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 Nov., witnessed the hardest fighting of the whole campaign in East Africa. Relentlessly pursued by Hannyngton’s columns von Lettow was compelled to fall back to the Lukuledi valley, the chief line of retreat being towards Nyango, a place 40 m. S.W. of Lindi, towards which Beves was pressing back Wahle’s detachments. Early in Oct. Hannyngton detached the Nigerian Brigade (with which was the Gambia Company) to march to Nyango and join the Lindi force. Meanwhile other columns of the Kilwa force, including cavalry, were marching S., but further W., towards the mission stations of Lukuledi and Massasi. At those places, and at Chitwa, S. of the Lukuledi river, were most of the German supplies.

The Nigerian Brigade, after a fine march of 80 m., reached its destination on Oct. 15. On that day two columns of Beves’s force under Gen. O'Gradyand Col. Tytler respectively had driven back Wahle’s main body to Nyango and Mahiwa (the latter about two m. from Nyango).

The Nigerians were to coöperate in cutting off Wahle’s retreat (preparatory to the pursuit of von Lettow), and were in action early on the isth. This was the beginning of a four days' battle, the most stubborn and most costly of the whole campaign. Von Lettow with four companies had gone to the help of Wahle, and attacks were met by counter-attacks; the Nigerians at Mahiwa being driven back and very hard pressed. Nyango the Germans abandoned on the i6th, only to take up stronger positions on a ridge two m. S. on the farther side of a river bed. These positions the British in vain assailed; they were in turn counter-attacked on the I7th and again on the i8th and compelled to fall back to the river bed, the enemy pressure continuing until after dark. Gen. Beves gave orders that the attack was to be resumed on the ipth. This order was cancelled by Gen. Van Deventer, and on the same day the command of the Lindi force was transferred to Gen. Cunliffe. On that day the Germans retired to the positions they had taken up on the 16th. The battle was over. Out of a total strength of 4,900 infantry engaged the British had 2,700 casualties, of which 528 were in the Nigerian Brigade. The 25th Fusiliers, reduced to a remnant in previous fighting, had 70 casualties out of 120 men who went into action. Von Lettow says that the German force was “some 1,500 men” and their casualties 519. This did not include all Wahle’s casualties in the retreat to Mahiwa, for on Oct. 15-8 the British captured in all 241 Europeans and 677 askaris. The total German force engaged was not fewer than 2,800. Von Lettow describes this fight as, next to Tanga, the most serious defeat suffered by the British, and says he adapted his tactics to those of Gen. Beves, who “threw his men into action regardless of loss of life and did not hesitate to try for a success. . . by repeated frontal attacks.” He (von Lettow) abandoned the idea of “an annihilating pursuit” as he learned that the enemy columns in his rear were threatening the Lukuledi mission station. He hastened to its relief and began the process of concentrating his forces to the Chiwata region. The Mahiwa-Nyango battle gave him this advantage—it was 10 days before Gen. Cunliffe was able to resume the offensive. On Oct. 24 von Lettow had a conference with Dr. Schnee, who appears to have urged that the end had come, but, writes von Lettow, “I firmly stated my opinion that. . . the war could and must be carried on.”

Meanwhile Tafel’s force had been driven from the Mahenge plateau with the help of troops furnished by the Belgians, whose coöperation had been sought. While columns of Northey’s force, under Cols. Hawthorn and Fair, pressed the enemy hard from the S. and S.W., the Belgians

struck at Mahenge from the north. The main Belgian column, under. Maj. Batille, left the Central railway on Aug. 15, and made good progress through very difficult country. The Germans put up the usual strong rear-guard delaying actions, but when the Belgians attacked (Oct. 8) the last defence of Mahenge, Tafel ordered a general retreat. His losses had been heavy and many of his askaris deserted. Both Hawthorn and Fair were drawing near, but Tafel succeeded in outdistancing his pursuers, whose long lines of transport had reached breaking point. Tafel chose the only route open to him—that

leading S.E. in the direction of von Lettow. On Nov. 16 he broke through two weak detachments of Northey’s force which gallantly endeavoured to bar his progress. A Belgian column, which had been sent round via Kilwa to Liwale, arrived only in time to engage Tafel’s rear-guard. This was the end of the Belgian effort, and their troops shortly afterwards returned to the Congo. The pursuit of Tafel was taken over by the Kilwa force and his attempt to join von Lettow was frustrated.

At this time, mid-Nov., von Lettow’s position was critical. The Lindi force had resumed its offensive on Nov. 6 and had joined hands with the Kilwa force on Nov. 12. Lettow had concentrated all his men near Chiwata, but to remain there meant certain disaster. So leaving

only a small body at Chiwata to put up a delaying action the place was taken by Gen. O’Grady on Nov. 14 he retreated eastward, i.e. towards the coast, along the broken edge of the Mkondi Plateau. He was pursued without pause and constantly engaged, suffering losses every day, was in a foodless region and had lost nearly all his stores. On Nov. 17 von Lettow took what he calls a fateful decision. It was to abandon all idea of fixed bases; reduce his force—half-starved and very short of ammunition, break off fighting and get away to some district where food was to be found. At a place called Nambindinga he left some hundreds of Europeans (many of whom, he states, were not unwilling to lay down their arms) and 600 askaris, and with the rest again eluded his pursuers by turning S.E. “by an unsuspected path.” While the British columns were re-forming to pick up his trail he marched rapidly S.W., having determined to cross the Rovuma near its confluence with the Lujenda, where was the Portuguese fort of Ngomano. At Nwali he shed more of his troops, and his force was now reduced to approximately 300 Europeans, 1,800 askaris and 3,000 bearers and other natives, including women and children. He marched along the Rovuma to the selected crossing place, and on the night of Nov. 25-6 he crossed the river into Portuguese territory. Gen. Wahle, Maj. Kraut and other tried leaders were with him and also Dr. Schnee. Two attempts to overtake him “failed by a few hours at both places, in spite of hard marching.” So wrote Col. G. M. Orr, commander of one of the pursuing columns.

For a day or two Tafel and von Lettow had been near one another; Tafel had reached the Rovuma but not finding von Lettow turned back. Running into an Indian patrol Tafel again tried to turn south. But his force was foodless and hopeless. On Nov. 27 a party of 37 Germans, 178 askaris and 1,100 followers gave themselves up to the British, and the next day, Nov. 28 1917, Tafel himself surrendered unconditionally with 19 officers, 92 other Europeans, over 1,200 askaris and some 2,200 other natives.

Not a single German combatant was left in German East Africa, and the conquest of the Protectorate was complete. At the time of his flight into Portuguese territory von Lettow states that he received a second summons to surrender. But he was no more ready to surrender to Van Deventer than he had been to Smuts; moreover, he considered his position satisfactory inasmuch as he could still contain a large enemy force.

The failure of the Portuguese to prevent von Lettow from crossing the Rovuma, or in accounting for him when he had crossed that river, was not due to lack of effort on the part of the Lisbon Government. During 1914–5 they had sent over 2,000 white troops to Mozambique, and

between May and July 1916 another force 4,600 strong was sent from Lisbon. Part of this force had occupied Nwali ( Oct. 1916 ), but had been forced to evacuate it a month later. In 1917 Portugal sent 8,776 more men from Lisbon, and had strengthened the posts along the Rovuma, including that at Ngomano. But the Portuguese white troops