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only small cargoes can be taken up-stream from Strassburg to Basle, 500 tons instead of 1,500 as far as Strassburg, and a tug-boat of 1,000 H.P. is required to tow five or six hundred tons up to Basle. The construction of this lateral canal is the only method by which traffic between Strassburg and Switzerland can be really made practical. The proposed canal is to have a breadth of over 86 metres, and a depth of between 6 and 7 metres, dimensions which are not much below those of the Panama Canal. The speed of the current would be not more than 1-20 metres per second, less, therefore, than the river current below Strassburg. The size of the locks will be 25 by 170 metres. Taking 300 working days of 12 hours, half of which for the up-stream journey, it will be possible to take up 1,800 strings of barges, each with a capacity of between 2,000 and 2,400 tons a yearly total of between 3,600,000 and 4,300,000 tons. Night traffic would double this figure. The total imports of Switzerland amount to about 7,000,000. Cost of transport will be extremely low.

Hydraulic Power. Between Huningue and Strassburg the Rhine yields 800,000 horse-power. It is impossible to harness this by canalizing the Rhine itself, owing to the formation of its bed and the necessity for building 30 locks and 30 weirs, which would delay traffic very considerably, and not give the best results. With a lateral canal, a barrage will be built across the river near Huningue, where the waters will be brought into the canal with a very small drop, leading to a series of locks. At each lock (of which there will probably be eight between Huningue and Strassburg) hydro-electric stations will use the power developed by the falling water. The idea of harnessing the Rhine below Basle was studied by an Alsatian engineer, Rene Koechlin, in 1890, and in 1909 the Control Commis- sion of the Rhine unanimously adopted the Kembs plan, so-called after the Alsatian village near which the first power station was to be built. In spite of the wide favour given to the construction of the lateral canal, it should be noted that the majority of Swiss engineers support the idea of seeking to increase the navigability of the river between Strassburg and Basle by a system of controlling locks.

The Port of Strassburg. The municipality of Strassburg began the construction of the port in 1898. The work was completed in 1901 at a cost of 13,000,000 francs, the whole of which was borne by the municipal budget. In its first year the port handled 540,000 tons. By 1914 the figure had increased to 1,989,000 tons. This prosperity incited the German town of Kehl, situated exactly op- posite Strassburg on the right bank, to follow the example of the capital of Alsace. While Strassburg had been left without support from the imperial authorities, the Grand Duchy of Baden came eagerly to the assistance of Kehl in its effort to meet Alsatian com- petition. The port was presented by the Grand Duchy with three docks and II km. of wharf accommodation; and was given the through traffic which Strassburg did not enjoy. The Alsatians fought hard against this system of nepotism, but could obtain no satisfaction until after the Armistice. The importance of Strassburg as a port of France is very great. France has sea-boards north, west and south Strassburg gave her a port on the east. The Rhine ports traffic amounted to 6,000,000 tons in 1913 that is to say, three times the total traffic of all French seaports. If France was to secure her share of this traffic, steps had to be taken in the pro- visions of the Peace Treaty to ensure the extension and steady de- velopment of Strassburg.

The town is uniquely situated from the point of view of inter- national traffic, and with its port could become the turn-table of Central Europe. Kehl, its German rival, could not be allowed to strangle the trade of French Strassburg, and Art. 65 of the Ver- sailles treaty lays down that, three months after the putting into force of the treaty the port of Strassburg and the port of Kehl shall become one for working purposes for a period of seven years. The extension of the Strassburg port was in progress in 1921, and Kehl was handling the traffic. In the event of the work at Strassburg not being finished by the end of six years, the Rhine Control Commission is entitled to prolong the temporary arrangement made by Art. 65 for a period not exceeding three years. The French State has assumed the financial burden of extending the port, the works of which will very largely benefit both the east and the south-east of France.

