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 in regions where local supplies of food were often non-existent. Thus in northern Rhodesia a road 400 m. long had to be cut through trackless bush, in which the areas of cultivation were infinitesimal. The Germans were better off in that, besides their two railways, they had constructed several main roads before the war, and during the war other roads and some light railways were laid down. And the German troops had not such long distances as had their opponents to cover on foot. Nor were they troubled by lack of food (at least not before 1917). The natives had been compelled to establish large food depots at all military stations, while Usambara, in or near which the bulk of von Lettow’s force was quartered for 22 months, was a land of plenty. But the necessity that they were under of guarding the coast and to a lesser extent the N.W. and S.W. frontiers, while keeping their main forces in the principal theatre about Moshi, imposed upon them a great deal of movement in a more or less N. and S. direction for which apart from the command of Lake Tanganyika few facilities existed. For instance, movement of supplies or stores by carrier from the Central railway to the Usambara railway took 12 days, and from the Central railway to Lindi in the S. not less than three weeks.

Throughout 1915 von Lettow’s chief concern was the increase and training of his forces. At the outbreak of war he had, as has been stated, just under 5,000 men (a figure which included the police as well as the troops proper). This number had been increased by Feb. 1916, when the

German force was at its maximum strength, probably over 20,000. Exact figures cannot be given as the number of carriers and batmen who acted as combatants is unknown, but the rule was to arm 15% of them. Von Lettow himself says that the total numbers enrolled during the war were “about” 3,000 Europeans and 11,000 askaris (natives); the figures of casualties and captives show that the number of whites on the German side was nearer 4,000, and an official German return gave 2,217 Europeans as under arms in Aug. 1915 The Europeans included most of the German settlers in Usambara and other districts, almost all of whom were ex-soldiers and many ex-officers; a few Boer settlers; German residents at Zanzibar who had been allowed by the British to cross to the mainland; some 500 sailors from ships in harbour, including over 400 men of the Imperial navy, and a few visitors to Dares-Salaam. These last had come to attend fetes to mark the formal opening of the Dar-es-Salaam-Tanganyika railway, and among them was a retired Prussian officer, Maj.-Gen. Wahle, who rendered von Lettow good service. The German forces were organized in companies normally consisting of 200 askaris and 16 Europeans; a few of the companies were composed almost entirely of whites, two companies were mounted. The askaris were drawn from the most warlike tribes of the country, and were very well treated. Von Lettow himself was ever careful of their needs and shared their hardships on campaign. He won and retained throughout their respect and devo- tion. Besides his regular force von Lettow had in the earlier stages the help of various levies; and the anti-Moslem policy of Dr. Schnee having been reversed he also obtained the support of a number of Arabs (support which proved of little value). His movements were not, for a considerable time, hampered by disaffection among the natives; some tribes near the border of British East Africa were deported because of doubt as to their sympathies, and the converts of the British missionary societies were in general regarded as enemies and were very badly treated, many being executed. Fear of a native rising was felt among the Germans when the war broke out, but the fear proved groundless. “It was not” (writes von Lettow) “till the enemy had penetrated the country that the natives became a real danger to us; and then it was indeed very great. The native has a fine sense of the transfer of real power from one hand to the other.” Even then, with the natives hostile, the askaris (who had with them their women and children and carriers) were faithful to their leader, and more resolute than many of the Germans.

That they obviously had the advantage inspired the German native troops with confidence, and the hard training they had between Nov. 1914 and March 1916 made them, as the event proved, very formidable opponents in the;r own country of white and Indian troops. And months before the onslaught of Gen. Smuts they had also been rearmed with modern weapons.

On Feb. 28 1915 a blockade of the whole coast of German East Africa was proclaimed, and the British Government stated that “ample steps had been taken to make the blockade thoroughly effective.” The task of the reënforced Cape squadron under Vice-Adml. King Hall in watching 600 m. of coast line provided with many excellent natural harbours was difficult, and in fact several vessels got through. In Dec. 1914, before the blockade was proclaimed, Dar-es-Salaam was visited and the German ships which had taken refuge there sunk. In April 1915, when the Germans were in greatest need of more ammunition, the blockade was broken in a remarkable manner. The “Rubens,” an English ship of 3,000 tons seized at Hamburg, had been loaded with arms and ammunition, had eluded the blockade of the North Sea, and on April 4 (its arrival was expected) was sighted by H.M.S. “Hyacinth” four m. off Mansa Bay, N. of Tanga. The “Rubens” got into the bay, severely damaged and on fire. The crew fled ashore; the ship was boarded by bluejackets, who found her timbered up and battened down; the party was recalled and more rounds having been fired into the vessel " the admiral . . . steamed away under the impression that she would burn herself out " (Brig.-Gen. J. H. V. Crowe). Subsequently the Germans salved at leisure nearly the whole of her cargo, though a great part of the cartridges had been damaged by sea water. But there were enough Mauser ’98 rifles to rearm the force, which previously, for the most part, used the M 71 rifle. (A year later, at another critical period of the war, the Germans were again rearmed, by another blockade runner.)

The operations against the “Königsberg” also resulted in a valuable addition to von Lettow’s armament. The cruiser had remained shut up in the shallow waters of the Rufiji, but in July 1915 the light-draught monitors “Severn” and “Mersey,” sent specially from England, succeeded in setting it on fire. The cruiser was then blown up by Capt. Looff, who with his officers and crew joined von Lettow. The “Königsberg’s” armament, which included 10 4.1-in. guns, was all salved, and these 4.1-in. guns formed von Lettow’s heaviest ordnance. The Germans also recaptured with its guns the 300-ton steamer “Adjutant” (originally taken by the British at Dar-es-Salaam), which had run aground off the Rufiji in Feb. 1915. The “Adjutant” was transferred by rail to Lake Tanganyika.

Plans for the conquest of German East Africa took shape in the summer ot 1915, but their execution had to be delayed until Britain could put a sufficient force in the field. This force was not forthcoming until the close of 1915, when Gen. Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa, having conquered German South-West Africa, agreed to provide a force for service in East Africa. At the time Gen. Tighe had under him 10 regular infantry regiments supplied by India, including the 40th Pathans and the 129th Baluchis brought from France, a squadron of the 17th Lancers (Indians), Imperial Service troops, the 27th and 28th (Indian) Mountain Batteries, and the Calcutta Volunteer battery. Of white troops there were, besides the two regiments