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 raised by the settlers in East Africa, the 2nd Rhodesian Regiment, the 25th Batt. Royal Fusiliers and the 2nd North Lancashires (the only regular British infantry unit in East Africa). There were also the battalions of the King’s African Rifles, but at that time the value of negro troops was not sufficiently appreciated. Though they were best adapted for warfare in equatorial Africa and ultimately bore the brunt of the fighting and though von Lettow had shown the way, the raising of new native regiments was neglected at first by the British.

The plan adopted by the British in conjunction with the Belgians was for a concerted attack on three sides. The object was not only to defeat the enemy, but effectively to occupy the country, so as to render impossible the splitting up of the German forces “into guerrilla bands doubling back in all directions” (Gen. Smuts). This aim was achieved with one remarkable exception, the Wintgens-Naumann raid (see p.883, note). But when von Lettow was driven eventually into Portuguese territory the whole remaining German force became a guerrilla band, with an unlimited field for doubling and redoubling. The scheme evolved in 1915 was to strike the main blow with the force in British East Africa, whilst the Belgians were to operate in the north-west and a second British force in the south-west of the German protectorate. This second force was gathered on the Nyasa-Rho- desia borders, and Brig.-Gen. Edward Northey assumed command of it in Jan. 1916. When, in March 1916, the Portuguese entered the war, they undertook to guard the southern frontier of German East Africa. Thus the Germans had enemies on every side, and had no opportunity (which the Germans in Cameroon took) of escaping capture by retirement into neutral territory.

When Gen. Botha’s Government undertook to send forces to East Africa it had to rely upon volunteers to redeem its promise. But a force already organized and originally destined for service in Europe the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade (under Brig.-Gen. P. S. Beves) was diverted to East Africa. A mounted brigade under Brig.-Gen. J. L. Van Deventer, and a brigade consisting of five batteries of S.A. Field Artillery, with all necessary administrative and other units, were also formed so that the South African contingent was complete and self contained. Later this contingent was increased by another infantry brigade, a second mounted brigade and the Cape Boys Battalion (under Col. Morris). All these troops except the 2nd mounted brigade had reached East Africa by Feb. 1916, before the offensive began.

When South Africa furnished this contingent the largest body of white troops which had taken the field in tropical Africa the Home Government offered the command to a South African, Gen. Smuts. Smuts was Minister of Defence in the Union Cabinet; the political situation in South Africa was uncertain and he declined the offer. Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was then selected for the post, but while at the Cape on his way out, in consequence of ill health, he resigned his appointment. Again appealed to, Gen. Smuts accepted the command and reached Mombasa on Feb. 19. He adopted, with some modifications, the plan of campaign which Gen. Tighe had originated.

Gen. Tighe had had a very difficult task, and the moral of his force, predominantly Indian, had suffered through being so long on the defensive. It altered completely with the opening of the offensive. Before the arrival of Gen. Smuts the railway across the waterless waste between Voi and Taveta had been taken to Serengati, within five m. of the German post on El Oldorobo (otherwise Salaita hill), which blocked the main approach to the Taveta gap. Skirmishing had been going on around Salaita since March 1915. The hill was without water, which was taken to the garrison from Taveta in donkey carts. " Strangely enough," wrote von Lettow, "it did not occur to the enemy to interfere with it [the transport] and thus render the mountain untenable." The first action in which the South Africans took part was an attack on Feb. 12 1916, on Salaita. Brig.-Gen. Malleson with the 1st East African and 2nd South African Infantry Brigades, supported by artillery, assaulted the strongly entrenched German positions, approached through thorn bush. Little progress was made and the Germans, reinforced from Taveta, counter-attacked and compelled Gen. Malleson to retreat. The British casualties were 172, of which number 139 were among the South Africans. They suffered through ignorance of the new conditions. “The South African Infantry,”" wrote Gen. Smuts, " had learned some invaluable lessons in bush warfare, and also had opportunity to estimate the fighting quality of the enemy."

Gen. Tighe intended to force the enemy from the Taveta gap by a double movement. One force, undeT Gen. J. M. Stewart, was to sweep round Kilimanjaro from the north ; another, under Gen. Malleson was to attack Taveta. The forces were to join hands at Kahe, a place on_the Tanga railway S. of Moshi. Gen. Stewart, who had the ist East African Division (infantry) and Van Deventer’s mounted brigade, was at Longido, some 50 m. from Kaijado, the terminus of the Magadi branch of the Uganda railway and Stewart’s base for supplies. The chief alteration in Gen. Tighe’s plans made by Gen. Smuts was to bring back Van Deventer’s mounted brigade to the Taveta side and to use it for a turning movement which would render a frontal attack on Salaita hill unnecessary. The infantry which were to follow up Van Deventer’s movement consisted of the 2nd East African Division, of which Gen. Tighe was placed in command.

Four days after reaching Mombasa Gen. Smuts telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that he was prepared to carry out the occupation of the Kilimanjaro area at once; two days later (Feb. 25) Kitchener’s sanction for the operation was received. There was good reason for haste as the rainy season was approaching, and during the rains operations might be (and in fact proved to be) impossible. Von Lettow was well aware of the enemy’s movements, and as early as Aug. 1915 had made preparations in view of having to abandon the Kilimanjaro and Usambara regions. These preparations included the removal of all military stores. For this purpose a light railway was built south from Mombo station on the Tanga railway to Handeni (40 m.), whence a wagon road went to Kimamba on the Central (or Tanganyika) railway. Up to nearly the end of 1915 von Lettow had thought that the new British offensive might be a landing at Dar-es-Salaam or Bagamoyo; afterwards there was no doubt that it would be in the Kilimanjaro region. To meet the attack he had, he states, a force of “about 4,000 rifles” under Maj. Kraut (the British estimated that Kraut had 6,000 rifles, 16 naval and field guns and 37 machine-guns). About 1,000 rifles were concentrated to dispute any advance from Longido.

The Germans were apparently unprepared for the turning movement executed by Van Deventer’s mounted men, who got behind Taveta, and forced the enemy to evacuate Salaita hill, though on this point von Lettow asserts “our want of artillery obliged us to look on quietly while the enemy executed unskilful movements at no great distance from our front.” Van Deventer’s movement began on March 8, and on the next day his men were astride the Moshi road behind Taveta. Salaita hill was evacuated by the Germans on that day and new positions were taken up by them covering the gap between the North Pare mountains and Kilimanjaro. Von Lettow himself, with the bulk of his force, was at Himo, five m. from his front, and he was aware that behind him Gen. Stewart’s column was advancing. That column, in Gen. Smuts’s plan, was to cut off von Lettow’s retreat, and in view of the greater distance it had to cover had started from Longido on March 5. Stewart’s column met with many difficulties, and though it had no serious encounter with the Germans its progress was much slower than had been anticipated. Meanwhile the attack on the position west of Taveta was delivered on March n. The road to Himo and Kahe passed between two hills, Raeta and Latema. Maj. Kraut held both