When the French regained Strassburg, there was not an Alsatian tug or barge in the port. Before the war the Alsatians had tried to build their own river fleet, but it had been quickly absorbed by the Baden Trust. In 1918 the total Rhine tonnage was about 5,600,000 (10,688 vessels), valued at 250,000,000 marks; of which the Germans owned nearly half. The Peace Treaty, taking into account the fact that a river fleet cannot be improvised overnight, provided for the cession to France of a portion of the German Rhine fleet. An American arbitrator was charged by the Reparations Commission with the task of determining the nature and value of the cessions to be made, which were in three categories namely: shipping, ship- ping shares, and dock property in Rotterdam. Mr. Hines, the. arbitrator, in his decision of Jan. 8 1921, declared that Germany should immediately hand over 254,150 barge tonnage, and 23,760 towing horse-power. On April 8 1921, France countersigned an agreement with Germany which places dock equipment at her dis- posal in the Rhenish ports of Rheinau, Mannheim, Ludwigshafen, Cologne, Duisburg, Ruhrort, and Rotterdam. A school was opened at Strassburg in July 1919 for instruction in the navigation of the Rhine, which requires special knowledge. There was a surtax of 36

fr. per ton on all extra-European imports which entered France through a non-French seaport. The Rhine is the only French river of which the mouth is not French, and the question arose whether this tax should be applied to goods arriving in Strassburg. French Chambers of Commerce, in agreement with the Strassburg Chamber of Commerce, successfully urged that this tax on bonded goods should not be applied to merchandise coming to Strassburg from Antwerp. The traffic of the port of Strassburg had in 1921 reached a pre-war figure. (P. B.)

FOREIGN TRADE

The position of France, in regard to foreign commerce, at the time of the World War was characterized by great uncertainty. In 1912, 1913 and the first half of 1914 there was general uneasi- ness and stagnation. The possessors of capital would take no risks. The Balkanic wars, the Agadir scare, and great political dissensions at home, all contributed to create an atmosphere which was very unfavourable to business.

France had a protectionist Customs tariff dating from 1892. It comprised a general tariff for countries having no commercial treaty with France, and a minimum tariff for countries conceding corresponding advantages to French trade. Germany enjoyed the most-favoured-nation treatment in virtue of Clause ir of the Treaty of Frankfurt. In course of time the protectionist tendency became accentuated. The increases in import duties were considerably more numerous than the reductions. The so-called " Padlock Act " empowered the Government to raise duties without waiting for parliamentary approval. This Customs policy, tempered by the commercial treaties, had one advantage. It endowed the foreign trade of the country with a certain amount of stability, but it caused the expansion of that trade to become extremely slow. It protected home manufac- tures against foreign competition, but, as a system of defence, it was considerably weakened by the existence of the most- favoured-nation treatment. In short, the position during the few years preceding the war showed no marked symptom of economic progress. The exports, with slight fluctuations, amounted to about 80% of the imports. The totals, expressed in values and in weights, for the four years 1910-13 are shown in Table 21. These figures indicate slow but regular progress,

TABLE 21. Exports and Imports, 1910-13.

Exports

Imports

Value in francs

Quantity in metric quintals

Value in

francs

Quantity in metric quintals

1910 1911 1912 1913

6,233,805,000 6,075,859,000 6,712,580,000 6,880,217,000

155,127,080 160,060,180 203,265,070 220,745,130

7,J73,332,ooo 8,065,828,000 8,230,846,000 8,421,332,000

357,183,54 404,284,450 397,463,890 442,203,860

due to increased imports of raw materials and increased exports of manufactured articles, but the balance of trade showed a deficit which amounted to 22% in 1913. The same state of affairs showed itself during the first half of 1914. The exports amounted to 3,375,953,000 fr. and the imports to 4,410,746,000 fr., so that there was every prospect of the totals for the whole year being very similar to those of preceding years.

France's economic life was more seriously affected than that of any other belligerent country when war broke out. A tenth part of her territory by far the richest part in minerals and manufactures was invaded during the first month of the struggle and was subsequently almost entirely devastated. The coal output was abruptly reduced by 60 per cent. The German occupation of the Briey and Longwy districts inflicted a severe blow on the metal industry. The territory held by the enemy throughout the war comprised 85 out of 170 blast furnaces, 48 out of 164 Martin furnaces and 53 out of 100 converters. Pro- ductive appliances were reduced by 64% as regards cast-iron and by 60% as regards steel. In spite of this great and sudden reduction in her manufacturing resources, France succeeded in supplying the needs of her naval and military forces and her civilian population. Arms and munitions factories were erected all over the country. The Government became their only customer, and as they were without raw materials, coal and chemicals, the Government also became the agency through