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1082 as First Sea Lord was taken by Adml. Sir Rosslyn Wemyss. Adml. Jellicoe's departure was associated with that of Vice- Adml. Sir Reginald Bacon's from Dover about the same time. The Belgian coast had acted as a fatal magnet to the Dover Command. All through the summer of 1917 Dover had been absorbed in preparations for what was known there as the Great Landing, a project for landing a division on the flank of the German army in conjunction with a general advance. Enor- mous pontoons of a special design, each to be pushed by two mon- itors, had been devised by Adml. Bacon, who had devoted an immensity of labour and attention to the scheme. But events had taken a different turn. The army did not want divisions landed in Belgium. The Admiralty wanted Dover Straits closed to submarines, and when difficulties arose as to the execu- tion of their plans, it was considered necessary to send the Direc- tor of Plans, Rear-Adml. Sir Roger Keyes, to Dover to close the Straits. This he did, and very effectually. The war at sea was gradually expressing itself more and more in terms of submarine warfare. Nothing else mattered. The Dover pontoons were ingenious, but they did not close the Straits. History was merely repeating itself. Sir Sidney Smith in earlier days had made the same mistake. He spent much of his time preparing plans and devising pontoons for a landing on the Flemish coast, till Lord Keith complained to the Admiralty that one-third of his force was employed in this way to the detriment of trade in the Channel, which was suffering from privateers.

Operations in 1918. All this time the Black Sea had been the scene of a sporadic warfare between the Russian and Turco- German forces. Russia had a considerable force in these waters. She possessed at the outbreak of war two good pre-dreadnoughts, the " levstafi " and " Ivan Zlatoust " (1006, 4 i2-in., 4 8-in., 12 6-in.), to pit against the " Goeben," and three dreadnoughts, the " Ekaterina II.," " Imperatriza Maria " and " Alexander II." (all 10 iz-in., 20 S-in.), which were on the stocks at Nikolaieff. Her inability to face the " Goeben " with pre-dreadnoughts, and her military commitments, prevented her cooperating on a large scale against Turkey during the Gallipoli campaign, but by the end of 1915, after the completion of the three dread- noughts, the control of the Black Sea passed into her hands and ensured her communication with the Caucasus. The collapse of Russia in 1917 and the mutiny of the Black Sea fleet led the " Goeben " to look to the westward) and on Jan. 20 she and the " Breslau " made a sortie from the Dardanelles directed against any Allied craft that might be cruising in its vicinity. The British force in the area consisted of the British Aegean Squadron under Rear-Adml. Hayes Sadler, a somewhat heterogeneous col- lection comprising the "Lord Nelson" (flag.) and " Agamemnon," 6 old light cruisers, 12 monitors, 7 sloops and 27 old destroyers. The only ships which could have opposed the " Goeben " (8 n-in.) were the " Lord Nelson" and "Agamemnon" (each 4 i2-in., 4 9-2-in.); the former was at Salonika, where the rear- admiral had gone to confer with the British general and French admiral, and the latter (Capt. P. W. Dumas) was lying at Mudros in the island of Lemnos. The ships in the immediate vicinity were the destroyers " Tigress " (Lt. J. B. Newill) and " Lizard " (Lt. N. A. Ohlenschlager) of the sth Flotilla, patrol- ling off the Straits, and the monitors " Raglan " (Comm. Visct. Broome) and M28 (Lt.-Comm. Donald Macgregor) anchored in Kusu Bay at the N.E. corner of Imbros some ism. from the Straits. The " Goeben " (Vice-Adml. von Rebeur Paschwik) and " Breslau," or to give them their Turkish names, the " Sultan Selim " and " Medilli," sallied out about 5 A.M. un- observed by the lookout station on Navro I. and steered for Imbros, shadowed by the " Tigress " and " Lizard." The " Raglan " sighted them at 5 =35 and gave the alarm by wireless. She was engaged by the " Breslau " and set on fire, and after a few shots from the " Goeben " sank. The " Breslau " then opened fire on M28, which burst into flames and blew up with her captain at 6:27 A.M. The "Goeben "and "Breslau" went off to the southward, but about 3 m. off the S.E. point of Imbros the " Breslau " entered a minefield, and was sunk by mines at 7:07 A.M., 40 survivors being picked up by the " Tigress." The

