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Rh in Europe than the British cavalry. The German cavalry gave the impression of having lost their confidence in the arme blanche without having become fully proficient in the tactics of the dismounted attack. The French and Austrian cavalry, on the other hand, probably still relied too much on the arme blanche.

At the outbreak of the World War the theory of the employ- ment of cavalry was governed by the following broad principles, (i) Before the battle, cavalry locate the enemy by reconnais- sance, screen their own infantry from the enemy's observation, and protect them from interference while marching to the battle- field. (2) During the battle they are posted far out, protecting the flanks; act as a mobile reserve, ready to move quickly to fill a gap in the line or confirm a success; and occasionally inter- vene in the conflict by attacking the enemy on an unprotected flank. (3) After a successful battle they pursue the retreating enemy, effecting captures and preventing him from recovering himself, or, if they are unable to do these things, providing early information of his dispositions in the next line which he takes up. (4) After an unsuccessful battle they cover the retire- ment of the infantry, giving them time to recover their moral and to reach the next position which they mean to hold.

In order to provide for the above duties cavalry were formed into three groups: (i) Independent, for long-distance recon- naissance and for other missions in which cavalry might be employed independently of the rest of the army; (2) Protective, for the duty of screening the main infantry columns; (3) Corps or Divisional, for minor reconnaissances, and for intercommuni- cation and orderly duties inside the infantry columns.

These groups were intended to be elastic in their composition, and it was correctly foreseen that the requirements of different phases of the campaign or action would often necessitate one group being reinforced at the expense of another. While it was realized that infantry commanders must have some mounted men for their own immediate needs, it was a principle that the minimum number should be allotted to group (3), the bulk being kept as independent or protective cavalry. The reason under- lying the division into the two last-named groups was the advisa- bility of separating reconnaissance from protection.

It may be affirmed at once that the above subdivision of cavalry duties still held good in 1921, and that the separation of the duties of reconnaissance and protection is a principle which should underlie the employment of all cavalry bodies.

A reconnoitring detachment, having been asked certain ques- tions, should be free to move in any direction in order to find the answers; moreover, touch with the enemy, once it has been established, should not be relinquished. Protection, on the other hand, entails the detachment regulating its movements to some extent by those of the force which it covers. It follows that, if one detachment is entrusted with a role which includes both these duties, the efficient performance of one or the other of them is likely to suffer.

Cavalry in the World War. If the events of the World War in the various theatres are studied, and if it is remembered that the whole of the campaign in Flanders and northern France, as well as much of those in Russia and Italy, was really one huge battle with flanks non-existent, it will be found that cavalry were constantly called upon to fulfil each and all of the roles mentioned above. For instance, during the advance into Belgium before the battle of Mons, the British cavalry moved well in advance of the infantry. The latter were thus enabled to reach their battle positions unmolested, and without the extra fatigue of having to deploy for a fight; the cavalry mean- while had numerous minor skirmishes with the German cavalry, who were fulfilling a similar role, but were unable to penetrate the British screen. 1 The plans for the battle of Beersheba in 1917 and those for the final advance in Mesopotamia in 1918 were based very largely on the result of cavalry reconnaissance, in spite of the fact that air reconnaissance had by this time made great strides.

1 It seems, indeed, probable that when von Kluck issued his orders for the battle of Mons he was very much in the dark as to the position of the British left flank.

As regards participation in the actual battle, at Mons and Le Cateau the bulk of the British cavalry were posted to the west of the infantry, where they were able to frustrate the German efforts at outflanking. After the fall of Beersheba too, while Sir Philip Chetwode's infantry were wheeling to their left in preparation for the next phase of the operations against the left of the main Turkish position, the mounted troops, placed several miles away to the right, were able to protect the flank of the wheel by defeating several determined counter- attacks. Cavalry used in this way can provide ampler elbow- room for manoeuvre than less mobile troops because they can be sent with safety to greater distances.

Of the value of cavalry in battle as a mobile reserve many striking illustrations can be found in the stories of the first and second battles of Ypres and of the German offensive in 1918 on the Somme. On many occasions in these operations they relieved infantry who had been exhausted or practically annihilated by continual heavy fighting; on others, by counter-attacking or by filling a gap defensively, they reestablished the connexion between infantry formations which had draVn apart. In this respect it should be noted that, while the tactical disadvantages of a gap in the line are of course obvious, only those who have had actual war experience can realize the quite disproportionate moral effect on everyone, from the general to the private, of losing touch with the units or individuals on the right and left. Sir Douglas Haig, in his despatch dealing with the German offensive in 1918, writes as follows: " Without the assistance of mounted troops, skilfully handled and gallantly led, the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from breaking through the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded ground before the French reinforcements had had time to arrive." These words, it may be remarked, refer to a period when tanks were already present in France in fairly plentiful numbers.

It is well to remember that the value of a reserve depends chiefly upon its freshness, and that even where conditions of ground or traffic preclude cavalry, as will often be the case, from moving much faster than infantry, they will invariably arrive on the scene of action less tired. A good illustration of this occurred in the Somme battle of 1916, when two cavalry regiments were ordered to fill the gap between an infantry division which was fighting in Longueval and another which was being launched from reserve against High Wood. The infantry had to advance a few miles only, but the day was a hot one and the shelling heavy. On reaching High Wood they were so exhausted that all efforts to make them dig themselves in were unavailing. The cavalry, owing to the maze of trenches and wire, could not. move even as fast as the infantry, but they dug themselves in with such vigour that by the following morn- ing they were completely underground. Nor must it be forgotten that moral is largely a question of physical fatigue.

The most brilliant role which can be allotted to cavalry in battle is that of intervention on an unprotected flank, or on a flank so weakly protected that the cavalry find themselves in great superiority. In the war on the western front no examples occurred of this, for the simple reason that unprotected flanks of sufficient length to give mounted troops the scope they require did not exist. A possible exception is the German break-through in the spring of 1918, but by this time the bulk of the German cavalry had been dismounted. In the more open theatres of the war, however, such as Palestine and Mesopotamia, cavalry often intervened in the battle with very important results. At the action of El Mughar in Palestine in 1917 a yeomanry brigade charged successfully the flank of a position which was holding up an infantry division, and took upwards of a thousand pris- oners. Ramadi, in Mesopotamia, in the same year provides an instance of an entirely unprotected flank which enabled the cavalry to place themselves directly across the enemy's only line of retreat. The Turks, after attempting to break out through the cavalry under cover of darkness, surrendered next morning, and a force of 3,500 was thus destroyed. Examples such as these, and several more like them could be given from the cam- paigns of Mesopotamia and Palestine, show that the value of