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cisely at the moment of crisis that the Higher Command will have the greatest need of regaining control of all those resources which it has imprudently dispersed, and it will be entirely unable to do so. On the other hand, if the commander has not made any special allotments, but has kept all his lorries under his immediate care, he will be able to organize the moves which he wishes to effect in accordance with the degree of urgency imposed by the operations he desires to carry out. If he thinks it well to move the formation which was taken as an example, he will allot im- _mediately ter lorries for this move, and they will return as soon as the move is completed. If the formation is not to be moved, there will not be ten lorries lying idle.

The Use and Duties of Depots. The reasons for avoiding the wastage of lorries apply likewise to avoid wastage of movements. The carrying-out of " detail " transports is the principal cause of low efficiency. In the battle of Verdun, March 1916, the supply of munitions was taken by rail to Bar-le-Duc and to Baudonvilliers. Trains of munitions arrived daily at these two stations to supply the artillery of the ten divisions deployed around Verdun, some 60 km. from the stations. If, to supply each of these divisions, there had been allotted a motor formation, which could come to load up at the stations and go as far as the batteries, bringing munitions, the efficiency would have been mediocre and uncertain. In effect each of these motor formations would have been under the constant repercussion of the events at the front and the difficulties of moving about in the front areas. An accident at a depot, an interrupted road, an advance or a check at the front, would set back the whole time-table of the formation, and one would have seen them arriving in the station for loading their lorries in twos and threes in disorder, and at different hours. The whole organization and supervision of traffic would have been impossible.

There can never be efficiency unless there is regularity of movements. It is never possible to have regularity unless the traffic of the back areas, which can be regular, is definitely sep- arated from the traffic of the front areas, which is always un- certain. How can this separation be effected? By the creation of depots depending on the lines-of-communication authorities, and supplied by them where the formations from the front areas come to refill exactly as they would refill from the railway if there were stations at these fronts. On this principle was or- ganized the transport of munitions for the army at Verdun, as well as the very considerable movements of troops which took place in these operations. The troops were disembarked at stations between Revigny and Ligny-en-Barrois, and their trans- port to Verdun, as well as that of the supplies, was carried out by the single artery formed by the road Bar-le-Duc-Verdun, which came to be known as the " Sacred Way " and formed the route gardee reserved for motors. Through a complete under- standing between the motor control at Bar-le-Duc and the rail- way control at St. Dizier, it was possible to regulate the workings of formations in such a way that the lorries were brought to the stations for loading at the same moment that the troop trains or munition trains arrived there. In continuous movement all formations, when loaded, went via Bar-le-Duc and followed the Sacred Way as far as the unloading point. They at once returned by the same Sacred Way to Bar-le-Duc, and took up their places at their own camp; and after a minimum of time for rest they left for a new town at the order of the regulating staff (" Commission regulatrice automobile," hereafter called the " C.R.A.") of Bar- le-Duc. Movement was continuous. The question of unloading or disembarking was dominated by the necessity of keeping free the route gardee. It was therefore necessary at the outset com- pletely to alter the location of the munition depots which had been placed along this route at Neippes, Lemmes and Verdun itself so as to permit of " sidings " where lorries could be placed for the duration of the unloading process, which consisted in piling up the munitions along the siding. It was necessary to open fresh munition depots more suited to these working meth- ods, and in this way came into existence the circuits of Regret and of Nixeville, about which were organized a series of lorry sta- tions with stores of materiel and supplies of every kind. On the

same principle, although at the beginning troops were disem- barked in any and every piece of road that led to the Sacred Way, either beyond Verdun or N. of Moulin-Brule, it became the rule later to build veritable " stations " for the personnel.

It was to these stations that the C.R.A. directed its movements of personnel and at these same stations troops due for relief came to embark. There also were collected casuals, leave-men and, in particular, the slightly wounded, who at fixed hours took their places in empty lorries on their return journey to Bar-le-Duc.

This situation may be summed up by saying that the employ- ment of the route Bar-le-Duc- Verdun was as strictly conducted as if it were a railway. One looks in vain for any other parallel. The intensity of movements required it, for in addition to the movements mentioned above one must add that of numbers of isolated cars and lorries, of every kind, which entered and circu- lated on the route gardee from the moment that it was given over to the motor vehicles.

III. INTENSIVE TRAFFIC ON ROADS

The Route Gardee. The command can only depend on move- ments by motor transport when they are executed with absolute punctuality and in accordance with programme: they must resemble movements by rail and be based on time-tables, just as in railway work. It is essential that breakdowns, and the resultant lagging behind scheduled times, be notified at once. For the organized employment of automobiles on the roads, like that of railway trains, the essential condition is to be master of the road. If, on a road, this or that mishap can take place without it being in someone's power to neutralize its effects, or if all and sundry are permitted to put columns of troops or vehicles on it, it is useless to attempt to carry out important movements. Con- gestions multiply, and their effect is reflected farther and farther back, leading to accidents, and increasing delay to the degree of stoppage; so that, whatever maybe the efforts of those in charge of the movement, their transport fails. It is an absolute rule, based on numerous experiences, that it is not possible to launch a big transport movement involving several hundreds of lorries without being absolutely certain of the complete freedom of the road. Nor does it suffice to be certain at any one particular moment ; it must be certain during the whole time that the move- ment will last. Hence the organization of the routes gardees, with their personnel of guards and their traffic orders.

A route gardee is not necessarily reserved exclusively for auto- mobiles, though this may be so, as with the route gardee from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. But there are other cases where one has to admit, under certain conditions, the movement of horse-trans- port. Such was the route Amiens-Bray. But in every case there must be a responsible authority, having power to give orders and have them carried out. In the French army, during the war, this authority was a motor regulating staff (C.R.A.). In the British army, the control of traffic in France was part of the duties of the Provost Marshal (A.P.M.). The organization of the route, on a railway model, is based on the " block-system." The route is divided into a series of districts, each of which is under the direc- tion of a district chief, having assistants for supervision. The district chief is in constant touch by telephone with the neigh- bouring districts, and with the office of the C.R.A.; he knows all the movements which affect his district, and also keeps a record of all movements which occur there and all the incidents of the traffic. Thus at the office of the C.R.A. it is always known what the state of the traffic may be on every route gardee, and the necessary arrangements for launching an important movement can be made in given time.

The route orders for the routes gardees are more or less drastic according to the breadth of the road, and whether or not there are relief routes. On the Verdun route, where the traffic was most intense at certain hours (one vehicle every five seconds), the narrowness of the road seven metres necessitated very strict rules: every broken-down lorry was thrown off the road; no lorry could range up alongside the preceding lorry, and so on.

The length and the importance of the districts on a route gardee depend, obviously, on special difficulties which they have to