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to this step had not been easy to obtain. Meanwhile the war fell practically fast asleep, as was natural. On April 4 1917 the troops under Prince Leopold of Bavaria, who had taken over the eastern front between Riga and the Carpathians from Hin- denburg in the autumn of the previous year, captured the small Russian bridgehead, Stochod, at Tobol in Polyesie, by a coup de main, on which occasion the Russians gave themselves up as prisoners in swarms. On the political circles of the Imperial Powers this action produced a most disturbing impression, and the troops were now ordered to suspend all hostilities against the Russians unless they should provoke them.

In preparing the line to be taken with regard to propaganda in the trenches, the Austro-Hungarian Government would have liked to make use of the Petrograd catch-words, " Peace with- out annexation or indemnity " and " the right of nations to self-determination." But the dominating influence of the German Supreme War Command, which was not prepared to give up its Balkan aspirations in a hurry, prevented this. Never- theless it was hoped, especially when the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils became a stronger political factor in Petro- grad in the beginning of May, that a way might be found to force Kerensky's Government to agree to an armistice and con- sent to open peace negotiations. This hope was to prove decep- tive. When at last an envoy from Prince Leopold of Bavaria succeeded in penetrating beyond the Russian trenches to Gen. Dragomirov, commander of one of the armies on the north front, he was met with an absolutely unequivocal refusal. Meanwhile, at numerous points of the front, a local truce had been declared. But in June a remarkable change was noticeable on the Russian side. Kerensky, relying on Gen. Brussilov and numerous Entente military missions, succeeded gradually in converting a considerable portion of the army to the idea of carrying on with the war to make the world " safe for democracy," and in restoring their fighting spirit.

Battles in Galicia and the Bukovina, Summer of 1917. By the end of July the Army Commands of the Central Empires had reason enough to. count upon a revival of the war in the east. Indeed, the Russian Supreme Command, apart from the concen- tration of troops at Riga, Dvinsk and Kriewo 1 in the Cour- land-Lithuania section, had assembled two powerful attack groups in East Galicia. The one, a division strong, stood N.E. of Brzezany opposite the Austro-Hungarian II. Army (Bohm- Ermolli); the other, 15 inf. and 2 cav. divs. strong, was piling itself up adjacent to the first and opposite the German Southern Army under Gen. von Bothmer. 2 These powerful attack-masses were charged to overthrow the enemy and to take Lemberg.

The Army Higher Commands of the Central Powers did not look on idly at the Russian preparations for attack.. By June 27 the German Emperor, in concert with the Austro-Hungarian General Staff and Prince Leopold of Bavaria, was ready with the order to counter-attack in case of a Russian attack in East Galicia, and to throw back the enemy beyond the frontier of the Austrian Empire. Besides the allied troops already on the spot, 5 divs. could be brought up from the west and 3 to 4 divs. from that section of the eastern front which was not threatened.

Battle of Brzezany, July 1-6. The anticipated Russian attack was launched on July i 1917 on both sides of Brzezany. The Western Powers had supplied their Russian allies with artillery, munitions and war supplies of all sorts in abundance. The battle of Brzezany lasted six days with only slight interruption. The Russians made only slight gains in fighting the German Southern Army E. and S. of Brzezany, and these were for the most part wrested from them again. N.E. of Brzezany, in the village of Koniuchy, they were more successful. Here they had brought into the fight a Czechoslovak brigade against Austrian battalions of Slavonic speech, large sections of which surrendered, with the result that the Austro-Hungarian line was driven back

1 At Kriewo the Russians actually attacked with 10 inf. divs. on July 21 and 22, forcing back the German front 2 km. deep along 4 km. of front.

Southern Army," etc., refer only to command and staff. The troops were thoroughly mixed on the whole of the eastern front.
 * The designations " Austro-Hungarian II. Army," " German

some 4 or 5 km. on a front of 10 km. On the evening of the second day of the battle, however, the Russian blow was count- ered by the German troops. Since, to the immediate N. of the battle-field and N. W. of Zborow, the first echelons of the German divs. rolling up for the counter-attack had arrived, and the Russian attack had so lost its force, Prince Leopold of Bavaria now supposed the danger to be averted.

Far more unpleasant was the effect upon the command of the heavy set-back to the Austro-Hungarian III. Army under Gen. von Tersztyanszky at Stanislau only a few days later. Here Gen. Kornilov, the ambitious commander of the Russian VIII. Army, had advanced to the attack at 7 A.M. with an attack- group thrown together anyhow. On the following day he already held in his hand the key to the enemy's position the Jutrena Gora height dominating Stanislau. Tersztyanszky hoped at first to have to withdraw the north wing only, but the Russians pushed the Austro-Hungarian regiments back so vigorously that by July n the whole of the III. Army had to be withdrawn behind the Lomnica. The town of Stryj, and the East Galician petroleum district, Drohobycz-Boryslaw, on the possession of which the continuance of the submarine war very largely depended, were in the utmost danger, and Prince Leopold of Bavaria was forced to let 3 inf. and i cav. divs. of the units rolling up for the counter-blow be diverted to the III. Army.

When the Russians again attacked at Kalisz and made prog- ress there, Prince Leopold and his chief of the General Staff, Col. Hoffmann, were confronted with the difficulty of deciding whether in the given case the counter-blow at Zborow, already being prepared, should be given up, and help sent in haste to the sore-pressed Gen. von Tersztyanszky. The Prince resolved to adhere to the original plan. He proved to be right. The attacks of Kornilov's troops lost their sting as rapidly as those delivered at Brzezany by the Russian VII. Army. Aided by German ree'n- forcements, Gen. Kritek, who relieved Tersztyanszky in the command of the III. Army, was able by the i6th to prove his troops/ newly established powers of resistance in counter- attacks at Kalisz.

Meanwhile, between the upper Sereth and the railway line between Lemberg and Tarnopol, immediately W. of Zborow, 8 inf. divs. (including the I. and II. Guard Divs.) and one combined cavalry div. were deployed for the counter-blow along 25 km. of front behind the divisions of position. The German Gen. von Eben was in command on the battle-field. The intention was on the first day to make a hole in an easterly direction in the south wing of the Russian VIII. Army which stood opposite, and then to wheel to the S.E. and grip the massed Russians of the VII. Army standing on either side of Brzezany, in the N. flank and in rear.

The Battle of Zbordw.This idea underlying the battle of Zborow (July 19-26 1917) was carried out according to plan. Early on the igth the German and Austro-Hungarian forces drove the Russians from the Zlota Gora height, N. of Zborow, under the eyes of Prince Leopold of Bavaria. Simultaneously the German Guard, reinforced by a line division, broke through the Russian front immediately S. of the Sereth. Only in places did the Russians offer resistance. Their retreat frequently degenerated into precipitate flight. While the Guard Div. in the following days drove down on Tarnopol, the divs. brought forward from the 2nd line pressed after in a S.E. direction. The Russian masses at Brzezany were soon swept into the general retreat. By the 22nd the German Southern Army was able to take up the pursuit, also from the N. wing. On the 23rd the III. Army followed S. of the Dniester, and was able on the next day, after several fights, to push out to beyond its old positions at Stanislau. On the 25th the German Guard took Tarnopol in presence of the German Emperor, and on the 26th the heights to the E. of it, thus assuring an adequate protection to the S.E. blow by the other allied forces. The S. wing of the II. Army was already beyond Trembowla, and the Southern Army beyond Buczacz. They had rapidly broken the Russian resistance.

A few days after the defeat of Zbor6w the Russian command passed out of Brussilov's hands into those of Kornilov. The