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Rh even if perfectly regulated, would have represented ten days' marching with its accompanying difficulties and fatigues for the troops. How could the food supplies have been assured for the infantry, as it marched by night and halted by day along the route, so as to hide all movement of troops? There would be serious risks of congestion, and even complete paralysis, at those points where there must be crossings with the columns of the divisions coming up from Revigny and Bar-le-Duc. The most experienced staffs would not have been able to solve such a prob- lem. By rail 800 trains would have to be operated over lines of which one part only was capable of much traffic. At 40 trains a day the move would need 20 days: and what sort of platform would be available for embarkation? What, moreover, would become of the surprise? Besides, there was at such a moment plenty of other work for the railways. The new system now, however, consists in the movement by road with broken-up for- mations, their elements being apportioned in accordance with their capacity for movement; and the different scattered mem- bers are brought together at a concentration point. Let us look at all the conditions which such solution requires. There is, first, the presence of a solid advance guard, which at all costs prevents the enemy breaking into a system which is incapable of defence. This advanced guard, in the present case, is the " front." Secondly, there is absolute control of the traffic on the route, and a certain professional ease in the art of handling all the various elements, putting them on the road, directing them, regrouping them. In this case the necessary skill had been acquired in the development of the regulating organizations at Verdun and on the Somme, during the movements of 1917 (Italy, Peronne) and in 1918 (March, May, July). Lastly, there must be the complete confi- dence of those who are being carried, who hand themselves over bound hand and foot to their transporters. These conditions being fulfilled, the problem set out above was simplified, thanks to the existence of the two C.R.A. 's of Toul and Souilly, the for- mer having as its sphere of action the zone of departure of the American formations, the latter the zone of arrival. The director of automobile services of the French army placed a delegation at Ligny, which took under its direct orders the two regulating commissions and coordinated their action. This delegation at Ligny dealt with eight groupings of automobiles, with which they carried out the transport of the infantry by lorries.

Let us enter into details, and see what are the different operations with which the delegation at Ligny would have to deal, to organize these movements at the outset.

(1) After a rapid evaluation of the kind and quantity of the effectives to be moved motor transports of infantry, the American divisional motor convoys, teams of the horse-drawn divisional or corps artillery, motor artillery this staff sets out on the map the different current-paths in which these elements can be analyzed. In the first place, the great road Toul-Void-Ligny-Bar-le-Duc- Chaumont-sur-Aire-^Souilly-Nixeville (or Chaumont-sur-Aire-Cher- mont-en-Argonne) is reserved for transports of infantry by the French motor reserves. A current of motor artillery traffic is deflected to the S. by Gondrecourt. Lastly, two routes N. of the line Toul-Ligny-en-Barrois are reserved for horse-drawn vehicles and horse artillery. These four streams distribute simultaneously all the units of the four types, arrangements being made for the American divisional motor convoys to follow the French motor con- voys of infantry transport.

(2) This being done, arrangements are made for the orders of march of each of the elements following the four itineraries. This work involves specifying the character of the elements, their places of departure (date and hour), their points of transfer from the authority of the C.R.A. of Toul to the charge of the C.R.A. of Souilly, and their points of final destination; and all these arrange- ments when worked out are submitted for the approval of the operations branch of the American general staff, which draws up all executive orders to be sent for despatch to each unit affected. These orders are sent in duplicate by the delegation at Ligny.

(3) The picking-up of each division by its lorries necessitates the working-out and despatch, by the delegation at Ligny, of orders to the two C.R.A.'s of Toul and Souilly, also to the commanders of the various automobile formations concerned. The order prescribes the day and hour of the picking up; the address of the divisional head- quarters staff ; the billeting distribution of the division; the routes of empty movement to bring their lorries to the embarkation stations, and the routes loaded which are to bring them to their destination; the place of assembling the empty automobile units after they had unloaded; the limit of a zone within which empty movements must

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not take place after 8 A.M. ; points of liaison either by telephone or motor orderly between the delegation at Ligny and the commander of the automobile formation. In conformity with the standing orders of the directorate of motor services, this order would instruct the commander of the automobile formation to make his plan of transport in conjunction with the C.R.A. of embarkation and C.R.A. of disembarkation.