" Goeben " seems to have struck a mine about the same time, and after continuing south for some miles headed for the Dar- danelles, followed by aircraft, and beached herself on the shoal off Magara. The " Raglan's " signal set the whole squadron in motion, and even the old cruiser " Europa " started to raise steam. The " Agamemnon " put to sea, and was on her way towards the Straits cleared for action when news arrived that the " Goeben " was returning to the Dardanelles. Almost simultaneously came a signal from the " Lord Nelson " ordering her to rendezvous off Cape Paliuri on the coast of Macedonia.

A series of air attacks were made on the stranded " Goeben," and in the course of the ensuing week more than 15 tons bombs were dropped round her with several hits, but the ii2-lb bombs failed to inflict any vital damage. An heroic attempt was made to torpedo her by 14 (Lt.-Comm. Geoffrey White), but the defences of the Straits were too strong, and the 14 was sunk and her captain killed. The separation of the " Lord Nelson " and " Agamemnon " had been criticised, but even if we suppose that one had been on patrol outside the Straits and the other at Lemnos, the " Goeben " was more than a match for one and the sortie was made too quickly for the other to arrive in time. The " Goeben " was still too formidable an antagonist for a single ship of the " Lord Nelson " class, and in these circumstances the minefield provided the best solution of the problem, though in view of the overwhelming superiority of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean the episode does not reflect very great credit on the strategy of the Allied arms.

In the North Sea the increased activity in the Dover barrage led inevitably to another German raid. The barrage of deep mines which had been laid across the Straits was now patrolled at night by a strong force of drifters, and illuminated by brilliant flares and searchlights in trawlers and destroyers, in order to discover enemy submarines and force them to dive. The Ger- mans sallied out against it on Feb. 15. The disposition that night was as follows: In the Downs" Attentive " and three destroyers; West Barrage Patrol off S. Goodwins " Swift " and " Marksman"; East Barrage Patrol (south and east side of Straits)" Termagant," " Zubian," " Melpomene " and " Amazon." On the line Folkestone to Gris Nez there were stationed 58 drifters, supported by Monitor 26 off the N.E. Varne buoy and the old destroyer " Syren." All the conditions were favourable for a German raid; a moon three days old set at ii P.M., and the east-going stream to assist the raiders home began to run at midnight. The light of the barrage could be seen a long way off. The flares and searchlights had a dazzling effect and the whole area was full of glare, varying in intensity as flares burnt up and died down and searchlights flickered and hovered. In such surroundings the flash of gunfire might be overlooked or might easily be mistaken for an attack on a submarine. If enemy destroyers were seen the general alarm for a surface craft raid was to be given; this was a green firework of any description, and on this signal all drifters had to evacuate the minefield and close the nearest land. The German 2nd Flotilla (898, Vioo, GIOI, Gio2, 6103, 6104, 897, 6109, no, in, 112) had again been chosen for attack and came straight from the Bight. At 11:30 P.M. on Feb. 15 it was off Sandettie Bank close to the Straits, where it split into two halves, one going towards Folkestone, the other towards Gris Nez. The northern force was sighted by the trawler " Sabreur " about 12:40 A.M. off Folkestone. She took them for British destroyers hunting a submarine, and made no sign. The minesweeper " Newbury " was burning a searchlight close by, and as the destroyers passed they opened a heavy fire and left her a blazing wreck. They then made off to the S.E. down the drifter line, sank two drifters, damaged a minesweeper and motor-launch, and disappeared to the N.E. about 1:15 P.M. It would appear impossible for all this to happen without an alarm, but no alarm went up. The motor-launch thought she had got mixed up in an attack by British destroyers on a submarine. No news was received at Dover, and the Western Barrage Patrol saw only a few faint flashes about i A.M. Meanwhile the German southern detachment had reached the southern end of the