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Rh confidence. The effect in Afghanistan of the Anglo-Russian Convention signed on Aug. 31 of the same year was not of a similarly happy nature. Articles III. and IV. of the Convention, which provided respectively for the establishment of direct relations between Russian and Afghan frontier authorities and the maintenance of equality of commercial opportunity for British (and British-Indian) and Russian trade and traders, were interpreted by the Afghans as an attempt to interfere with the economic autonomy and political independence of their country. Article V. laid down that the Convention would only come into force on the notification of the Amir's consent to its terms. This consent, though repeatedly pressed for, was never given by the Amir.

From 1908 to 1914 the history of Afghanistan remained peace- ful and uneventful, and was chiefly remarkable for the gradual introduction into the country of measures of civil, economic and military reform.

Influenced by what he had observed in India, steps were taken by the Amir to open schools, increase facilities for the education of the upper classes, establish factories, introduce telegraphs and tele- phones and to provide medical relief. The provision of improved military education and reforms in the training of the army were like- wise taken in hand. For the above purposes a number of foreigners were imported into Afghanistan, and of these the majority were Turks. It was, however, in the direction of public works that the Amir chiefly directed his energies. Great efforts were made, largely by means of forced labour, to improve the internal communications. Metalled roads were constructed between the principal local centres, and good roads, realigned and fit for motor traffic, were constructed from Kabul to Dakka and from Kabul to Kandahar. Important irrigation canals were also constructed, notably the Nahr-i-Siraj from the Helmand river near Kala Bist; from the Kabul river near Daronta; and the Panjdeh Argandab canal from the Argandab river near Kandahar.

The outbreak of war in 1911 between Italy and Turkey created, as might be expected, a general wave of sympathy among the Afghans for their co-religionists in Turkey, and considerable sums of money were subscribed by the general public to Turkish funds.

When in Aug. 1914 war was declared between England and Germany the Amir was immediately informed by the Govern- ment of India and asked to maintain the strict neutrality of Afghanistan, and to this he gave a solemn assurance on the understanding that the safety and independence of Afghanistan were not interfered with.

On the entry of Turkey in Nov. 1914 into the war on the side of Germany, the Government of India, in communicating the event to the Amir, laid stress on the non-religious nature of the struggle, and brought to his knowledge the terms of a proclamation issued by the British Government pledging immunity from attack of the Holy Places of Arabia. The intervention of Turkey under German in- fluence could not fail to place the Amir in a very difficult position. Public feeling in Afghanistan was profoundly stirred by this event, and the trend of popular feeling under other conditions of rulership might have led to far different results had not the Amir Habibulla Khan, faithful to his pledge, maintained throughout the long years of the war an attitude of strict and correct neutrality and enforced it upon his country, notwithstanding many temptations and induce- ments both from within and without his country. Within Afghanis- tan the voice of religious bigotry and fanaticism was loudly raised on the side of Turkey, while the opportunists proclaimed against the folly of not taking advantage of so favourable a moment for suc- cessful aggression.

More seductive still were temptations from outside. Chief among them were the persuasions of an important mission which the German Government despatched towards Afghanistan in the spring of 1915. The party were selected to comprise such elements as would be likely to appeal to Afghan sentiment Indian sedition- ists were, both Mohammedan and Hindu, together with German and Turkish officers. The mission bore letters from the German chancellor, and were charged to make important revelations regarding possible future relations between Afghanistan, Germany, Austria and Tur- key. The mission reached Kabul through Persia towards the end of 1915, and were dismissed in May 1916, without effecting their purpose.

The continuous and unwavering loyalty of Amir Habibulla Khan to his pledges to the British Government throughout the changing vicissitudes of the World War forms one of the most remarkable in- cidents of that eventful period. He not only maintained throughout the strictest neutrality of his country but successfully used his influence to preserve peace among the unruly tribes on the frontier, thereby diminishing demands on the depleted garrison of India.

With the Armistice of Nov. 1918 the World War came to an end, but Afghanistan was not long to enjoy the benefit of peace.

