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Inf. Div., subsequently reenforced by the ist Landsturm Cav. Bde. It was feared that it would all too quickly reach the inner region of Transylvania, with its excellent communications. In that case it would threaten the rear of the 7 ist Inf. Div. which occupied positions on the W. bank of the Alt (Oltu) between Fogaras and Reps, and farther N.E. to Homorod and Okland, at the weak angle where the front of the I. Army from a direction W. to E. bent sharply from S. to N. Generally, too, it would deprive the covering troops of the possibility of protecting according to plan the picked attacking troops coming up to the front. The commander of the east front, Lt.-Gen. von Morgen, therefore, planned to make a surprise attack on the Rumanian IV. Army on its emergence from the Gorgeny and Hargitta mountains, using for the purpose the concentrated strength of newly arrived units. He proposed to attack either from the area N. of Szasz Regen (Reghina-Sas) southwards or from the upper course of the Great and Little Kukiillo valley in a N. E. direction, and by pressing on the Rumanian communications to prepare an annihilating defeat for them. This plan, however, was not approved in higher quarters; it was determined merely to strengthen the E. front by hurrying up the Austro-Hungarian 72nd Inf. Div., and a more active conduct of the defence was recommended. Both Supreme Army Commands adhered to the original plan of concentration and to the idea of striking first at the inactive enemy S. of Hermannstadt.

Before daybreak on Sept. 15 the Rumanian II. Army crossed the Alt between Fogaras and Reps in several columns, for the most part without bridges or river transport, and advanced farther N. from Barot, through Homorod-Okland-Draas towards Katzendorf. In order to make a mobile defence possi- ble the yist Inf. Div. had left only weak covering troops (about 3,000 rifles) on the 6o-km. front, placing the main force in readi- ness in the district Petek-Mehburg. The weak defence naturally had to give ground before the far superior weight of the Ruma- nian attacking columns. But in the afternoon the main force of the div. made a surprise attack, advancing southwards through Palos and struck the 6th Inf. Div., marching as the most north- erly column of the II. Army, in flank and rear. The surprise and confusion of the Rumanians were so great that the II. Army, which had only just crossed the Alt, ceased to advance, and remained inactive for a week.

The Rumanian IV. Army, on the other hand, continued to advance steadily, thereby compelling the command of the I. Army to support the Landsturm Cav. Bde. by 4 newly formed Bosno-Herzegovinian inf. batts., which really belonged to the unit of the yist Inf. Div. In addition the 39th Honved Inf. Div., N.E. of Maros Vasarhely, was pushed up to the front; the 8gth Inf. Div. was advanced to Maros Vasarhely, and an inf. bde. of the 37th Honved Inf. Div., coming up without artillery, was placed in readiness at Teke, N.W. of Szasz Regen. The newly arrived Austro-Hungarian VI. Corps Command took over the command of the N. wing (72nd Inf. Div., half the 6ist Inf. Div. and half the 37th Honved Inf. Div.), while the I. Res. Corps Command retained command of the Landsturm Hussar Bde., the 39th Honved Inf. Div., the 7ist Inf. Div., supported by the igth Mountain Bde. of the 6ist Inf. Div., and the 8gth Inf. Division.

At the end of Sept. the IV. Rumanian Army in the N., with the reenforced i4th Div., had reached Deva in the Maros valley and Kasva in the Gorgeny valley, and with sections of the 8th Div., was already pressing at Kibed on the Kukullo position. With the reenforced 7th Div. the west of Szekely-Keresztur was reached, where the ipth Mountain Bde., already much weakened, could only defend itself with difficulty against the overwhelm- ing pressure, while the yist Inf. Div. on their left wing had def- initely to give way.

