Page:EB1922 - Volume 30.djvu/952

896

the weight of the Grand Duke's attack on the line Kielce- R. Opatowka, brought the enemy ever nearer to Cracow and Upper Silesia, and the destruction of bridges and railways on the IX. Army front could only have a temporary effect. More- over, new dangers threatened both the eastern and the southern fronts of E. Prussia.

On Nov. 5, the Austrian I. Army had retired behind the Nida, Zastrow's advanced forces were retiring on Mlava, Below was preparing to meet a new thrust of the Russian X. Army (Sievers). On the 8th Ludendorff asked Falkenhayn for 6 to 8 more divisions as soon as possible, and for more later. The crisis, and with it the hope of decisive victory, was becoming more acute. On the loth the regrouping was complete, except in the centre, where Bohm Ermolli was not yet on the scene. Here, cavalry alone held the country to the N. and N.E. of Kalisch. The Posen and Breslau Corps were beginning their advance from Kalisch and Kempen respectively. Woyrsch (Ldw. Corps, ist Gd. Res. Div., 35 Res. Div.) was in front of Czestochova; from Zarki to Wielun the Austro-Hungarian I. and IV. Armies had fallen back concentrically on Cracow, in front of which they now stood; the XI. Corps covered W. Galicia; the III. Army had taken over the front of Bohm as well as its own and stood on the line Virempna-Dukla Pass-Uszok Pass, and Pflanzer-Baltin, his offensive suspended, was at Verecze, Okormezo, S. of Dela- tyn, R. Pruth. But the offensive group (IX. Army under Gen.-Oberst von Mackensen) was ready the XI. and XVII. Corps astride the Warta where it enters Germany, the XX. at Hohensalza, the I. Res., XXV. Res. and 3rd Gd. Div. between Hohensalza and Thorn.

At that date the Grand Duke's Armies were thus disposed

X. on E. Prussian eastern front, I. (8 divisions) on E. Prussian S. front (Plock to Mlava), with advanced troops approaching Soldau, Rypin and Lipno and one corps S. of the Vistula about Wloclawek; II. (6 divisions and a cavalry mass), W. of Lodz, advancing on Kalisch, with the II. Corps between Kutno and Lencyzka as a protective echelon; V. (8 divisions) nearing the Widawka river, cavalry approaching the Upper Warta; IV. (6 divisions) between the Pilica and Jendnziejow, pointing towards Beuthen; IX. (8 divisions) in the angle of the Nida and the Vistula; III. following up the Austro-Hungarian retreat towards and beyond the Dunajec, VIII. and Dniester Group on the Carpathian front; XI. (newly formed) besieging Przemysl.

On Nov. ii the advance of the German IX. Army began. On the 1 2th at Wloclawek, parts of three corps quickly over- whelmed the corps of the Russian I. Army there, and drove it over the Vistula. The next phase was a concentric advance on the Russian II. Corps, right echelon of the II. Army, which held a position from Kutno to Lenczyca; out of this position it was driven with heavy losses on the isth, losing at Lenczyca the gate between the Bzura and the Ner (Warta) waterlines. Then, while part of the German army pushed forward down the Vis- tula to intercept any assistance that might come from the I. Army, the XXV. Res. and XX. Corps from Kutno and Lenczyca, with the XVII. and XI. Corps from the Warta valley, advanced on Lodz, the manufacturing centre of Poland.

The battle of Lodz, which began on Nov. 17, is described elsewhere. In its intensity, its vicissitudes and its significance, it was the Ypres of the eastern front. In it took place the epic incident of the break-through, envelopment and final self- rescue of the XXV. Res. Corps and 3rd Guard Division. No battle of the World War shows such varied, involved and difficult tactical situations. Here we are concerned with the results only. From the igth the Posen Corps and Frommel's cavalry were actively engaged on the left of the XI. Corps, thus connecting the battle of Lodz with the fighting which went on all along the line to Cracow, where the Austro-Hungarian I. and IV. Armies contended without defeat or victory against the thrust of the Russian IV. and IX. Armies. Further E., the Austro-Hungarian

