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successes of the cavalry were in fact most of them gained by mounted attacks against a dismounted enemy. Dismounted attacks usually either failed or took so long to organize and carry through that the mobility of the force was to a very large extent nullified. The advantage of a mounted attack is so great from the point of view of a quick decision that it would be justified even if it were more expensive in life than a dismounted attack. But such is not the case. The fact is that for attack cavalry are useless, either mounted or dismounted, unless the enemy is very much inferior or demoralized, and that wherever a dismounted attack will succeed, a mounted attack will also get home much more quickly and at smaller cost. The only exception to this is in the case of ground which is impassable for horses but passable for men on foot. The speed of the mounted charge more than compensates for the size of the target which it presents; but its comparatively low vulnerability, given ground in any way suitable, is due not so much to this fact as to considerations of moral. By the exhilaration of the gallop, and the instinctive feeling of superiority of the mounted man over the man on his feet, the attacker is steeled in his determination to come to close quarters. The defender, on the other hand, already conscious of an inferiority in numbers or moral, or both, is impressed by the novel sight of several waves of horsemen galloping towards him well opened out, and offering no very satisfactory target. He exaggerates the pace at which they are approaching him and opens fire too soon. At the very moment when they are coming close enough to be really vulnerable, perturbed by the small amount of impression which he has hitherto made on them, he becomes flustered, fails to take deliberate aim, and even forgets to alter his sights. Thus it happens that a mounted charge often achieves the apparently impossible, by which means the most decisive successes in war have always been won.

Shock action therefore is by no means a thing of the past, and mounted troops must carry some arm which they can use while still on their horses. The only sound exception to this rule is in the case of non-regular troops, for the training of whom in mounted action there has been insufficient time. In other words, mounted infantry or mounted rifles should be looked upon as imperfectly developed cavalry, to be evolved into the fully trained article as soon as time allows of it. Now, in the hands of an expert, the most efficient arm for mounted use is undoubtedly the pistol; but in the hands of an insufficiently trained man it is nearly as dangerous to friend as to foe; and the time necessary to produce an expert, or even a safe, shot with a pistol from the back of a horse is such as to be prohibitive, even for regular troops. There remains the shock weapon or arme blanche, of which the three possible forms are the sword, the lance, and the short lance or hogspear. The sword is the least efficient against a dismounted enemy, but its use is more easily taught than that of the lance. The lance, both materially and morally, has more effect than the other two, but is very conspicuous and heavier. The hogspear is nearly as effective against a dismounted enemy as the ordinary lance, is easily carried, and its use soon learnt. Certain difficulties exist, how- ever, in connexion with withdrawing it after the thrust. If these could be got over it would be the best weapon of the three.

The principles of shock action are as follows: (i) In all cases the maximum amount of fire support should be given by artillery and automatic weapons. This fire, which should take the form of a sudden burst of extreme intensity, must be continued up to the last possible moment before the collision, and should there- fore usually be delivered from a direction different to that of the charge. (2) Some automatic weapons must follow close behind the charge, to pursue by fire and consolidate the ground gained. (3) Since disorganization is quite inevitable as the result of a charge, a reserve must be kept in hand. (4) In the attack of a mounted enemy, weight is the chief consideration. The charge should therefore be delivered without a moment's hesitation, at full speed, in serried ranks, and, if it can be done without delay, down hill. (5) In the attack of a dismounted enemy, moral effect and avoidance of formations vulnerable to fire must be aimed at. Now the sight of a number of successive

lines approaching him impresses the dismounted man more than speed or mere numbers on a broad front. The charge should therefore be delivered in depth, well opened out, and not neces- sarily at a very great pace. (6) Mounted men are particularly vulnerable to enfilade or oblique fire. Consequently, while depth is the more important consideration, the whole of the enemy's front should be attacked, or, if that is not possible, the heads of the defenders on the part not attacked must be kept down by supporting fire from artillery and machine-guns.

Though a mounted is distinctly preferable to a dismounted attack, it will often happen that the approach to the enemy lies over ground which is impracticable to horses, or that he is sheltering behind an impassable obstacle. Recourse must then be had to the rifle. The typical cavalry dismounted attack consists in utilizing the mobility of the horse to gain a position on the enemy's flank whence he can be devastated by fire. Sur- prise plays a very important part in such an operation. The cavalry man, moving rapidly, can more easily achieve surprise than the foot soldier; moreover, he can, if his attack fails, break off and try elsewhere, an advantage which is denied to the infantry man, with his more limited range of action. The necessity of keeping the enemy engaged frontally while at the same time turning his flank usually entails a wide extension of the force; the maximum number of rifles is put in the firing line from the outset, and small reserves only are retained. The advance is made mounted up to the last possible moment, and the led horses are kept well forward with a view to a further outflanking movement or a pursuit. The immediate objective of the operation is a fire position. For a purpose such as block- ing the retreat of an enemy by bringing fire to bear on a defile these tactics are eminently suitable; but it is doubtful whether they will often be successful in other situations. In modern warfare flanks are hard to find and are seldom left unprotected; the operation therefore usually becomes a frontal attack. Indi- rect artillery fire and aeroplane observation have greatly increased the vulnerability of led horses, and in practice it usually takes cold steel, or the threat of it, to compel the retreat or surrender of the enemy. For the attackers to succeed mounted, consid- erable superiority is necessary; for a dismounted attack still greater ascendency is required.

In the World War cavalry were often unable to turn the enemy's flank and found themselves committed to a frontal attack dismounted. It was clear that such a situation demanded the assumption for the moment of infantry tactics. Led horses had to be left some way behind; dispositions had to be made in depth with adequate supports and reserves; artillery and machine-gun bombardments had to be arranged for and the attack driven home with the object, not of gaining a fire position only, but of assaulting the enemy. In the future tanks will, when they are available, free the cavalry from carrying out this kind of operation, for which the latter are not well suited by reason of their small fighting strength when dismounted. Still, tanks may not always be present or able to act, and cavalry must know how to attack dismounted in depth.

This kind of attack is of course valueless without the bayonet, which is also required for use defensively in trenches, and for night attacks dismounted. 1 Cavalry may often be called upon in the future for such tasks. It would not seem to be beyond the limits of human ingenuity to devise a short lance, made in two pieces, which could also be fixed to the rifle as a bayonet.

The tactics of cavalry in defence consist in making full use of their mobility to compensate for their weakness in fire strength. Their mobility gives them over infantry the following advan- tages: (i) They can counter-attack more rapidly, therefore with more chance of effecting surprise; (2) they can move more quickly to reinforce threatened portions of the line; (3) they can retire more easily to a second position. It follows that they can be pushed out to a greater distance, and can hold a longer front than the equivalent number of infantry. The value of

1 An example of the latter is the successful counter-attack made by the British I2th Lancers, in company with two infantry battal- ions, at Wytschaete during the first battle of Ypres.