This manner of operating has the advantage that an officer of the C.R.A., perfectly familiar with his region and its road system, takes part in working out his embarkation plan; it enables the loops to be determined by which the different automobile units arriving at the different places of embarkation will assemble. It was the same for the disembarkation.

(4) The D.S.A. of Ligny, using the preliminary table of the ensemble of the movements, draws up detailed tables of the move- ments on which figure the place, the date and the hour of departure of each element, whether horse-drawn or motor; the itinerary in the American zone; the point of handing over from one to the other; the itinerary in the French zone; and the final destination. To establish these detailed tables consultation is necessary with the American staff, and also with the staff of the 2nd French Army at Laheycourt which looks after rationing and billeting areas.

(5) In the course of the movements the American operations section made certain modifications in the list of formation units which it had communicated to the delegation at Ligny. These modifications consisted either of omissions or substitutions, as in the case where one division took the place of another in the new order of battle. The desire to deal suitably with the special qualities of each American division necessitated modifications of this nature. In order to maintain the most exact order in the prescriptions con- cerning the movements, the delegation at Ligny tabulated a general summary for each day, to which was added in the course of the day a numbered series of " additions " or " alterations." The chief table and the supplementary tables were notified immediately to the two C.R.A. 's affected, who in their turn gave orders to their district chief commanders. The principle which served as an absolute guide was at all costs to make good the movements as they were ordered, in establishing as rapidly as possible the liaisons necessary, in particular with the unit in motion, to be certain of the time-table.

The difficulty of these transports and movements had been con- siderably increased by the need of secrecy to cover the operations of concentration. General Pershing, who commanded the American I. Army, had definitely ordered that no movement should be visible to the enemy observers able to fly over the American zone. In conse- quence all movements, without exception, had to be carried out at night, and it was absolutely forbidden to use any light whatsoever, be it touring-car lamp or lorry back-lights. This applied equally to movements on foot. Thus it was in complete darkness that the elements had to be put on the road, march discipline assured, cir- culation controlled and liaisons established. On Sept. 25 the con- centration was achieved as the C.-in-C. had ordered.

Combined Use of Railway and Motors. The foregoing was an example of a strategic movement carried out solely on the roads. In the majority of cases, however, use is made of railways and roads in combination. The end to be attained is always a rapid move of powerful forces; the staff should therefore make use simultaneously, and as efficiently as possible, of every means of transport which it possesses. Under what conditions will this simultaneous employment give the best results? Is it better to carry out end-to-end movements, parallel and simultaneously by railway and by roads, or, on the other hand, to make movements by railway for one part of the journey, and to prolong these movements by automobile? The question and the answer apply both to transport of troops and to the transport of materiel.

The weak point in transport by railways is not in their capacity, for this is very considerable if there are available both a double railway track and a quantity of locomotives and wagons sufficient for the full exploitation of the system. One must never lose sight of the fact that the efficiency of the railway is much superior to that of the road; a train of 50 wagons is equivalent to 1 50 lorries. At a speed of 30 km. an hour, and with 4 departures an hour, one has four trains in a length of 30 km., or the equiva- lent of 600 lorries. We have seen that 600 lorries form on the road a length of 20 to 25 kilometres. Railway and road have therefore very nearly the same output. But the lorries, going 15 km. an hour, are only half as quick. Further, at the end of 100 km. it is necessary for the lorries to stop in order to rest the drivers, for, save in exceptional cases, relief crews are out of the question,, while trains travel indefinitely without changing loco- motives. The weak point in transport by rail really lies in the necessity of having stations for embarking and for disembarking. Save in quite exceptional cases it is an absolute technical neces-