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TABLE VII. Numbers Employed in Government Establishments and on Government Work in the Metal and Chemical Trades.

Males

Females

Total

Percentage to total numbers employed in the metal and chemical trades and in all Government establishments.

Males

Females

Total

April 1915

July 1915 i

July 1916 July 1917 July 1918

1,009,000 1,397,000 1,752,000 1,923,000 2,046,000

78,000 136,000 375,ooo 707,000 825,000

1,087,000 1,533-000 2,127,000 2,630,000 2,871,000

55-9 74-0 84-0 88-0 91-2

33'5 52-8 70-8 84-4 89-4

53-4 71-6 81-4 86-8 90-7

assumed more of this burden, amounted to from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 tons of iron and steel a year to France and 250,000 tons to Italy. Great Britain also kept France and Italy supplied with benzol, and Italy with T.N.T., picric acid and other explo- sives. As regards finished munitions there was a certain amount of interchange, Great Britain receiving aero-engines and some anti-aircraft guns from France and motor-cars from Italy, and supplying heavy artillery and ammunition, incendiary and other special small-arms cartridges for use in aeroplanes, and machine- guns. British assistance to Russia took the form almost entirely of finished products, including machinery.

The Last Stage. Under Lord Invcrforth, as Minister from Jan. 1919 to March 1921, the last stage was reached. Prior to the Armistice the Demobilization Committee had considered plans for dealing with the situation that would arise when the " cease fire " sounded, and the army in France would suddenly find itself unable to deal with the inflowing tide of munitions. The most difficult problem was to dispose of the daily production of explosives and filled shell from the filling factories. When the Armistice actually arrived immediate orders were given to stop work in these two classes of factories. Some latitude was allowed in the engineering shops, but, as arrangements had been made for paying benefit to men out of work, the rights of the Ministry under the Break Clauses were soon put into operation. Production, in fact, ceased partly owing to the sudden loss of purpose in munition work and the unwillingness both on the part of the workpeople and of employers to continue making what were obviously useless articles. In the steel works, man- agers were loth to put material into articles which would clearly have to be put back into the furnaces, and everyone was anxious to get on to peace work. The Finance and Contracts departments did their utmost to come to friendly agreements with con- tractors in regard to cancellation, and every effort was made to clear the munition material from the shops.

A similar policy of encouraging a rapid return to peace con- ditions was adopted in regard to the raw materials controlled by the Ministry. Restrictions on importation and on purchase of steel were rapidly removed, and even where large stocks were held by the Government, control over the market was rapidly relaxed. In order that the metal and chemical markets should know how they stood, the stocks in Government hands were published, and in as many cases as possible bargains were made with trade organizations to take over and dispose of these surpluses, which in several cases amounted to two or three years' supply for peace purposes.

It was at first anticipated that the State would have to place substantial orders to enable industry to start, and large orders in particular were anticipated in connexion with the Govern- ment's housing scheme. The Cabinet therefore decided that the plan already discussed for converting the Ministry of Muni- tions into a Ministry of Supply, which should deal with pur- chases of all kinds for every department of State, including the Post Office, Office of Works, Admiralty, War Office and the Air Ministry, etc., should be carried into effect. The anticipation that large orders would have to be placed was, however, not ful- filled, and as the need for drastic economy in Government ex- penditure was slowly realized the scheme was dropped.

Immediately after the Armistice the labour department of the Ministry of Munitions was transferred to the Ministry of Labour, and the design department reverted to the War Office. The Ministry was thus left with two great tasks, that of closing up the accounts of the war and that of disposing of

the enormous war stores in the hands of the Government. The surplus stores in Great Britain of the fighting departments were transferred to the charge of the Ministry, as well as the large stocks held abroad. At the end of the financial year 1920-1 these remaining duties were transferred to a liquidation and disposals commission under the direct supervision of the Treasury, and the Ministry of Munitions as a separate entity ceased to exist. (H. I. H. L.; W. T. L.)

II. UNITED STATES

No accumulation of war materials in excess of the amounts required for the regular army, which numbered 127,588 on April 6 1917, was made by the United States in anticipation of entry into the World War; and the Director of Munitions, Benedict Crowell, subsequently stated that there were no plans in the War Department for the " necessary mobilization of industry and production of munitions, which proved to be the most difficult phase of the actual preparation for war " (America's Munitions, p. 18). After the declaration, all of the forces of Government, supplemented by voluntary endeavour of citizens, were turned towards the recruiting and supplying of the national army, which 19 months later (Nov. n 1918) numbered 3, 757, 624, of whom 2,086,000 had been transported to France.

WAR OPERATIONS OF AMERICANS 1917-8

Men in France fighting 1,400,000

Men in France behind lines 600,000

Men in army in United States 1,700,000

Men in navy 550,000

Men in war work 7,150,000

Women in war work 2,250,000

Men and women not in war work 44,350,000

Aged and children 47,000,000

Total 105,000,000

The total number of American troops placed in the field was larger than could have been equipped with material of American manufacture; the speed in recruiting was made possible by the fact that the great European Allies had in 1917 reached, if not passed, their maximum man-power in the field, whereas their power to produce munitions was unimpaired and growing. They were able to guarantee their surplus for the use of American troops and thus ensure an earlier and more numerous American participation upon the firing line. American divisions were there- fore assembled rapidly, even though they were ahead of the munitions programme. The war came to an end before many of the elements in this programme of procurement were expected to be ready in sufficient supply. Many items would have con- tinued to be procured abroad regardless of the length of the war, for the double purpose of saving ocean tonnage and giving profit- able occupation to Allied civilian workers. Some items ' were delayed by faulty estimates or mistakes at home.

Procurement in Time of Peace. The pre-war agencies for the procurement of munitions in the United States were shaped by the needs of small and permanent armed forces. In the Navy Department there was an old-established system of bureaux in which the needs were estimated and the supplies procured so smoothly that the only requirement of war was to enlarge the personnel of existing offices. In the War Department there was no central system of purchases; in the lack of one, each bureau bought independently for itself, the most important of the purchasers being the quartermaster-general, the chief signal officer, the surgeon-general, the chief of ordnance and the chief of engineers. Each of these departments had its own system of specifications and rules of purchase. Moreover, the