transport workers, dockers and sea- men. Society, however, stood firm and the C.G.T. met with disaster. Within a few weeks it lost two-thirds of its members. The leaders who had failed to withstand pressure from the extremists were held by them to be responsible for the debacle, and in every meeting they were assailed with the utmost ferocity. The Orleans Congress (held in Sept. 1920) was in its way a defeat for the extreme Left, whose leaders were in gaol awaiting their acquittal on a charge of having conspired against the State. That defeat was more apparent than it was real, for the Bolshe- vist Left forced the moderates to accept in the very heart of the C.G.T. the formation of revolutionary syndicalist committees whose avowed object it was to get rid of the official leaders, to resume pre-war doctrines and to link up with Moscow.

In 1920 the C.G.T. tried, but without complete success, to exclude all those who adhered to the Bolshevists. Its members then were about 600,000. It was still, however, linked up with the reformed International Federation of Syndicates, and its chief concern was to devise a plan whereby German labour could collaborate in restoring the devastated regions.

Socialist Party. Although the C.G.T. always theoretically declared itself to be quite independent from the Socialist move- ment, concerted action was frequent before the war and machin- ery was created to coordinate their action.

The Socialist party in 1910 had about 60,000 members and was composed of many conflicting schools. Even after the pro- cess of unification differences between the sects were frequent, and all the tact and authority of Jaures were needed to preserve the semblance of harmony. The organization of the party had at its base local sections grouped into departmental federations, the delegates from which formed the National Council. This body appoints an executive committee. The Socialist parlia- mentary group, which always kept rather aloof from the party organization itself, was represented at the annual Congress.

The funds of the Unified Socialists were obtained from 50-0. subscriptions from all adherents and an annual subscription of 3,000 fr. from deputies. The official organ was I'Humanite.

Before the war there were three tendencies clearly defined within the party. There were the followers of Jules Guesde, who believed in the utility of social reforms and in the possibility of acquiring power by constitutional means. They were opposed to Socialist acceptance of office in a " bourgeois " ministry. They rejected the general strike, anti-clericalism and anti-patriot- ism, and fought against any understanding with other parties and notably against the bloc of the Left which controlled national policy during the Combes and Waldeck-Rousseau Ministries. They were austere doctrinaires and pure Marxists. Thus Guesde refused to vote for workmen's pensions.

Jaures and his followers were more broad-minded and would have accepted ministerial office. They believed in social reform, were ardent in the fight against the Church, and advocated union with other groups of the Left. Gustave Herve (who sub- sequently has become reconciled to patriotism) in those days led the extremists. He preached rebellion in the time of war and scoffed at all the theories of Karl Marx. These three schools clashed at every National Congress but the conciliatory skill of Jaures always produced a resolution so ambiguous in its phraseology as to be adopted with unanimity. Since syndical- ism had emancipated itself from the Socialist party the action of this latter was almost entirely parliamentary. Its policy was simple: Abroad an understanding with Germany, Alsace- Lorraine being definitely abandoned, no colonial conquests, evacuation of Morocco or, at most, peaceful penetration of that country; at home social reforms, State monopolies, taxes on capital and income, reduction of term of military service and adoption of militia system.

Jaures leavened all this dough with his great eloquence. Guesde spoke rarely and always bitterly. Marcel Sembat showed with wit, in his book Faites un Roi, Sinon Faites la Paix, that socialism was the only safeguard against war.

On July 31 1914 Jaures was assassinated by a fanatic, Raoul Villain (afterwards acquitted). Jaures had just returned from Brussels where the German Socialists Miiller and Scheidemann had declared that their followers would not vote German war credits. This promise was not kept, and the French Socialist party also voted war credits on Aug. 4 1914.

In 1915 the first signs of dissension in the Socialist ranks became visible. Up till then the participation of Jules Guesde, Sembat and Albert Thomas in the Ministry had been accepted without opposition by the party. This changed, however, when the idea of a compromise peace first made a small number of converts among Socialist deputies. In 1916 this section grew in influence. It created its organ Le Populaire, and had as its leaders Paul Faure and Jean Longuet. Still further advanced along the road to compromise were the extremists Alexandre Blanc and Raffin-Dugens, who were linked up with revolu- tionary syndicalists and took part in the manceuvres for peace at Zimmerwald and Kienthal. The position did not change much until the Russian Revolution. While Albert Thomas, Marcel Cachin and Ernest Lafont were sent to Russia in the hope of preserving the military alliance, the extremists and Longuet's followers clamoured for passports for their delegates to the proposed Stockholm Socialist Peace Congress.

The Bolshevist Revolution had two effects upon the French Socialist party. It widened the gap between the patriotic " Major- ity " section and those who espoused the cause of Lenin, and