Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/1123

Rh

the " Monarch " and missed, Ui5 was rammed by the " Birming- ham" (s826'N. i58' E.), and Ui3 never returned. But the operation had an important bearing, for though reassuring enough from one point of view it gave the British commander- in-chief a sense of insecurity, and he asked permission to take the fleet to the west of the Orkneys as soon as the Expeditionary Force was across. That night (at 10 P.M. on the 6th) he received orders to take his whole force north-west of the Orkneys. The menace of the submarine was already working when the trans- ports were assembling to take British troops over to France.

On Aug. 5 the British Government had decided to send the Expeditionary Force across the Channel, and Aug. 9 was finally fixed as the first day of passage. The question of transporting a British Expeditionary Force across the sea had been a subject of study for some years. Southampton to Havre was the principal route for troops, Newhaven to Boulogne for stores, and transports were already assembling at Southampton. It had been part of the war plans that, in the event of troops being sent to France, the Grand Fleet was to come down to a position south of the Forth (latitude 56 N.). But it was now to westward of the Orkneys, and remained north of Cromarty (58 N.) till Aug. 15, sometimes west of the Orkneys and sometimes east. The task of immediate protection fell therefore to the Channel Fleet. By Aug. 9 its 18 ships had assembled off Portland and were covering the lines of passage in the Channel. In the Narrows between Holland and Harwich, Tyrwhitt had a watching patrol of 12 to 18 destroyers on a 3o-m. front. The " Bacchante," " Cressy," " Hogue," and " Aboukir " of Cruiser Force C were behind him in the Downs or off Dungeness keeping touch with the Channel Fleet. In the Straits were five destr6yers of the Dover Patrol (increased to 12 at night) assisted by three light cruisers, and supported by 10 submarines of Comm. Keyes' force posted between the Goodwins and Ruytingen (near Calais). French submarines were on watch between Gris Nez and the Varne, and far to the westward cruising from Ushant to Land's End was Rear-Adml. Rouyer's force of 14 old French cruisers in touch with Wemyss' squadron of four " Tal- bots." This was a respectable force, and was in position by the gth when the troops began to cross, and for a fortnight remained on the alert. A steady stream of transports passed across the Channel, sailing as soon as they were ready and waiting only for the tide. Their numbers rose to 44 on the I4th, and remained well over 30 per day up to Aug. 18. On Aug. 12 the Admiralty suggested to the commander-in-chief that the fleet should return to 'the eastward of the Orkneys, and it came back just when the flow of troops was at its height, and sweeping down to the latitude of the Forth (56 N.) on the i6th joined hands with the southern forces, and for a few hours made a complete ring round the German Bight. But nothing was seen of the enemy and the Grand Fleet returned to Scapa. It arrived there on the i8th, and the enemy for the first time ventured out a little way. Two light German cruisers, the " Stralsund " and " Strassburg," pushed into the Narrows that day. There they were sighted at 6:30 A.M. by the " Fearless," which gave chase and opened fire on the " Strassburg " (thought to be the " Rostock "). Tyr- whitt came hurrying to the scene followed by Cruiser Force C, and the enemy quickly decamped.

By the 2oth four British divisions had crossed, but the news from France was bad and another division was hurried over. By Aug. 23 the movement was complete. Out of 240 transports employed not one had been lost by accident or enemy attack. A hundred thousand men were in France, and British divisions were already fighting against heavy odds at Mons.

In order to secure the position in the south and on the east coast, a squadron (Cruiser Force K) of two battle-cruisers, the " New Zealand " .and " Invincible," under Rear-Adml. Sir Archibald Moore, was now stationed in the Humber and remained there for a time. Hardly had the passage been accomplished and the Watching Patrol been withdrawn for a short time than news came of a severe check in France, and the Admiralty was faced with the possibility of having to abandon the French Channel ports. So far did matters go that Boulogne was closed

down on Aug. 24 and the army base was shifted to St. Nazaire. This would have meant a serious dislocation of British naval strategy, but before it reached a critical stage the German advance had been checked.

The retention of Ostend and the Belgian coast was now engag- ing naval attention. Marines were being hurried over there, and for nearly two days (from Aug. 26-28) the Channel Fleet and Cruiser Force C were carrying them and their stores across, and were lying off Ostend to support their landing. The operation was entirely abortive. No sooner had they been landed than they were reembarked. The landing offered an excellent opening for the German High Sea Fleet to attack, but for a time at least its attention was riveted to the Bight.

Commodore Keyes' submarines had been watching the German patrols round Heligoland for some time, and on the strength of their observations he had suggested a plan for cutting them off. The original orders provided only for a concerted operation by six of Comm. Keyes' submarines, and Tyrwhitt's flotillas sup- ported by the five "Bacchantes" of Cruiser Force C and the " Invincible " and " New Zealand." But at the last moment Beatty and his battle-cruiser squadron were fortunately allowed to join in, and there followed on Aug. 28 Beatty and Tyrwhitt's dramatic swoop into the Bight (see HELIGOLAND BIGHT). The German patrols were driven in, the big ships failed to support them, and three light cruisers, the " Mainz," " Ariadne " and " Coin " were sunk.

The action had an important ulterior effect. It confirmed the Kaiser, probably influenced at the time by the situation in E. Prussia and the Baltic, in his determination to follow a strictly defensive naval policy, though Tirpitz fought strenuously for an increased offensive.

German strategy now settled down to the two-fold form of submarine activity against ships-of-war and minelaying, varied by occasional raids against the English coast. The activity of the German submarines (or " U-boats ") soon began to be felt. On Sept. 5 U2i entered the Forth and sank the " Path- finder," a light cruiser patrolling outside, the first ship to fall a victim to an enemy submarine. Scapa's defenceless state became a source of acute anxiety to the British commander-in-chief, and the Grand Fleet itself was not immune from false alarms, which in the circumstances had to be taken seriously enough. On Sept. i the " Falmouth " thought she saw a submarine, and there ensued a feverish commotion in the Flow, which culmi- nated in the battle-fleets weighing in thick weather and putting to sea at night. It anchored in Loch Ewe and was there on Sept. 7 when it was recalled to the North Sea to screen the passage of the yth Division. Again Beatty's squadron and Tyrwhitt's flotillas swept the Bight from east to west on Sept. 10 with the battle-fleet behind them, but this time it was bare.

A week later (Sept. 17) an important conference assembled in the " Iron Duke's " cabin at Loch Ewe. The First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) was there with the chief of the war staff (Rear-Adml. Doveton Sturdee) and the Director of the Intel- ligence Division. Weighty matters were discussed, and the remains of the old war plans emerged in the form of a proposal to attack Heligoland and to enter the Baltic. It was decided that the former project offered no advantage, for when it was taken it could not be held, and that no operation on a large scale could be attempted in the Baltic without endangering British supremacy in the North Sea.

When the First Lord returned he found the German threat to the Belgian and French Channel ports beginning to develop, and orders went out on Sept. 19 for the Marine Brigade to be landed at Dunkirk as the nucleus of a larger force. The task of screening their passage fell on the southern forces. This was one of the functions specially allotted to them in the war plans, and it came as a severe shock to the Admiralty to find Cruiser Force C, one of its component squadrons, suddenly swept off the board. On Sept. 22, while patrolling at 10 knots off the Dutch coast, the " Cressy," " Hogue " and " Aboukir " were torpedoed between 6:25 and 7:30 A.M. by Ug, and disappeared beneath the waves with a loss of 60 officers and some 1,400 men. This