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Karniewo switch-line crossed the Orzyc-Wengierka confluence; a little to the E. it followed the high ground of Gora Krzyzewskie, and thence, bordering a series of woods and minor valleys, it ran over the Ruz, past Mamino Nowawies and Prystan, into the woods some 5 m. N. of Ostrolenka. West of the Orzyc, the south- western portion of the Karniewo switch-line itself belonged to the same general system. On this Karniewo-Prystan line, the Ger- man XVII., XIII. and I. Corps were engaged throughout July 17, while the XI. Corps and its western neighbours felt their way southwestward towards Pultusk. Particularly stubborn was the resistance on the Gora Krzyzewskie and at Karniewo. But in the evening the 35th and 36th Divs. broke through the less strongly held line W. of the Orzyc, and crossed that river behind the Russian lines, reaching Makow and threatening the Gora Krzyzewskie in flank and rear. At night, therefore, and in the morning of July i8th, the defenders evacuated the whole of these positions as far E. as the Ruz and fell back into the Pultusk and Rozhan bridgeheads and behind the river between and on both sides of these places. East of the Ruz, in front of the German I. Corps, the Russians held on for yet another day, retiring only on the night of July 18-19.

The Narew itself, at that season, was generally shallow, and fords could be found at most points. Moreover, the water- meadows and marshes were sufficiently dry to allow of infantry passing over them by selected tracks. In general, the defenders' bank dominates the other above Rozhan, while the reverse is the case at Rozhan and from Gnojno, a few miles above Pultusk, downwards. Between these points lies a great marsh basin, called on the defenders' side the Bagno Pulwy, and through this basin the Narew runs in a large bend. The policy of the defence was generally governed by these topographical considerations: at Rozhan and Pultusk resistance in the bridgeheads of the right bank; above Rozhan, passive defence behind the river itself; and below Pultusk active counter-attack defence in advance of it, based upon the fortifications of Zegrze-Serock and Novogeor- gievsk. In the basin of Bagno Pulwy the river was tactically neutral; crossing was not difficult either in attack or in counter- attack, but the absence of good communications made it useless for the Germans to force the passage here without at the same time mastering either Pultusk or Rozhan or both. General von Gallwitz decided that the XI. Corps reinforced (38th, 86th, 5oth Res. and ist Guard Res. Divs.) should storm the Pultusk bridgehead from the N. and N.W.; the XVII. Corps (35th and 36th Divs.) force the Narew between Pultusk and Rozhan at a point as near as possible to the former (substantially, in the region of Gnojno); the XIII. Corps (26th, 3rd and 4th Guard Divs.) storm Rozhan; the I. Corps press the remaining enemy rearguards back to the Ostrolenka portion of the river, and force the passage below Ostrolenka with the aid of a newly arrived division (83rd) which was assigned to it.

Meantime the weak VIII. Army (von Scholtz), starting from the positions about Lipniki and Kolno, facing Novogrod and Lomzha, in which the spring fighting of that front had died away, had conformed to the advance of the I. Corps, and by July 19 had pushed its immediate opponents behind the Narew and into Lomzha. The details of Scholtz's operations fall outside the scope of this article, and it will suffice to say that its " sympa- thetic " offensives followed the main attack of Gallwitz, stage by stage, up to and over the Narew, culminating in the passage of the river on July 26 near the Skwa mouth and on Aug. 2 between Novogrod and Lomzha.

More important than this cooperation on the E. side was the protection of the southwestern flank of the forces attacking Pultusk against the highly probable counter-attacks emerging from Zegrze-Serock. This duty was assigned to the XVII. Res. Corps, 1 the advance of which on July 16-17 had conformed to that of the XI. Corps' right wing. But since the first reconnaissances had shown the defences of Pultusk to be too strong to be taken at a rush, the XVII. Res. Corps (85th Div. and Pfeil's Bde.) was brought somewhat more to the E. and included in the attack-

1 Dickhuth's Corps was now drawn off to take part in the siege of Novogeorgievsk.

group to strengthen it. Only Pfeil's Bde. remained, facing S. as flank-guard.

