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ments from the X. Army, and by assumption of responsibility for the Omulew front by the VIII. Army, which enabled Gallwitz to group his forces more closely on the Chorzele and Mlava fronts. The crisis died away in local attacks in the latter half of March. The Russians were becoming weak in munitions; the Germans continued weak in men. The last fluctuations of the battle brought the Germans from Chorzele close up to Przasnysz. Thus the E. Prussian offensive of the Russians closed, in the same way as the Carpathian offensive was soon to close, with little gain and great loss of leaders and of irreplaceable ammuni- tion. The Germans, on the other hand, like the Austrians, had failed to achieve their strategic purpose. The general results were thus, for both sides, negative, in spite of the accomplished " Cannae " in Masuria itself an exhausting effort.

Intentions and Plans for the Summer Campaign. On both Prussian and Galician fronts a pause of some weeks was imposed by the weariness of both sides. The latter part of March and early April in the N., and the last half of April in the S. were devoted to discussion and formation of plans. At this stage the distribution of force was, according to an Austrian headquarters statement of April 20, as follows, in rifles and carbines: East Prussian fronts: 263,000 Germans of X., VIII., and

Gallwitz Armies, and 508,000 Russians of the X. and XII.

Armies. Frontage 380 km. Central salient: 245,000 Germans and Austrians of IX.,

Woyrsch, and Austro-Hungarian I. Armies, and 436,000

Russians of the II., I., V., and IV. Armies. Frontage 275 km. Upper Vistula to Beskidengebirge: 108,000 Austrians (IV.

Army) and 100,000 Russians (III. Army). Frontage no km. Carpathians and Bukovina: 385,000 Austrians and Germans

(III., II., S. Army, Pflanzer-Baltin) and 496,000 Russians

(VIII., XI., and IX. Armies). Frontage 387 km. In sum, there were 1,001,000 Germans and Austrians to 1,540,000 Russians.

According to- the distribution table given by Falkenhayn for the end of that month, 366,000 German combatants faced 640,000 Russians between the Baltic and the Vistula; 184,000 Germans and 54,000 Austrians, in all 238,000, were opposed to 407,000 Russians in the Polish salient; and 89,000 Germans and 610,000 Austrians, total 699,000, stood on the W. Galicia, Carpathian and Bukovina fronts against 7 20,000 Russians. In sum, 1.303,000 soldiers of the Central Powers to 1,767,000 Russians. The differ- ence between the two sets of figures is partly accounted for by the fact that artillery personnel is included in the second and not in the first set: but whether taken separately or together, the figures throw a strong light on the state of the Russian army on the verge of the tremendous campaign of summer, 1915. It will be noticed that the total of 1,767,000 combatants is approximately the same as the mean monthly strength with the colours in peace (1,700,000). At this period no considerable forces were maintained in any but the eastern European theatre, so that, in effect, practically the whole of Russia's resources in men had been absorbed in maintaining the formations existing in peace and some 35 reserve divisions created on mobilization.

It will be noticed also that under the imperative needs created by the two-front war the German forces in the East had trebled, as compared with the strength at the time of the Masurian lakes battle in Sept., but that the Austro-Hungarian forces, though far above the nominal figure of Sept. 1914, were well below their mobilization figure. Hitherto, it must be remembered, the policy of "winning the war in the East" had not been accepted by Falkenhayn, and the German increases represented simply defensive and counter-attack requirements, and in particular the relief of pressure on the Austro-Hungarian armies. Correspond- ingly, German ideas and execution began from this date to predominate over Austrian. But no effective united command was ever created. German interferences in Austrian operations and operative methods, imperatively necessary to the common cause, but very often tactless, were constantly resented by Conrad and by most Austrian leaders; and moreover great divergencies of policy developed between the two imperial Governments in respect of Poland, Italy, and the Balkans.

Falkenhayn neither then nor thereafter accepted the principle that a decision could be obtained in the East. But his ideas had undergone a change since he conceded the eight new division^ to the eastern theatre " on loan." The French attempt to break through the Champagne lines had failed. A large number of German divisions were being reorganized on the basis of three infantry regiments instead of four, and the forces thus obtained were grouped in new handy divisions of veteran troops, which gave greater freedom in the play of reserves. He had abandoned, after detailed study, his Jan. prospect of a break-through on the Albert-Arras front, and therewith all offensive plans in the western theatre, while Conrad had refused to agree to his renewed proposal to force a way through Serbia for munitions for Turkey, though the peril of a Dardanelles break-through was becoming more and more evident. On the other hand, indices collected both on the Carpathian and Prussian fronts pointed to a growing shortage of material on the Russian side, as well as to a decrease of efficiency owing to losses in leaders and pre-war soldiers. Falkenhayn further thought it possible to keep both Italy and Rumania neutral, at least for a long time. All things considered, he came to regard a very heavy blow on the Russian front as necessary, possible, and desirable; and on Com ad's reviving, on April 7, the old scheme of combining blows from the lower San, and from the S. front of E. Prussia, with a rendezvous near Siedlce, he agreed, not indeed as to the plan, but as to the principle. It was still only a " sufficiently " heavy blow that he intended to deliver, but the limitation implied in the adverb was considerably relaxed. Eight divisions (Guard and X. Corps, XLI. Res. Corps, and two of the new divisions) were to be brought over from the western front, this time simultaneously and for use as an army. Of this army (XI.) Mackensen was appointed chief, with Colonel v. Seeckt as his chief of staff, Prince Leopold of Bavaria succeeding Mackensen at the head of the IX. Army. To cover the withdrawal from the W., sharp local actions were initiated at different points on the trench-line. One of these, involving ten or more divisions, is known to history as the Second Battle or " gas attack " of Ypres.

The theatre of Mackensen's operations was to be the country between the upper Vistula and the mountains (Dunajec-Gorlice- Tarnow), where the front of contact was in much the same posi- tion as it had been at the end of the battle of Jaslo. It was held by the Russian III. Army (Radko Dimitriev) on the one side and by the Austro-Hungarian IV. Army (Joseph Ferdinand) on the other, both being relatively weak. Supposing surprise to be effected, a mass of eight first-class divisions, supported by the troops already on the front and by artillery on a scale never before seen in the East, had every prospect of breaking through. Falkenhayn took many precautions to secure his surprise, and in the main with success, although the Russians and their Allies were well aware that a blow was impending at some point of the eastern front. The troop trains were sent by roundabout routes, false rumours were circulated, and Conrad himself was not informed of Falkenhayn's decision till the movements of concen- tration had begun. Hindenburg, whose jurisdiction only ex- tended to the left of Woyrsch's line, was instructed to make de- monstrative attacks at different points. One of these, the raid of v. Lauenstein's group into Courland, had an important sequel, and will be discussed later. The significance of the other two, an attack at Suwalki by the X. Army and a gas attack near Skierniewice by the IX. Army, was only momentary. In direction the attack was partly frontal, and it has been criticized for that reason. But a prime factor was the necessity of relieving the situation for the Austrians on the Carpathian front as soon as possible; and, besides in all probability compelling the Russians to retire in the southern part of the central salient, a drive N.E. and E. from the front Gorlice-Tarnow would make the Russian positions in the Carpathians untenable at least as far as the Lupkow pass inclusive. Falkenhayn went further, and proposed to involve the Russians even more thoroughly in mountain difficulties by retiring the right of the III., and the II. and South Armies. To this, however, Conrad would not agree; and Mack- ensen's blow lost part of its effect through this refusal.