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 In consequence of the heavy rains Gen. Hoskins had to abandon operations on a large scale, though by the end of Feb. the N. bank of the Rufiji was cleared of the Germans. Some idea of the difficulties caused by the rains may be gathered from the fact that in this area “patrol work had to be carried out for some time in canoes, and the men found themselves making fast to the roofs of houses which had lately formed their quarters” (Gen. Hoskins’s despatch). Sickness among the European and South African units was so great as to necessitate their withdrawal. As many as possible were sent to South Africa to recuperate, being recalled in May, when the dry weather permitted the offensive to be resumed. Meantime Gen. Hoskins utilized the period of the rains to undertake a thorough reorganization of his forces. The training of new battalions of the King’s African Rifles was pushed on rapidly, and special attention was devoted to the improvement of communications. The difficulties of transport were very great; owing to the tsetse fly animal transport was no longer possible; both carriers and light mechanical transport, essential for a forward movement, were deficient. Gen. Hoskins by energetic measures largely overcame these difficulties.

To an extent hard to realize, the operations—of the Germans equally with the British and Belgians—depended on the number, organization and distribution of native carriers. Complete statistics are lacking, but on the British side alone, first to last, well over 500,000 carriers were employed. Those with the main forces were recruited from British East Africa (Kenya Colony) and Uganda, in both of which countries a Compulsory Service Act was put in force in March 1917. Uganda, which also found a large number of carriers for the Belgian troops, up to the end of 1917 had furnished a total of 178,000 porters (besides 10,000 men for the King’s African Rifles). A still larger number was recruited in British East Africa; a fair number of carriers were also recruited in German East Africa itself. Gen. Northey, as already stated, obtained his carriers from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Many carriers were used in the first line, that is they took ammunition, water, etc., right up to the fighting men, and casualties in action amongst these carriers were numerous.

There was also serious wastage among the carriers from sickness and privations, especially among the men obtained from Uganda and British East Africa. This arose mainly from the difficulty in supplying them with their accustomed food. Tribes, like the majority of those in the Uganda Protectorate, whose staple food consists of bananas, sweet potatoes and beans, suffered from intestinal disease when placed on a grain diet. For example out of 3,576 carriers from Uganda employed in the coast region of British East Africa between Aug. 1914 and March 1915 only 2,050 returned. Sufficient care was not always taken by officers in charge to procure suitable rations. But these cases were exceptional, and the African Native Medical Corps, 1,000 strong, raised in 1917 (recruited mainly from the senior high-school boys in Buganda), did much to improve the health of the carriers. In 1918 the carriers in hospital numbered 7%. The West African troops had their own Carrier Corps, raised voluntarily in Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. The South African troops also brought their own carriers and labour contingents, a total of 60,300 men being sent from the Cape.

Before the weather had improved sufficiently to permit the offensive to be renewed Gen. Hoskins was appointed to command a division in Palestine. Gen. Van Deventer returned from South Africa and took over the command on May 29 1917. The position of the Germans at this time was briefly this: von Lettow with his main force was at the Matunda river, with patrols and detachments pushed close to and S. of Kilwa. Maj.-Gen. Wahle had recently been transferred from Mahenge to command in the Lindi area, succeeding Capt. Looff. At Mahenge Capt. Tafel had taken over control. There were smaller German detachments between Kilwa and Lindi and near the Rovuma. There was indirect if not direct communication between all the German forces. Nowhere, as throughout the campaign, was there any continuous front. The columns under Northey contained the Mahenge force on the

S. and W., and Van Deventer had at Iringa another column watching Tafel from the N.W. The rest of Van Deventer’s force was to be engaged against von Lettow. That von Lettow might in the last resort retire into Portuguese territory had been foreseen; he had in fact contemplated that course ever since in Sept. 1916 he had been forced out of the Uluguru mountains. And German columns had already raided deep into Portuguese East Africa, bringing back much loot and reports of a land flowing with milk and honey.

For his main operations Van Deventer had the choice of an advance either from Kilwa or Lindi. An advance from Lindi (which is situated on the estuary of the Lukuledi) appears to have had the prospect of the best results, as by pushing forces up the valley of the Lukuledi and joining hands with Northey’s column E. of Nyasa the escape of von Lettow into Portuguese territory might have been prevented. But Lindi harbour was poor, that at Kilwa was good, and the main body of the Germans was concentrated near it. Van Deventer’s formula was to “find the enemy and hit him hard,” and he decided to attack on the Kilwa side. The Kilwa force had been under Gen. Hannyngton, but Hannyngton was then seriously ill and Gen. Beves was in temporary command. The advance began on July 5, in the direction of Liwale, it being hoped to force von Lettow to disclose his intended line of retreat. Three columns were formed, the forces engaged including South African infantry, King’s African Rifles, the 23rd Punjabis and two mountain batteries. After some sharp fighting the Germans fell back to Narungombe, where an engagement was fought on July 19. The fighting was very severe; the Germans delivered several well-sustained counter-attacks and the issue appeared doubtful. The fight showed that “the enemy’s capacity for resistance had not in any way been weakened by the rainy season, and that the moral and training of his troops remained high” (Van Deventer).

After the fight at Narungombe the Germans, who were under Capt. von Liebermann, retreated south. Von Lettow regarded the action as an opportunity missed by von Liebermann and as further proof of the immense difficulty of carrying out successfully in the bush operations in which several columns are engaged. But Beves’s offensive was spent, and his troops suffered heavily from sickness. It was not until mid-Sept, that a new Kilwa force was ready to take the field. In the meantime preparations had been made for the advance from Lindi. In Aug. Brig.-Gen. H. de C. O’Grady, a great fighting soldier, had driven the Germans from the estuary of the Lukuledi, and provided elbow room for a further advance. He also foiled an attempt made by von Lettow in person to surprise his force.

When in Sept. Van Deventer was at length in a position to begin the main advance Gen. Beves had been transferred to the Lindi command and Gen. Hannyngton had resumed command at Kilwa. The Nigerian Brigade had been at Kilwa since Aug., and Hannyngton had also three

new battalions from India, including the 25th cavalry. It was planned that the Kilwa force should sweep S. and the Lindi force W. so as to enclose von Lettow and prevent his breaking W. and consolidating with the Mahenge force. This period of the main advance, up to the end of