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revolution in land warfare since 1914 had introduced new weapons of elaborate mechanism for which no department had any estab- lished precedents. When war began and efforts were made to ex- pand the army in every direction the various procurement agen- cies developed duplication of work and inconsistency in standard, and by their competitive entry into the markets increased the scarcity of goods and raised the price.

Military Organization. The inadequacy of the American military organization was recognized by the War Department as well as by critical observers on the outside, and after the out- break of the World War numerous efforts were made to induce Congress to provide more completely for national defence. The reluctance of the people to assume military burdens in time of peace and the desire of the national administration to refrain from active war preparations while pressing its policies of neutral- ity retarded the movement for preparedness. In the winter of 1915-6 there was begun a serious attempt to correct deficiencies of the existing system, with the result that Acts of 1916 changed the basis of army, navy and civic cooperation for war. The National Defense Act (June 3 1916) and the Naval Appropriation Act (Aug. 29 1916) were in harmony with earlier American poli- cies. The former left the army to be raised after entry into war, though providing in its officers' training camps a better means for training line officers than had prevailed in earlier wars, while the latter contemplated an effective navy. A naval build- ing programme, covering a three-year period, was undertaken in the latter Act. It called for ten dreadnought battleships and six battle-cruisers; but it was not possible even to begin the construction of most of these until after 1918, and they had no effect upon the outcome of the World War.

Council of National Defense. A Council of National Defense was provided for in an Act of Aug. 29 1916, constituting a new venture for the United States, based directly upon the experience of the European belligerents with the need to organize the whole of their social and industrial strength for the prosecution of the war. In no earlier war had the national effort involved so nearly the whole national strength as in this. The forces in the field were no more completely fighting the enemy than were the merchant marine, the manufacturers of war munitions, the pro- ducing farmers, and the civic agencies that saw to the rationing of national resources and their conservation. The Council of National Defense consisted of six members of the President's Cabinet, the Secretaries of War (chairman), Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labour. It was not intended that these ministers, already burdened with the duties of executive departments, should personally undertake the task of mobiliza- tion of civic forces for war, but they were authorized to create an Advisory Commission of specialists in various fields of industrial activity who should direct the studies and coordination. As finally organized, the Advisory Commission of the Council- of National Defense consisted of Daniel Willard, railway president and chairman; Bernard M. Baruch, an expert in raw materials; Howard E. Coffin, a manufacturer of motor-cars; Hollis Godfrey, an educator; Samuel Gompers, a veteran labour leader; Franklin H. Martin, an eminent physician; and Julius Rosenwald, a prominent merchant. Walter S. Gifford, an engineer, was selected as director of the Advisory Commission, and each member was made chairman of a committee according to his specialty.

The Council of National Defense did no important work until after the breach with Germany (Feb. 3 1917); between this date and the actual outbreak of war it sat in continuous session upon the problems of the procurement agencies of the Government, and more particularly those of the army, since the needs of the navy were less in amount and simpler in scope. Its special committees brought to Washington the men acquainted with the industrial resources of the United States and the available capacity for the manufacture of war material. There had been a voluntary survey of these resources conducted by a committee of the Naval Consulting Board, which the Navy Department organized in Oct. 1915. In the committee on supplies, of which Julius Rosenwald was chairman, numerous sub-committees were created at once to sit with officers of the Quartermaster's

Produced

Shipped

Blankets Coats Drawers Undershirts Shirts Stockings Shoes Breeches and Overcoats

trou


 * ers

19,419,000 22,603,000 71,884,000 69,764,000 22,198,000 89,871,000 26,423,000 17,342,000 7,748,000

3,127,000 7,294,000 14,701,000 15,693,000 6,401,000 29,733,ooo 9,136,000 6,191,000 i ,780,000

Department of the army in the scrutiny and award of contracts. Munitions Types. A large part of the munitions needed for maintaining an army of 4,000,000 men could be produced in the United States without difficulty because the articles needed were similar to those called for in time of peace. Such articles as shoes, socks, uniforms, blankets, food and food containers, camp utensils and equipage required only the drafting of speci- fications and the speeding-up of industry to produce the requisite amounts.

CLOTHING, ETC., PRODUCED AND SHIPPED TO THE A.E.F. BETWEEN APRIL 6 1917 AND Nov. n 1918

Up to the point at which they called for more than the visible supply of raw materials they presented few problems different from those of ordinary manufacture. More difficult than these were the heavy manufactures of the material needed in transpor- tation, beginning with ships, locomotives, and rolling-stock, and including the goods to be utilized by the engineers in France and by the construction division around the cantonments and factory towns. The Engineer Corps alone handled 3,225,121 tons of supplies during the 19 months of war; 1,303 locomotives and 18,313 freight cars were shipped to France; 1,002 m. of standard- gauge railroad track were constructed there. The manufacture of these goods was difficult, not because of their novelty but because it was often impossible to assemble rapidly the machin- ery with which to make them, and to build the new plants in which to construct them. In a war lasting only 19 months many of the preliminary processes could not be completed, nor quantity production be reached. Most difficult of all was the problem of manufacture of delicate or heavy ordnance, siege guns, field artillery, machine-guns, rifles, aircraft, tanks and motor trans- port, in which quantity production depended upon slow and painstaking preparation of the preliminary processes, upon the supply of labour and raw materials, and upon the wise selection of designs and types to be manufactured.

Considerable experience in the manufacture of ordnance and other munitions had been gained by private firms during the period of American neutrality through the fulfilment of contracts placed in the United States by the Allied belligerents. In April 1917 every shipyard had its ways filled with vessels on foreign order. Most of the private capacity to make explosives, rifles, machine-guns and cannon was similarly in use. The experience thus gained was an asset for the United States, but its value was limited by the fact that few of these resources could be diverted to the supply of American armies without endangering the supply of Allied armies already on the firing-line in the common cause.

General Munitions Board. The evolution of the American equivalent of a munitions ministry begins in Howard E. Coffin's committee of the Advisory Commission of the Council of Nation- al Defense. Here it was early learned that new factories must be erected for the construction of guns, aircraft, and other mu- nitions of the elaborate type, and that a preliminary determina- tion of standards must precede this in order that the types put into production should be as few in number and as useful as possible. On March 20 1917, the Munitions Standards Board came into existence to advance this work as a sub-committee of the Council of National Defense. Frank A. Scott, a Cleveland engineer, was chairman of this board, and directed its study of requirements with a view to standardization. Within a few days it was learned that the Board must do either more, or nothing, since unless it could get preliminary statements of the needs of the army and navy its work was fruitless. On April 9 it was reorganized as the General Munitions Board, because,