Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/1137

Rh

barrage about 12:55 A - M - There they opened fire on the trawler " James Pond," a searchlight vessel, and set her on fire; then proceeding slowly to the N.W. along the drifter line they sank the drifters " Cloverbank," " Cosmos " and " Jennie Murray." One of these seems to have sent up a green light, which led to a general retirement towards Dover, but two more drifters, the " Christina Craig " and " Silver Queen," were met and sunk by the enemy as he retired to the east. Meanwhile the monitor M26 and the destroyer " Syren " remained serenely at their posts under the impression that the firing was associated with an air raid. M26 saw a green light to the southward about

1 A.M., and without repeating the signal ran down there at full speed (g knots), and must have passed fairly close to the enemy, but finding everything quiet returned to the N.E. Varne about 2:10 A.M. By this time the firing had been heard at Dover and the rear-admiral asked for its reason at 1:28, but it was not till 2:52 that he heard that M26 saw a green light.

One more glimpse was caught of the enemy. About 2:20 the " Termagant," with the Eastern Barrage Patrol, was in about the middle of the Straits on a S.W. course, when the " Amazon " (2 4-in.), the last ship in the line, caught sight of three destroyers stealing past about 400 yd. off. She thought they were on their way to Dunkirk, and though they failed to reply to her challenge reported them as British. The senior officer (Comm. M. R. Bernard) was not satisfied, and asked if they had replied to the challenge, but by the time the question and answer got along the line the enemy were out of sight. By 2:30 evidence of a raid was taking shape. Reports of burn- ing drifters and survivors were coming in, but it was not till 3:18 that the " Termagant's " report of passing three destroyers j came in and banished all doubts. The losses inflicted by the enemy were seven drifters and one trawler sunk and three drifters and one minesweeper damaged. Had the alarm gone and been repeated immediately the enemy was seen the losses would have been less and the enemy might have suffered more.

They were not so fortunate, however, a month or so later. On March 21 the destroyers " Botha " (Comm. Roger Rede,

2 4-7-in., 2 4-in.) and " Morris " (Lt.-Comm. P. R. Percival,

3 4-in.) were lying in Dunkirk, with three French destroyers close by, when a burst of firing was heard off shore at 3:30 A.M. The British slipped, and passing through the Zuidcoote Pass, a narrow channel between the Dunkirk and Ostend roads, came upon the German destroyers retiring. The exploit of the " Broke " was repeated. The " Botha " rammed a German at full speed and cut it in half. Another was disabled by the fire of the two boats. A torpedo then hit the " Botha " in a coal-bunker and brought her to a full stop, while the enemy disappeared towards Ostend with the " Morris " in chase. She returned after seeing them enter Ostend Mole, sank the disabled boat burning close by, and took the "Botha" in tow. This was the last of the long series of Dover raids.

The war had become more and more a war of straits and pas- sages, but it was not till 1918 that minelaying was carried into the Cattegat. It had been in the early part of the war a sort of " No Man's Sea," but Germany began gradually to reach out into it, and in 1917 her ships were regularly cruising there. The sweep on Nov. 2 1917 had revived all her old fears, but no minefields had yet been laid there. In Feb. 1918 a deep minefield was laid off the Skaw, and another on April 15 some 10 m. N.E. of Laeso. This was laid by the " Princess Margaret " and " Angora," supported by vessels of the 6th L.C.S. and I3th Flotilla, and escorted by the " Valentine " and " Vimiera," which sank 10 German trawlers off Anholt. The discovery of the mines seems to have caused serious apprehension in German naval circles, but the operation was not repeated.

At Dover a plan was maturing to supplement the closure of the Straits by the blocking of Zeebrugge and Ostend. .This would seal up not only the Flanders submarines but the destroy- ers there as well, which formed a constant threat to the barrage and its patrols. The enterprise was a daring one, but the plans were carefully made and skilfully performed on the night of April 22-23. The " Vindictive " (Capt. Alfred F. Carpenter)

went alongside the Mole to draw the fire from the three blocking ships, and though only two of the latter achieved their object, the whole attack remains a great and inspiring example of care 7 ful planning and heroic execution. At Ostend the attempt miscarried, and a second attempt made by the " Vindictive " on May 9 also failed (see ZEEBRUGGE).

