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news to Singapore. The big Australian and New Zealand convoy of 38 transports homeward bound, which left Albany on Nov. i, escorted by the " Minotaur," " Melbourne," " Sydney," and " Ibuki," was approaching Cocos. It was only 55 m. off when the news reached it, and the " Sydney " went off to Cocos I. at full speed. An action ensued between the " Sydney " (Capt. J. C. Glossop, 8 6-in.) and the " Emden " (Capt. von Muller, io4-i-in.). By 11:30 the latter was driven ashore, blazing.

With the destruction of von Spec's squadron there remained only, as regards German naval forces at sea, the " Dresden " hiding in the creeks of Tierra del Fuego, and the "Konigsberg" shut up in the Rufiji river (German East Africa), both of them powerless for harm. The ocean passages were again secure for Great Britain and her Allies. Samoa and New Guinea had fallen, and a Japanese guard stood at the gates of Tsingtau. In Cameroon, Duala, Buea, and Victoria had been occupied. The naval operations under the conduct of Capt. C. M. Fuller had contributed largely to this success, and the " Cumberland" now joined the stream of British cruisers homeward bound.

Operations in 1913. The year 1915 saw a heavy blow dealt at the German battle-cruisers in the North Sea. An impres- sion prevailed in Germany at this time that the British fleet was preparing to block the Jade and it was decided to send Rear- Adml. Hipper's battle-cruisers as far as the Dogger Bank to reconnoitre on Jan. 24, but the Admiralty had intelligence of this and dispatched Beatty with his battle-cruisers on the 23rd to join hands with Tyrwhitt. They met Hipper's forces on the morning of Jan. 24 and the battle of the Dogger Bank ensued in which the Germans lost the " Blucher " and were driven back to port (see 3 0.848). The battle reacted at once on German naval strategy. Von Pohl, chief of the staff, replaced von Ingenohl in command of the High Sea Fleet with instructions to use extreme caution. The successes of von Weddingen had in- clined the German naval staff more and more to submarine warfare which opened with the declaration of a war zone round the British Isles on Feb. 4. Their tendency in this direction was strengthened by the final collapse of their cruiser warfare abroad. News of the " Dresden's " destruction arrived in March 1915. For two months after the battle of the Falklands she had lain hidden in the innermost recesses of the Magellan Straits with half a dozen British cruisers looking for her, and it was not tiE Feb. that she ventured to creep back into the Pacific in order to meet a German colh'er south of Juan Fernandez. The " Kent," searching the Barbara Channel (Magellan Straits) with the "Glasgow" at the time, got the news and hastened after her. On March 7 1915 she reached the rendezvous but the " Dresden's " speed enabled her to get away. It was not for long, however. The " Glasgow " had made out the words " Juan Fernandez " in a message the " Dresden" had sent and there, on March 14, the " Kent," " Glasgow " and " Drama " found her and brought her career to an end.

From the lonely islets of the Pacific we must return to Europe for a time. There the centre of interest had shifted from the Grand Fleet to the Dardanelles. After the Dogger Bank action the German fleet became more wary in its excursions and the work of the Grand Fleet was confined to periodical cruises enlivened only by an occasional attack by a submarine. The battle of the Falklands had released a number of older battleships and cruisers but in the North Sea the war was settling down into a state of equilibrium. The Germans rarely came out of the Bight and we could rarely go into it. On sea and land a deadlock had arisen, giving rise to the belief that a better outlet for energy could be found in the Mid East. In this way the idea of the Dardanelles came cranking across the original plans of naval strategy, challenging even the Grand Fleet in its insistency, swallowing at a gulp the Channel Fleet and wrecking Lord Fisher's plans for a Baltic campaign.

The general conception was sound for it was a matter -of first-rate importance to gain free access to Russia and the scheme offered strategic political and economic advantages of the first magnitude, but it was begun in a haphazard way and its direction was marred by an inability to distinguish clearly

between a naval bombardment and a combined naval and military operation and by a failure to appreciate that two operations unless conducted simultaneously must prejudice one another. The history of the naval side of the subject can only be briefly sketched. Petrograd had asked on Jan. 2 for a diver- sion to relieve the pressure of the Turks in the Caucasus. The idea of the Dardanelles was broached. Vice-Adml. Sackville Garden, the senior officer in the Mediterranean, gave his opinion on Jan. n that a progressive attack on the defences, step by step, was practicable. The First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) waxed enthusiastic over it and pictured the forts falling in succession before the " Queen Elizabeth's " guns. There can be little doubt that had plans and preparations for a combined operation been made on a sufficient scale, a great success might have been gained; but the refusal of Lord Kitch- ener to supply the troops led to the proposal to force the Straits with ships alone. This was an entirely different operation and the war staff failed to put its difficulties in a clear enough light. It was and is a truism of naval warfare that ships are handi- capped in engaging forts. A ship cannot be concealed; a fort, and much more a modern movable battery, can. Aerial recon- naissance and the increased range of naval guns were supposed to have altered these conditions, but aerial spotting in con- junction with naval artillery was still in its infancy, and the limitations of naval bombardment were insufficiently appreciated.

The First Lord had a wofully extravagant estimate of the capacity of the " Queen Elizabeth's" guns, and thought of her creeping relentlessly forward, destroying each fort in turn with five or six i s-in. shells. Lord Fisher was absorbed in his project for a campaign in the Baltic, and it was allowed that the propo- sition was worth a trial.

The result was an endeavour to perform a task of first-class magnitude with second-class material and with insufficient preparation. Had a force for the purpose been segregated and thoroughly trained on the lines afterwards followed for the much smaller project of Zeebrugge, the chances of success would have been much greater. It would have required a nucleus of the best artillerists, the best minesweeping officers and the best minesweeping vessels in the fleet and at least two score of first-class airmen to evolve and apply a sound scheme of air-spotting. Given these necessary adjuncts and approximately six weeks of intensive specialized training to groin the whole into a solid arch, the Dardanelles could probably have been forced. But here the strategical weakness of the conception would have revealed itself. The forcing of the Straits in itself could do little unless it precipitated a revolution. In default of a revolution the fleet would have been left in the air in the Sea of Marmora, for its ships could hardly pass and repass through a channel a mile wide whose shores were in hostile hands. But the principal objection lay in the fact that any premature bombardment must inevitably wreck or at least imperil the prospects of a combined operation and anticipate surprise where surprise was the essence of success.

But by Feb. 1915 the idea of merging the two operations had crept in. A military force was to be available " to reap the fruits " and was being assembled in Egypt. The opinion found favour that if the navy failed, the army should help a fatal conception which ignored the real relativity of the two opera- tions. Meanwhile Lord Fisher's attitude'of lukewarm acquies- cence had changed to one of definite disapproval, but his position was weakened by his adherence to a scheme for landing in the Baltic, much more difficult and dangerous. The War Council definitely approved of the project on Jan. 28, bringing Lord Fisher to the verge of resignation.

The force collected for the purpose consisted of the " Queen Elizabeth" (Capt. George Hope) and "Inflexible" (Capt. R. Phillimore) with a heterogeneous collection of old battle- ships drawn from the Channel Fleet or which had come home from abroad after von Spec's defeat. In command was Vice- Adml. Sackville Garden who had been admiral superintendent at Malta Dockyard when the war broke out, with Comm. Roger Keyes as his chief-of-staff. Operations against the outer fort