During July 19 and on the morning of July 20, the heavy artillery was brought up, with its ammunition, over the sandy roads from Przasnysz, and the super-heavy artillery now assigned to von Gallwitz, even from railheads in East Prussia.

Meantime reconnaissances were pressed, and artillery regis- trations carried out, both before Pultusk and before Rozhan, and the XVII. Corps advanced into the southern part of the marsh- basin between the two. At Rozhan, on the morning of July 20, a sudden local attack by part of the German 26th Div. carried a salient on the S. front. But before this gain could be exploited, sharp Russian counter-attacks began without warning at several points between Rozhan and Pultusk. At the same time von Gallwitz's headquarters learned that large masses of Russians were arriving below Pultusk, with the evident intention of coun- ter-attacking from the region of Zegrze. Gallwitz at once cancelled his preparations for the storming of the bridgeheads and began a rapid regrouping.

The Russian attack was especially heavy from Rozhan and from Dzbondz, just below that place, where the German forces consisted only of a liaison detachment that stretched across the marshes to join the XIII. and XVII. Corps. Weaker Russian forces crossed the Narew on the front of the latter, and sorties were made from Pultusk against the 5oth Res. Div. and ist Guard Res. Division. The danger S. of Rozhan was met by withdrawing the 36th Div. to bar frontally, and the 35th Div. t attack in flank, the Russian force which had crossed at Dzbondz. At the other points of contact the Russians were repulsed, and eventually the Dzbondz column also was forced to retire over the Narew. But Gallwitz, on the evening of July 20, judged it prudent to take the XVII. Corps out of the Narew bend, and t create a reserve group consisting of the 38th Div., a mixed Guard Cav. Bde. newly arrived, and the 8sth Div. of the XVII. Res. Corps on his right, behind Pfeil's screen. The situation was indeed serious for the German projects, for the Russians were fighting under better conditions than they had had W. of the Narew or could expect E. of it. A battle on the Narew line would not compel the Russian Command to send thither those large forces which it was the primary object of the German scheme to divert from Mackensen's front. Moreover, if Gallwitz were definitely brought to a standstill on the Narew line, the Warsaw- Ivangorod stretch of the Vistula might still he held by the Russian front, without the necessity of further retreat.

The Russian Command had, however, already resolved, owing to losses and to shortage of arms and ammunition, to retire to the short line Kovno-Grodno-Brest; and all resistance, however fierce, in front of that line was intended only to secure time and space for evacuations. The counter-strokes in the Narew bend, therefore, were not continued after the repulse of July 20, and those S. and S.S.W. of Pultusk were not yet mature. Nevertheless, the gain to the Russians was considerable. Caution, and a delay of two to three days in the attack on the bridgeheads, had been imposed on the Germans, who were only able to begin the attack on Pultusk, Rozhan, and the river ten days after launching the attack on Przasnysz an average progress of no more than 2-25 m. a day. Even before the period of great counter-strokes had arrived on July 22 at Rozhan, and on July 23 at Pultusk, the German attacks, prepared in the manner of Namur and supported by super-heavy artillery, were launched. At that date, the group- ing of the Germans, after the re-shuffles of July 20-21, was as fol- lows: XI. and XVII. Res. Corps combined as Pliiskow's group (right to left, Pfeil's Bde., 85th Div., 86th Div., soth Div., ist Guard Res. Div.), for the attack of Pultusk; XVII. Corps (35th and 36th Divs. with 38th Div., a Guard cav. bde., in reserve) on the Narew just above Pultusk; XIII. Corps (26th Div., 3rd Div., 4th Guard Div.), investing Rozhan; I. Corps (2nd and 37th Divs. reinforced by newly arrived 8$rd Div.), above the Ruz mouth; fresh reserves (Menges's Div. and 54th Div.) detraining in rear. Pultusk (July 23-25). The defences of Pultusk bridgehead consisted of an inner line of trenches incorporating some old- pattern forts, and following generally the ridge on which the