As the " Vindictive " was returning from her Zeebrugge venture the German fleet was putting out to sea. This was its last excursion and was directed against the Scandinavian con- voys. The fleet left at 6 A.M. on April 23; von Hipper led the way with his battle-cruisers, the ist Scouting Group, the and Scouting Group and 2nd Flotilla. Behind him came the battle- fleet, consisting of the 3rd, ist and 4th Squadrons, mustering 17 battleships, with the 4th Scouting Group and ist, 6th, 7th and gth Flotillas. In the morning of the 24th von Hipper was off the Norwegian coast when one of the " Moltke's " propellers was flung off its shaft, causing the turbine to race; the auxiliary condenser discharge was penetrated by a large fragment of metal and the engine-room flooded. Von Hipper went on to the north with his squadron, sending the " Moltke," which could still go 13 knots, back to the battle-fleet. By 7 A.M., when she had reached a position 40 m. S.W. of Stavanger, her speed was reduced to 4 knots, and she sent out a signal for help. The battle-fleet sighted her at 9:40, and the " Oldenburg " took her in tow. Von Hipper had turned back on getting the " Moltke's " signal, but hearing of the arrival of the battle- fleet he turned north again and ran up as far as lat. 60 N. Nothing had been seen of the British convoy, and the battle- fleet turned back with the " Moltke." Covered by the fleet she reached List (some 55 m. from Heligoland) at 6:50 P.M., where she was torpedoed by 42 (Lt. C. H. Allen), but got safely home.

A worse day for the excursion could not have been chosen. The homeward-bound convoy of 34 ships had left Norway on April 22, and at 8 A.M. on the 24th, when von Hipper was off the Norwegian coast, was within 50 m. of the Forth, while the outward-bound convoy of 47 ships was getting ready to leave the river. Not a single ship was anywhere near the Norwegian coast, and the sortie was futile. It had, however, many rami- fications, and an important conference on the subject of con- voys was held in the Forth on April 29, attended by the C.N.S. (Adml. Sir Rosslyn Wemyss), the D.N.I. (Rear-Adml. Sir W. R. Hall), and the Director of Plans (Capt. C. T. M. Fuller). There it was decided to alter the Scandinavian route to the north- ward of 61 N. so as to increase the chance of intercepting an attack on it. The incident had another interesting aspect. Up to the moment when the " Moltke " began to ask for help, no indication had been received by wireless directionals of the German fleet being at sea. Submarine J4 had seen it at 7 P.M. on April 23, but the report had not reached the c.-in-c., who was disturbed at finding the whole of the German fleet off the Norwegian coast without his knowledge. The disadvantages of relying too exclusively on wireless directionals was clearly demonstrated, and the utility of the submarines in reconnaissance work confirmed.

This was the last excursion of the German fleet, and ranks in importance with that of Jutland and Aug. 19 1916. In the north a stupendous effort was being made with the help of the U.S. navy to close the northern exit to submarines, and during the remainder of 1918 the Grand Fleet was largely occupied in escorting and covering the minelaying squadrons.

One of the last important operations in the North Sea was the bombing of the Zeppelin sheds at Tondern, near Sylt (Schles- wig-Holstein), on July 19 1918. This was made by the air- craft carrier " Furious," supported by five battleships of the First Battle Squadron ("Repulse" class), and escorted by the 6th L.C.S. and a number of destroyers. The" Furious "was an immense cruiser (20,000 tons, 30 knots) of the same type as the " Courageous " and " Glorious," originally designed for Lord Fisher's Baltic campaign, and she had been converted into an aircraft carrier. The attack was made by seven aeroplanes 130 H.P. single-seater " Camels " flown off her deck, each