XI. Corps and III. Army engaged, equally without decisive results, the Russian III. and VIII. Armies. But Ludendorff had undeniably won his " Teilerfolg," for the Russian onset on all parts of the line S. of the Lodz area was partly or wholly

suspended in order to assemble all possible forces for the pre- vention of disaster on the right wing. Pressure was relaxed also on the two fronts of E. Prussia as the uncommitted reserves of the attack were taken away. In his regrouping the Grand Duke was successful; a continuous line of battle was formed by Dec. 6 from How on the Vistula, W. of Lowicz, E. of Lodz, W. of Petrikow, W. of Novo Radomsk, and so to the Cracow battle-field. But the cost had been heavy, and the Russians were unable, then or thereafter, to resume the tidal advance on Silesia and Moravia. With the formation of this long con- tinuous line from N.W. of Warsaw to S. of Cracow began a new phase of the struggle, in which the battle of Lodz merges into the battle of Lowicz, and that of Cracow develops, on its south- ern side, into the battle of Limanova-Lapanov.

It has already been mentioned that Ludendorff had on Nov. 8 asked Falkenhayn for 6 to 8 divisions to be sent at once from the W. and more later. At that date Falkenhayn was still con- templating an attempt to revive the battle of Ypres, and had not reconciled himself to position warfare. On the i8th, before the decision had fallen at Lodz, Falkenhayn in agreeing to send 6 divisions had at the same time expressed his belief that it would even so be impossible to bring Russia to admit defeat, and that the outcome certainly desirable in itself would only be to relieve Austria-Hungary by the reconquest of the Vistula- San-Dniester line, and perhaps of Lemberg also. But a week later, under the influence of Mackensen's victory, he said that success in N. Poland might decide not only the Galician question _but the whole war. He thought this might be achieved by building up yet another striking force E. of the Vistula, where the Russian I. Army was continually giving up divisions for the battle of Lodz. Ludendorff, on the contrary, saw no pros- pects in such a piecemeal building up of strength which the Russians could answer pari passu. Power and surprise com- bined, he held, were essential. At this moment, there were in Germany 9 new divisions under training, but the awful wastage of the lives and energy of their predecessors at Ypres had con- vinced Falkenhayn that it was necessary to avoid cutting short their training and to give them more experienced leaders before committing them to battle. Ludendorff, in spite of the achieve- ment of the XXV. Res. Corps at Lodz, seems to have concurred in this view. Thus the reenforcement reduced itself to a gradual incoming of 8 divisions from the W. (II., III. Res., XIII. and XXIV. Res. Corps) which, with the I. from the now relieved E. Prussian front were all absorbed in the frontal battle about Lodz and Lowicz, save one which was sent to assist the Austrian IV. Army S. of Cracow. The battle of Lowicz began and con- tinued as a front-to-front battle in which each side sought to condense enough force for a blow, now here and now there. It ended, in mid-December, with a general withdrawal of the Rus- sian line to a winter-position, which ran along the Bzura and Rawka to Rawa, and thence southward, crossing the Pilica E. of Tomaszew and following the upper course of that river, 5-15 km. E. of it, till near Jendrziejow it reached the Nida, to follow it to the upper Vistula.

South of Cracow, in a country of hills where manoeuvre was possible and open flanks frequent, advance and counter-advance alternated during the month of December. In conforming to the general retirement of the Allied forces in October, the Austrian I. and IV. Armies had gathered about Cracow, and during No- vember they had maintained their front against the Russian IX. Army (battle of Cracow). At the end of the month, however, the enemy had developed a strong attack S. of the Vistula, which reached the line Wyelica Sieprow Droginia, and threat- ened by turning the fortress from the S. to make the desired breach for passage into Moravia. This danger was averted by a regrouping of the Austrian IV. Army, which enabled an attack- force to be assembled on the right wing about Mzana Dolina and Dobra, almost in the mountains. On the 3rd this force attacked northward, bringing the Russians' advance at once to a stand- still, and forcing them to make new dispositions. The fighting was prolonged and heavy. On Dec. 8, 'forces of the Russian VIII. Army, condensed on the western flank of that army, be-