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Dniester. This he followed up a few days later, under pressure from all sides, by offering to place the Field-Marshal in command of the whole eastern front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpa- thians. For some such unity of command there was urgent need on military grounds. Indeed the proposal had received a passing consideration in Nov. 1914, when the Archduke Frederick was to have held the command with Ludendorff as his chief-of-staff. But Conrad was opposed to this solution, arguing that the Rus- sian assaults were not to be stopped by new commanders but by strong battalions, that the non-German peoples and troops of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would regard any too con- spicuous manifestation of German influence as a burdensome tutelage, and finally that in the southern section of the eastern front so many specifically Austrian interests were at stake - in particular with respect to the danger from Rumania that this section ought not to be withdrawn from the immediate influence of the Austro-Hungarian Higher Command. But, however worthy of consideration Conrad's objections may have been, it is only human to suppose that personal grievances also played their part. The solution proposed by Falkenhayn was tantamount to making a clean sweep of the Austrian General Staff from the command of the war in the east. Yet, the leader of the Austro-Hungarian army was practically alone in his opinion. Even in those Viennese circles most jealously con- cerned to uphold Austrian prestige there was a pressing demand to have the question of the command straightened out on German lines, since Conrad's leadership no longer inspired full confidence. In principle the old Emperor, Francis Joseph, agreed also. Emperor William, for his part, proposed a com- promise to his allies. Hindenburg was certainly to have supreme command from the Baltic Sea to Lemberg, by far the greater portion of the eastern front, but the southern portion on both sides of the Dniester and in the Carpathians was to be placed under the command of the Austrian heir-apparent, Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, who later became emperor. The Arch- duke had been fetched from the Italian front to take over the command of the XII. Army, and now, since this army had not come into being, was temporarily commanding a group of armies on both sides of the Dniester. To protect German interests the German Gen. von Seeckt, formerly Mackensen's chief-of-staff, would be attached to the Archduke. This solution was accepted by the Austrians and acted upon in the beginning of Aug. 1916. It was the prelude to the establishment of a Supreme War Command (Oberste Kriegsleitung) over all fronts.

The impulse to create a general supreme command of this nature, to apply to all fronts, emanated from Sofia and Con- stantinople. Germany was agreeable to the proposal, which also gained ground rapidly in Vienna's political circles, but here again it was Conrad who, in defiance of his superior commander, Archduke Frederick, sharply opposed the idea, even threatening to resign. Emperor Francis Joseph's personal intervention alone was able to overcome this opposition. On Sept. 16 1916 the agreement on the Oberste Kriegsleitung was signed in the German headquarters at Pless in Prussian Silesia. According to these arrangements, shortly after acknowledged as binding by the Bulgarian and the Imperial Ottoman Army Commands, the German Kaiser became responsible for the higher leading of operations in general without disturbing the relations between the allied sovereigns and their fighting forces. The Kaiser was assisted by the chief of the General Staff of the German armies in the field, who before every important decision was to consult the chiefs of the allied General Staffs and, as far as possible, bring them to an agreement. This done, the German chief of the General Staff would issue orders, binding on all, in the name of the Oberste Kriegsleitung. In order to meet Conrad's partic- ular misgiving the German Kaiser bound himself, in a special supplementary note which was kept secret from Sofia and Con- stantinople, that the integrity of Austria-Hungary should be as carefully protected as that of Germany.

The institution of the Oberste Kriegsleitung was undoubtedly an advance on the method of dealing with each case as it arose, which had been practised since the beginning of the war. But

the undertaking, set on foot with such difficulty, still lacked one thing to complete it the creation of a common political and domestic policy. This was never achieved. On the contrary, the forces involved in these matters fell farther and farther apart the longer the war lasted, particularly after the change of Government in Austria-Hungary. To make matters worse, when the young Emperor Charles took over the Austro-Hunga- rian command, alterations were made in the most important parts of the agreement in consideration of his position as sover- eign, so that in the end the old methods employed in the first two years of the war came back into use.

The New German Supreme War Command (Oberste Kriegs- leitung). The agreement on the Supreme War Command had been signed on the part of the Germans by Field-Marshal von Hindenburg as new chief of the General Staff. On Aug. 29 1916 Falkenhayn had left the Supreme Command. It had long been only a question of when the Kaiser would be forced to yield to the storm raised by Falkenhayn's critics; the immediate cause of his dismissal was Rumania's declaration of war on Austria-Hungary on Aug. 27 1916. Up to the last hour, in spite of the well-founded warnings of Austria-Hungary, Fal- kenhayn had been unable to believe that Rumania was on the point of coming in, and had perpetually reassured the Kaiser to that effect. When the event happened the Kaiser was thunder- struck, and Falkenhayn's fall followed. The German nation and its allies greeted the new men, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, with the utmost confidence.

The first task to fall upon the new command was the organ- ization of the Rumanian campaign (see next section). Mean- while the defensive battle against Russia had to be carried on. This constantly flamed up again along the whole front from Luck to the Carpathians till the end of Oct., although the Rus- sian attacks had fallen off in strength and determination, and no more successes worth mentioning were gained by them. The relief offensive, too, which the Russians undertook between Nov. 28 and Dec. 13 1916 in the Wooded Carpathians against Kovess" and Arz's armies, to relieve Rumania, hard pressed in Wallachia, was without results and could save neither Bucharest nor Focshani. Neither did success attend the Russian surprise attack on Jan. 23 1917 on the Aa at Riga, great as were the prospects of success on the first day. The German position was indeed rushed, but the defenders' reserves, brought up in haste, restored the situation.

The enormous drain on Russia's forces in the summer, and the difficulties of her interior political situation, had sapped the marrow of her army. The armies of the Central Powers and their allies had come through their difficult crisis. As in the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916, so now they experienced a great relief in the east.

The Russian Revolution. The Austro-Hungarian chief of the General Staff, Conrad, who since Nov. n 1916 had been a field-marshal, was once more proposing to take the opportunity of attacking Italy. The attack was to begin in the spring of 1917 and was to be carried out by an equal division of Auatro-Hunga- rian and German forces. But the new German Obcrste Kriegs- leitung in the middle of Jan. rejected the plan for the time being. They relied on the ruthless submarine war, begun in Feb. 1917, to bring their enemy to his knees. Gen. von Arz, who had succeeded Conrad as chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff in March 1917, received the decision of German Head- quarters with unqualified approval. The Russian Revolution, which broke out in the middle of March, was extraordinarily favourable to the military situation of the Central Powers. It could not, of course, be seen as yet whether Russia's armies would permanently withdraw from the list of enemies, which now included America. But for the moment the crash was so enormous that it must be months before the Russian High Com- mand could consider offensive operations. The Central Powers now left nothing untried that could hasten the process of dis- organization among their enemies. This purpose was above all to be served by an extensive peace propaganda, which was to be carried to the Russian trenches though Ludendorff's consent