At 3 A.M. on Feb. 20 1919 Amir Habibulla Khan was shot in his bed in his tent at Kala Gosh while touring in the district of Lamaghan. His brother Nasrulla Khan, then at Jalalabad, at once proclaimed himself Amir of Afghanistan in his stead. Prince Amanulla Khan, the third son of the late Amir by his principal wife, the Ulya Hazrat, who was then residing at Kabul as gover- nor, was simultaneously proclaimed Amir by the people of all classes at the capital. His uncle Nasrulla Khan at once abdicated in his favour, and his elder brothers, Inayatulla Khan and Haya- tulla Khan, and other members of the royal family, acknowl- edged his succession to the throne. The facts relating to the mur- der of Habibulla Khan have never been made known. Nasrulla Khan was charged with complicity and sentenced to imprison- ment for life. In a letter dated March 3 1919 to the Govern- ment of India, Amanulla Khan announced his accession with protestations of friendship to the British Government. Mischie- vous and unfriendly influences however, so long kept in check by the wise, restraining hand of Amir Habibulla Khan, soon began to display themselves. In April the new Amir proclaimed the independence external as well as internal of Afghanistan. In the same month a mission under Gen. Wali Mohammed Khan was despatched to Moscow to institute relations with the new Soviet Government. Grossly exaggerated and unfounded reports of rebellions in India and of British tyranny in India and Meso- potamia were spread broadcast by official agency throughout the country and frontier tribes, and exhortation was addressed to all to be prepared for a call to arms. This was quickly followed by the proclamation of a jihad (holy war) and the cupidity of the credulous Afghan people and frontier tribes was aroused by promise of an easy conquest of India.

Early in May information accumulated to the effect that the plan of operations decided upon by the Afghan Government was to attack simultaneously on three fronts under separate generals through Dakka, Khost and Baluchistan, by hordes of Ghazis (reli- gious fanatics) supported by regular troops. Prompt measures were accordingly taken to reenforce British forces on the Indian frontier.

The arrival of Afghan troops at the western end of the Khyber was reported on May 3, and active hostilities opened on May 8 by the occupation by Afghan regular troops of the heights commanding Landi Kotal. From there they were immediately expelled, and the British force in the Khyber, advancing into Afghanistan, occupied Dakka May 13. This prompt measure, and the menace it involved to the safety of Jalalabad, had an immediate and discouraging effect on the Afghan plan of operations, and was shortly followed on May 28 by the capture of the Afghan fortress of Spin Baldak which threatened the security of the southern capital of Kandahar.

In a letter dated May 28 the Amir addressed the Viceroy of India, definitely asking for peace and suggesting a cessation of hostilities. He was informed in a reply dated June 2 that an armistice would be granted on certain terms, which included the withdrawal of all Afghan troops from within 20 m. of the British front and the exercise of the Amir's influence in restrain- ing the frontier tribes from further hostilities. These terms with but slight modifications were accepted 'by the Amir in a letter of June u, in which he agreed to send delegates to India to discuss terms of peace and the reestablishment of former friendly relations between the Afghan and British Governments. These delegates duly arrived at Rawalpindi on the date appointed, July 25, and peace was formally signed on Aug. 8.

The preceding narrative of the war has only referred to the brief operations in which British troops were engaged with forces of the Afghan regular army. Open hostilities by the latter against British forces may be said to have ceased on June 3. This, however, repre- sents but a small portion of the actual fighting which took place between the outbreak of war at the beginning of May 1919 and the signing of peace in Aug. 1919. Throughout the whole of that period continuous conflict prevailed, now at one point, now at another, along the whole stretch of the north-west frontier of India from Chit- ral to Chaman. The rising of the frontier tribes failed, as such ris- ings always have failed in the past, to be simultaneous, and the ardour of many tribes received a wholesome check from the news of British successes and the capture of Dakka in the north and of Spin Baldak in the south at the outset of the war. Nevertheless the call to jihad and the cupidity aroused by specious promises of plunder, together with the encouragement and material support given by bodies small and large of Afghan regular troops interspersed along the frontier, succeeded in causing many of the great frontier tribes, Mohmand, Afridi, Wazir, Mahsud and Shiranni, to throw themselves at one time and another against whatever appeared to be weak points