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The loading of guns and limbers on lorries does not present any special difficulty; it is sufficient to have fixed rules for putting the materiel in place, and these are the same as the loading-rules for the same materiel on railway wagons. This is true both for heavy artillery and for artillery of small calibre. As for the horses, they accommodate themselves perfectly to this manner of transport. At the time of the different German attacks in 191 8, especially in May and July, there were on the French front enormous transportations of complete divisions which attacked as soon as they were unloaded from the lorries. The automobile almost completely takes the place of the railway, securing much quicker travelling and better surprise effect. There is always one condi- tion, that the troops thus transported can live and fight with a limited quantity of baggage, all their supplies being assured by lorries to the complete exclusion of horse transport. An example may be given from experience in 1918, when the Higher Com- mand had under consideration the possibility of obtaining a great success in Italy. A study of this move, developed in every detail, shows that, with the resources in automobiles which were then available for release from the French front, it was possible, after twelve hours' warning, to move three divisions complete with divisional artillery, machine-guns, cookers and a number of horses, equivalent to three pairs per wagon and two per gun and to transport them in seven days from the region of Chalons in France to the region of Mantua in Italy. Stages of 15 hours (including one hour for a general halt) would have had nine hours of complete rest between. Three distinct routes were pre- pared, with provision for petrol depots and workshops, guides, police, and so forth. Undoubtedly this unexpected movement of three divisions, so rapidly as to ensure secrecy, would have had a decisive influence. And it is just such possibilities that are bound to enter into the strategic conceptions of the future.

II. TRANSPORT OF MATERIEL

Lorries are not specialized for the transport of materiel. The same type is employed as for troops, and therefore the organiza- tion is similar. A lorry-group capable of moving a battalion of infantry can alternatively move 100 tons of materiel. Experience in the World War has shown that, during the periods of active operations, a division requires an average of 200 tons per day in foodstuffs and ammunition. This is equally true in the case of defensive areas, as at Verdun; in offensive actions of the type of the Somme battles in 1916; or those of July, Aug. and Sept. 1918, on the Marne. Two groups are therefore required for the supply of a division, subject to the distance from the railway being at furthest within a radius of 40 kilometres. Four groups are neces- sary if the division is 70 km. from a railway. An average of 3 hours must be reckoned for loading at the stations; with allowance for difficulties arising amid intensive operations, 7 or 8 hours are taken up on the journey and 2 hours in unloading. This gives about 13 hours for work, and leaves n hours per day for the maintenance of materiel, feeding and rest. If the traffic opera- tions are to be continued for a number of days, any more than this cannot be demanded of the personnel or of the materiel without risking excessive wastage. On the day after a journey with loads the vehicles return empty, and on the day after that they recommence the journey loaded. As 200 tons a day are required for a division there must be a double set of two groups, with a total capacity of 400 tons.

There has been much argument as to which is the more effi- cient type of lorry for the transport of materiel, the light lorry of 2 or 3 tons' capacity, or the heavy lorry of 5 tons. Before the war, military experts in all countries had a marked objection to the heavy lorry, which was gratuitously supposed to be difficult to handle on bad roads and unsuited for average military re- quirements. This opinion is now out of date. The first objection does not hold good in countries with a network of well-maintained roads, such as is found in western Europe. The second objection has equally fallen to the ground, since the greater part of trans- port work is concerned with munitions, which represent weight rather than bulk. The full load is never used in a lorry, however light, if it only carries bread; and only the employment of a

trailer allows of the maximum efficiency. Unfortunately, the employment of trailers has great inconveniences, notably in the manceuvring required for loading at stations. Systematic at- tempts have been made to find a regulation method of yoking a trailer to every 5-ton lorry when it is necessary to transport personnel, or materiel of light weight (forage or bread). These trailers have not been very satisfactory: the motor consumes more, and tires wear more; the rate of movement is slower, and any economy in drivers is an illusion.

To sum up it may be said that, for war service, lorries from 2 to 5 tons of average load are equally useful, but that it is useless, as was done before the war, to give prizes to induce constructors of lorries to design vehicles on the light side. In the organization of transport one obtains the greatest efficiency by giving a pref- erence to the light lorry for the transport of personnel and of light materiel.

Non-Specialization of Materiel. At a general mobilization, like that at the opening of the World War, the resources available for transport are necessarily limited not only by financial condi- tions, but by the number of vehicles in existence in the country capable of being requisitioned, and by the maximum production of the manufacturing firms. On the other hand, there is no limit to the requirements in lorries, because no general worthy of the name thinks he has a large-enough stock of transport at those critical times when every addition means an increase in his power of manoeuvre. During the 20 days which intervened between May 27 and June 15 1918, the lorries of the French army had to transport about 800,000 tons of foodstuffs and munitions, in order to ensure the supplies of those armies which were making headway against the German attack. And yet during this same period the French Headquarters Staff had transported by auto- mobile the infantry of 63 divisions. It was necessary also to make numerous evacuations of public records, civil populations, hos- pitals and engineer parks. This wonderful effort was only pos- sible because in the French army the principle of non-specializa- tion was adopted. Every lorry was controlled by the motor transport service of the armies, and was utilized by it foi 'tny form of transport needed. No vehicle was specially or perma- nently attached to this or that higher or lower formation. When a higher formation, such as a division, had need of transport, the automobile service arranged the transport, but as soon as it was finished the lorries employed on this service returned and were available for other transport services. In short, the lorry cap- ital never remained unproductive.

Unfortunately, the tendency of every service, and of all units subordinate to it, is always to oppose this idea of non- specialization, which ought to be the aim of the Higher Com- mand, whose interest is always to obtain the maximum return on lorry capital. In effect, each service desires to have a special allotment which becomes its own property, and calculates al- ways the value of this " indispensable " allotment by the eventual requirements the day when the work will be heaviest. But if such demands for special attachments are not very energetically resisted, capital fritters away without any profit.

Supposing that ten lorries are united to one definite forma- tion underthe pretext that it may have to make rapid moves at a considerable distance, in practice this rapid move will occur perhaps not once in a month, and in the interval the ten lorries will remain in park. During this same month those lorries in normal use would have been able, if they have a capacity of 2-5 tons and travel lookm. per day, to do more than 60,000 km. -tons of work, with allowance for overhaul. They could have moved a depot of munitions of 1,000 tons for 60 km. or have maintained the supply of bread every day for a division. It might be supposed that a wide-awake staff, having made this allotment of 10 lorries, would not let them remain idle, but would order the formation conceived to undertake such and such transport of a general kind. But such a practice is only possible in calm periods. As soon as troublesome times arise everybody is fully occupied ; the formation does not wish to lose the ten lorries which it will need and for the very purpose for which it was given them at a moment when it will not be able rapidly to replace them; and it is pre-