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tente officers were instructing Russians in the western methods of attack. Along with all this the greatest efforts were made to raise the soldiers' moral.

By March 1916 about 130 inf. divs. and 40 cav. divs. stood on the Russian front, the inf. divs. consisting of i6batts. almost double the number of the German. This did not include the draft formations standing in readiness immediately behind the fighting reserve. The rifle strength of the front might safely be estimated at 2\ millions. Her allies might well hope that Russia, in spite of her defeat in 1915, would come up to expectations in, the general offensive planned for the summer.

Battle of Lake Narocz (Naroch), March 18-29 igi6. The German attack on Verdun in Feb. 1916 brought the Russians into action earlier than was expected. Like Italy, who was now making her fifth attack on the Isonzo, the empire of the Tsar was expected to lose no time in doing its utmost for the relief of France. Russia had already transferred her centre of gravity to the area N. of the Pripet before this demand reached the Higher Command. On this section, that is, opposite the German front, were 80 out of 130 Russian divisions. Since the beginning of March Hindenburg's general staff (Kovno) had located a concentration of Russian troops at Smorgon, Dvinsk (Dtina- burg) and Jakobstadt. On the other hand, the attack of the II. Russian Army under Gen. Smirnov on both sides of the Narocz lake on March 18 took the Germans somewhat by surprise. After a preliminary bombardment, such as had not yet been seen on 1 the eastern front, this army flung itself upon the German XXI. Army Corps commanded by Gen. von Hutier. It was assumed from orders of the supreme commander of the Russian west front (Gen. Ewerth), which were captured by the Germans, that the Russians meant more by this attack than a mere relief offensive. While Gen. Litvinov's I. and Gen. Plehve's V. Armies were holding the weak German forces occupying the trenches at Widsy. Dvinsk, and Jakobstadt, Smirnov was to force a way through in the direction of Vilna-Kovno and then to wheel northwards and so drive the German wing to the sea.

The " Narocz Offensive " led at first to considerable successes for the Russians. The attack delivered between the Narocz and Wiszniew lakes by Gen. Balujyev with 4 army corps pressed the weak German forces backwards some miles between March 18 and 21. Though the groups attacking farther to the N. were not so fortunate, the Russians might yet hope for success. Then, to the rescue of the Germans, came a sudden thaw. This, indeed, increased the difficulty of bringing up the reserves which they had scraped together so painfully, but incomparably worse was the plight of the attackers in this melting of snow and ice. Their second and culminating attack on March 26, according to the German reports, was choked literally " in mud and blood." Towards the end of March the Russian spring offensive of 1916 died away, without ever getting beyond the local success on Lake Narocz. Their losses were estimated by the Germans at 150,000 men, while the Germans sacrificed not more than 15,000.

On April 28 1916 the troops of the German X. Army under Gen. von Eichhorn snatched from the Russians the greater part of that tract of country which they had captured 'during the March battles in the confined area of Lake Narocz.

The Luck (Lutsk) Campaign, Summer of 1916. At the con- ference held on March 18 1916 the Allies had fixed July i for the opening of the great general offensive on all fronts. For this the Russian Supreme Command was now making ready. By the end of May all their preparations pointed to the proba- bility of their decisive attack again being made N. of the Pripet marshes, and again on the German front. Of the 130 Russian divs., comprising over i\ million rifles, as to which the Austro- Hungarian and the German intelligence service had accurate reports, 74 to 77 or less than two-thirds were in the northern section. On the side of the Central Powers there were at the same time on the eastern front 83^ inf. divs. and about 20 cav. divs., each cav. div. counting almost as many rifles as one regt. of inf., and often fewer. Altogether these amounted to 600,000 fighting men for the Germans and the same number for the

Austro-Hungarians. The distribution of forces was the same as in the beginning of March.

In the middle of May the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy had started, meeting at the beginning with great success. Once more the Russians were faced with the necessity of reliev- ing their hard-pressed allies, and at least preventing any further transference of Austro-Hungarian fighting forces to the Italian front. Now the preparations for the Russian attack were not yet complete. Also it was evident that active relief to the Ital- ians could only ensue from an attack, not on the German, but on the Austro-Hungarian eastern front that is, between Pinsk and the Bessarabian Pruth. The Russian Supreme Command were not easily induced to depart from their original plans or to attack prematurely before July i. In the end, however, they had to yield to the pressure of the Allies. Gen. Brussilov, supreme commander of the Russian " south-west front," with the Quartermaster-General, Gen. Dietrich, as the real source of energy at his side, received the order to advance to the attack from Rovno down to Bessarabia. The very first assault, made with attack groups that had been got together at haphazard, brought Brussilov great and unexpected success on both wings in the battles of Luck and Ocna, although the defenders were not unfavourably situated as regards numbers. Thereupon the Russian Supreme Command decided to refrain from the great attack on the German front altogether and transfer the centre of gravity of their operations to the southern section. The advances on the Russian side during the next three months, at Riga, Jakobstadt, Dvinsk, Smorgon and Lake Narocz, were therefore undertaken only at odd moments, without any successes worth mentioning, and must be treated simply as demonstrations. But meanwhile Brussilov had snatched from the Central Powers large portions of Volhynia and East Galicia and the Bukovina.

Battles of Baranovichi (Baranowicze). On the other hand, the objective of the Russian Supreme Command in the three battles at Baranovichi had a close connection with the opera- tions at Luck. In the first battle, on June 13 and 14 1916, the attacks led by Gens. Ragosa and Lesch failed completely. Gen. Woyrsch maintained the upper hand over the Russian grenadiers with his Silesian Landwehr. The Germans lost 150 men, the Russians 7,000. In the second battle, on July 2-14, the Rus- sians put in 16 of their divs. against the 2! German and 2 Austro-Hungarian divs. holding the section Gorodishche (Horodyszcze)-Baranovichi. The Russian main blow fell on the Austro-Hungarian XII. Corps under Gen. von Henriquez, and forced it back to the second position. German battalions were hastily scraped together to reenforce their hard-pressed allies. There were critical hours and critical days. But on the last two days of the battle the greater part of the ground cap- tured by the Russians was torn from them again. East of Baranovichi Gen. Ragosa's troops were fated to achieve only unimportant local successes. The defenders lost in dead, wounded and missing 180 officers and 8,000 men; the attacking Russians many times this number.

For the third time the battle of Baranovichi blazed forth on July 25 1916, this time as an introduction to the great Russian general attack N.W. of Luck. Once more the Russians flung themselves against the Gorodishche section, but were driven back by the Germans after a fierce three days' fight.

Operations in the Summer of 1916. The Russian offensive in the beginning of June 1916 brought the attention of the Central Powers with a jerk to the eastern front, where all at once the situation had become extraordinarily tense, and the anxiety became all the greater with the reflection that the results in the other theatres of war had not come up to their expectations. The Verdun undertaking had cost the Germans heavy sacrifices without making them masters of the fortress, and it was but a small consolation to know that the French had bled even more .than they. On the Somme an English- French attacking force of prodigious size and fighting strength was massing itself. In the Venetian mountains at Asiago, the Austro-Hungarian corps, though it was still attacking, had lost much of its momentum since May 25. A pause in the fighting at the end of that month