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 hills. and the pass or nek between them; no turning movement was possible and the order was given to Gen. Malleson, commanding the 1st Brigade of the 2nd East African Division, “to clear up the position and, if possible, make good the nek.” The whole region was densely bushed. The advance began at 11:45, and the 130th Baluchis and the 3rd King’s African Rifles were sent forward to seize a spur of Latema. The defence was very strong and by 4 little progress had been made. At this hour, writes Gen. Smuts, “Gen. Malleson, who was seriously indisposed, asked to be relieved of his command.” Gen. Tighe then assumed personal direction of the operations. The 2nd Rhodesians, the 3rd King’s African Rifles, and the 130th Baluchis now attempted to gain the Latema ridge. The enemy, well hidden in the bush, and supported by accurate machine-gun fire, kept, however, possession of the ridge. Finally, the 5th and 7th South African Infantry Battalions, brought up as reinforcements and led by Lt.-Col. Byron, were sent in to make a night charge with the bayonet. Here and there small parties, which became isolated, gained the crest. Col. Byron got within 30 yds. of the main enemy position, but with 20 men only, and was forced to retire. Tighe thereupon dug in astride the road to await daylight. At 4:30 March 12 Smuts ordered Tighe to draw back his force. This operation was in progress when news came that the enemy was in full retreat. Von Lettow states that about ii P.M. on the nth a telephonic message from the Raeta position informed him that the enemy had penetrated into the position in great force and that to avoid the risk of having his communications cut he ordered the troops with him, forming his left wing, to fall back towards Kahe. When he discovered the mistake made it was too late to alter his dispositions. Maj. Kraut then evacuated the Latema-Raeta position, and the whole force retired to the Kahe position, abandoning Moshi and Kilimanjaro. Gen. Stewart’s division had not played the part expected; it was not until March 13 that it reached Bomba Jangombe, 25m. N.W. of Kahe. Here Gen. Stewart was informed by telegram that the enemy had already avoided encirclement, and his force was brought into New Moshi on the i4th. On the igth Gen. Stewart left for India. Later experience showed that the difficulties of encirclement were greater than then supposed.

Von Lettow’s new position known as the Kahe-Ruwa stretched, S. of the Moshi-Taveta road, from Kahe railway station, near which the Ruwa (Pangani) crossed the railway, eastward along the northern end of the Pare mountains, through a region of forest, bush, swamps and rivers. On March 18 he was attacked from the Latema Nek direction by a force under Brig.-Gen. S. H. Sheppard (who had commanded the 2nd East African Brigade under Gen. Stewart) and on March 20 Gen. Van Deventer was sent westward from Moshi to turn the enemy’s rear at Kahe. He reached and after some sharp fighting seized Kahe station on the 2ist, but owing to the difficulty in getting his force across the Pangani could not cut off the enemy. On the same day Sheppard fought a very determined and apparently indecisive action on the northern front a South African Brigade which was to have aided him “was so impeded in the dense bush that it was unable to exercise any influence on the fight” (Gen. Smuts). But under cover of night the German force was withdrawn to Lembeni station, 20 m. S. of Kahe. Von Lettow retired in perfect order with practically all his stores and guns, except one of the “Königsberg’s” 4.1-in. guns, which was blown up.

The fight of March 21 marked the conclusion of the Kilimanjaro operations. They had opened the door into German East Africa and had greatly inspirited the British. They had done more, for though von Lettow’s force was intact and its moral still high, its supply of ammunition had been greatly depleted. But at this critical moment another ship ran the blockade and brought the Germans most welcome supplies, including four 4.1-in. field howitzers, ammunition for the “Königsberg’s” big guns, 5,000,000 rounds of ’98 small-arms ammunition, 12 machine-guns, medical stores, provisions and clothing (for women as well as men). The ship, the “Maria,” which had come via South America, the East Indies and Madagascar, entered Sudi Bay, near Lindi, in the far south of German East Africa, in the middle

of March unobserved by the British patrolling vessels. She was discovered early in April, fired into and damaged. But she completed the discharge of her cargo, and got clear away. The value of this reënforcement to von Lettow is difficult to over-estimate.

The military problem as it presented itself to Gen. Smuts and to Col. von Lettow respectively was very different. Smuts knew that the Belgians were ready to strike from the N.W. and the Nyasa-Rhodesia force from the S.W. and von Lettow was also aware of the fact. But in so large a country as German East Africa those operations were not likely for some time to affect the main forces. Von Lettow’s position was comparatively simple; he could not prevent the enemy from developing his offensive in the manner he chose, but with his superior mobility he could adapt his movements to meet his foe’s tactics.

Gen. Smuts had four possible alternatives: (1) to advance from Victoria Nyanza on Tabora, the chief town in the interior (this was ruled out as it was thought, and proved to be the case, that the Belgians could deal with Tabora); (2) follow the enemy down the Tanga railway through Pare and Usambara (this was rejected as it was the enemy’s chosen ground, and where he was strongest); (3) advance direct inland from Kilimanjaro; (4) land a force at Dar-es-Salaam and advance along the Central railway. Gen. Smuts chose the third alternative; whether it was better than the fourth is questionable. An advance along the line of the Central railway had obvious advantages. The railway traversed the protectorate in an east-west direction from end to end; its occupation would have cut the German forces in two and materially helped the operations of the Belgians and Gen. Northey. Dar-es-Salaam, the ocean terminus of the railway, lay at the mercy of the British navy; it was the capital of the protectorate; its occupation would have much political as well as military importance, and would have given the British a sea base 200 m. nearer South Africa than Mombasa and reduced land communications to a much greater extent. And the shortening of the lines of communication was a vital matter. Smuts, however, decided against Dar-es-Salaam “partly because the prevalence of the S.E. monsoon at that period (April) made a landing of a large force on that coast an operation of great difficulty, and even danger, partly because a prolonged campaign on the coast immediately after the rainy season would mean the disappearance of a very large percentage of my army from malaria and other tropical ailments.”

Moreover, von Lettow by retiring along the Tanga railway had left the road into the interior “wide open and unguarded.” At that time, April 1016, it was not realized that the climate of the interior was little less deadly than that of the coast, and that whatever course was adopted a large proportion of the army especially among the white troops would be affected by malaria and other tropical ailments. Also Gen. Smuts was misinformed as to the extent and severity of the forthcoming rainy season. Of the difficulties of communication he was well aware, and slightly to lessen them the railway from Voi to Taveta was carried through the Latema gap and joined to the Tanga railway at Kahe. This railway was completed on April 25 1916. It was cut through swamps and virgin forest and thousands of men had to be employed to keep the rails from sinking in the mud. Kahe, by rail, was 210 m. from Mombasa; from Kahe the advance into the interior had to be made by other means of transport. Smuts made large use of motor lorries.

Smuts’s plan for his new campaign was, briefly, as follows: A mounted force under Van Deventer was to make a rapid advance