On the evening of Sept. 17 Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn, with the staff of the newly formed German IX. Army, arrived at Deva, and took over the command of Gen. von Staabs' troops, and of all the reenforcements coming into this district. His commission was, in conjunction with the I. Army, to throw the enemy out of Transylvania, and for this purpose, while masking

the Vulkan and Szurduk passes, to surround the enemy posted at Hermannstadt, with a double ring, and beat him. Gen. von Falkenhayn first ordered Lt.-Gen. Sunkel, commanding the i87th Inf. Div. in the neighbourhood of Petroseny, who was about to push the Rumanians back to the frontier passes, after reaching this line to send all the troops he could spare from his div. and the Alpine Corps towards Hermannstadt; he ordered the assembly of the i87th Inf. Div. at Reussmarkt, of the Alpine Corps at Sinna, and the disentrainment of the 76th Res. Div. at Markt-Schelken. Finding by a reconnaissance in the direction of the Roter Turm Pass that the road was practicable for moun- tain troops without wheeled transport, he decided to direct the Alpine Corps by way of Cindrelu and Prezbe towards the Roter Turm, in order to hinder the retreat of the Rumanians by this route, while the iSyth Inf. Div., the sist Honved Inf. Div., the 76th Res. Inf. Div., and sections of the Schmettow Cav. Corps, were to attack W. and E. of Hermannstadt in the direction of the northern outlet of the pass. This was not indeed a double encirclement of the enemy, as had been ordered by the Supreme Command, for which the forces of the eastern wing, where only a few squadrons could be made available, were insufficient. It was, however, a far-reaching enveloping movement against the one passable rearward communication of the enemy, in coopera- tion with an energetic attack on the front, of which the object was to destroy the group composed of the 2nd and I3th Ruma- nian Inf. Divs., under Gen. Popovici commanding the I. Corps.

On Sept. 22 Gen. Popovici attacked, but only attained success southward of Cornaticlu against the extremely thinly held posi- tions of the 7th Cav. Bde. of the ist Div., being everywhere else completely repulsed. The expected continuation of the Rumanian attack on Sept. 23 did not take place, and it was possible to issue orders for the projected battle. By Sept. 25 the XXXIX. Res. Corps with the iSyth Inf. Div. were able to be assembled at the foot of the mountains S.W. of Hermann- stadt, the 5 ist Honved Inf. Div. to the N.W., and the 76th Res. Inf. Div. to the N.E. of the town, while the Alpine Corps was to be within a day's march of the Roter Turm Pass. The general attack in the direction of the pass was to begin on Sept. 26; the Alpine Corps was to endeavour to reach the E. side of the pass in order there also to block the bridle-tracks leading over the mountains. The Schmettow Cav. Corps might, in the event of further pressure by the enemy, give way with its right wing, but with its centre on the Alt and its left wing towards Fogaras it was to hold its ground obstinately, and, in addition, if the opera- tions proceeded according to plan, to arrange to push forward from the N.E. over the river towards the entrance of the pass. The I. Army Command was asked, as soon as possible, to place the 8gth Inf. Div. in readiness at Schassburg (Segesvar).

The Rumanians standing at Hermannstadt did not interfere further with the preparations for the attack; on the other hand the nth Rumanian Div. stationed at the Szurduk Pass attacked again on Sept. 25, and regained possession of Petroseny. The I44th Inf. Bde., reenforced by two German battalions and two batteries, held the heights N. of the place. The IX. Army Com- mand did not contemplate further reenforcement, but the unat- tached staff (i.e. without troops) of the German 3013! Infantry Div. was sent there, under the direction of which were placed the I44th Inf. Bde. and the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Mountain Bde., which had arrived on the 28th; and with these forces the Rumanians were again compelled to give up the extremely val- uable coal basin.

The Battle of Hermannstadt (Nagy Szeben). On Sept. 26, favoured by beautiful autumn weather, the attack began, and it continued with undiminished violence against the obstinate defence of the Rumanians until the evening of Sept. 28. It ran, on the whole, the course intended by Gen. Falkenhayn.

The Alpine Corps had already reached Roter Turm, Riu Vadulin and Caneni with their advanced troops on the road to the pass, early in the forenoon of Sept. 26. The Rumanians indeed now thoroughly realized the magnitude of the danger which threatened them, and delivered the most violent counter- attacks from N. and S. against the detachments of the Alpine