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Rh an exact comparison was impossible. In all cases the deficiency in 1918 on pre-wa s r figures was far greater, both for Germany and for Holland. In respect of stocks, the figures show how at Sept. 1 1916 wheat, fats, meat and sugar were near the pre-war level, “a dangerous point in war, having regard to the uncertainties of transport,” and by Sept. 1918 had been built up to a level ensuring safety for the coming winter.

The course of prices is shown in two stages; one from July 1914 to July 1917, when the main development of food control in the United Kingdom began, and the other from July 1917 to Oct. 1918. For each of these periods the course of British food prices is contrasted (a) with that of the prices of certain other staple articles (textiles, coal and soap) in the United Kingdom; (b) with that of food prices in France, Germany and Sweden, respectively:—

The following comments from the memorandum of the Ministry of Food are interesting:—

“The effect of the introduction of price control from July 1917 onwards is very marked. The rate of increase for controlled food since that date is one-quarter of the rate before then and is also very much less than the rate for other articles and for other countries. If the prices of such food had continued after July 1917 to rise at the same rate as before, they would in Oct. 1918 have stood not 115% but 150% above the pre-war level. If they had continued after July 1917 at the same rate as textiles, they would have reached 185%. The controlled foods cover 94% of the total food expenditure.

“The keeping down of food prices is of course to some extent due to the introduction of the bread subsidy. Though with this allowance the effect of control in slowing down the rise of prices is naturally less, it is still clearly marked. The rate of increase in food prices after July 1917 remains little more than half the rate before then, and less than the rate of increase for any of the other articles shown. To this result two distinct factors have contributed—one, the fixing of prices and margins by the Ministry of Food on a costing basis in this country; the other, the action of the Government of the United States and other exporting countries in controlling the prices paid to the producers there.

“It is probably no exaggeration to say that a large part of the population have been better fed during the war than at any previous period, because for the first time they have been assured of regular work and wages. A number of luxuries and subsidiary foods—fruit, canned fish, sweets, etc.—have been cut off. The supply of essential foods, though reduced as a whole, has been sufficient for all because it has been fairly distributed among rich and poor.”

The Ministry of Food in the United Kingdom accomplished, with a reasonable minimum of mistakes, the work for which it was established. The rationing system adopted is dealt with separately under. Two cautions or criticisms are not out of place. First, the administrative machinery required was very extensive. The staff directly employed by the Ministry, either at headquarters or in the offices of the Divisional Food Commissioners and Livestock Commissioners, numbered at its maximum over 8,000. In addition the local food control committees employed varying numbers, rising at times of exceptional pressure to as many as 25,000 persons. The printing and stationery bill for a single year exceeded £1,500,000. The expenditure was no doubt fully justified by results, and under the arrangements made it did not fall on the taxes but was covered by a trifling percentage on the price of the articles in which the Ministry dealt. Second, while the profits and margins secured by distributors were undoubtedly lower than they would have been in a time of scarcity without control, they were probably not as low as in a time of plenty without control but with competition. The policy was adopted, indeed no other policy was possible, of preserving the normal channels of trade. This meant that the margin at each stage of distribution, i.e. the difference between the price at which the distributor received his supplies and that at which he was compelled to pass them on, had to be fixed at a point which would afford a living to the distributor of average or less than average efficiency. The more efficient distributor could still make very large profits and did so; he had no motive for cutting prices in order to increase business, since his share of the total business was stereotyped.

If the position of the United Kingdom be briefly compared with that of other countries, it is seen that the central fact facilitating food control in the former was that it had to look to imports rather than to home production for the bulk of its supplies. This simplified the problem of the British food controller (till he was driven to rationing) by making it largely a question of how much shipping he could extort from the shipping controller and how much foreign credit from the Treasury. Both Italy and France produced a larger proportion of their cereals at home, and required less meat. In Italy even sugar was mainly home grown. For the food controllers of Central Powers, questions of importation hardly arose. Their main problem and one which they solved only to a limited degree was that of inducing the farmer to give up a fair proportion of his produce at the official price to the public authorities. They seem, indeed, to have been considerably less successful than the British food controllers in getting agreement with the agricultural population on production and prices; sometimes, at least, prices were fixed which the farmers regarded as arbitrary and which they evaded systematically by contraband sales. Two minor features may be mentioned as having simplified the British task. One is the concentration of the great bulk of flour-milling in the United Kingdom in a small number of important mills (less than 700), which could be readily controlled and which furnished the only easy market to the farmer and the corn merchant; in most other countries mills are more numerous and smaller, and it is common for the farmer to grind his own corn. The other is the limited power of the British municipal authorities. In Germany it was the natural thing for the separate municipal councils to act as independent organs of food control, making their own contracts with neighbouring rural districts for the supply of food to their citizens, fixing prices in their markets, and rationing when need arose. This made possible competition, confusion and difference of standard between the authorities, and made difficult a survey of the nation's needs and resources as a whole. In the United Kingdom, Lord Rhondda, as housekeeper for a family of forty millions, made a single bargain with each group of producers, put all the supplies from different sources into one pool, and distributed them fairly at standardized prices.

In the United States (see p. 98) the problem was different. That country in itself experienced no shortage of any essential food, but became the great source of supply to all the Allies in Europe, and gained in importance as shipping was concentrated