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 AKINS, THOMAS (1844–1916), American painter (see ), died at Philadelphia June 25 1916.

EAST, SIR ALFRED (1849–1913), English painter (see 8.827), was knighted in 1910, and died in London Sept. 28 1913. EAST AFRICA: MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1914–8.—The outbreak of war found all the combatants in East Africa unprepared for offensive operations. But the advantage inclined to the Germans, for they had forces on the spot sufficient for defence, which was not the case in respect to the British protectorates bordering German East Africa. The Belgian Congo was also without adequate means of defence.

Hostilities were entirely unexpected. So little was the Government of British East Africa anticipating war with its German neighbours that the bulk of the Protectorate Force, a battalion and a-half of the King's African Rifles—negro troops officered by Europeans, together with the Uganda battalion of the same force, was, in Aug. 1914, engaged against recalcitrant tribesmen in Jubaland, on the borders of Italian Somaliland, 500 m. away. In short, all the British protectorate lay open to invasion. But Lt.-Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck, commander of the forces in German East Africa—the one German soldier who earned a high reputation in the colonial campaign—knew that his opponents would be reinforced from oversea, and contemplated nothing more than an offensive-defensive. His total force, when the war began, was just under 5,000 including 260 Europeans.

The British had the advantage of the command of the sea, and the ports of German East Africa lay open to attack. So keenly did the governor of the protectorate, Dr. Heinrich Schnee, realize their helplessness that one of his first orders was to forbid any action to be taken which would lay the ports open to bombardment. As in the case of the governors of British Dominions and Colonies the governor of German East Africa was also commander-in-chief of the forces, and Dr. Schnee asserted his authority in that respect despite the protests by von Lettow. Indeed, Dr. Schnee and many of the Government officials at Dar-es-Salaam, the capital and chief port, had “little stomach for a fight,” and when on Aug. 8 two old British cruisers, the “Astraea” and “Pegasus,” steamed across from Zanzibar to Dar-es-Salaam, by the governor's orders and without the knowledge of von Lettow, negotiations for surrender of the port took place. The ships had no force to garrison the town, but the Germans signed an agreement “which forbade us to undertake any hostile act in Dar-es-Salaam, while the enemy was not so bound” (von Lettow). The same day Dr. Schnee left Dar-es-Salaam for Morogoro, a pleasant hill station with European amenities, 140 m. inland by train. The high-power wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam which communicated with Berlin was destroyed.

Despite the attitude of the governor, von Lettow determined to carry on the fight to the utmost possible limit. He had taken up his command in East Africa in Jan. 1914 convinced that “the universal war,” as he calls it, might be imminent, and that if it broke out it was his duty to combat as many of the enemy as he could and for as long as he could.

The country was highly favourable to protracted defence by a resolute and ruthless commander, such as von Lettow proved. A very large proportion of the country is covered by “bush,” that is an undergrowth sometimes more or less open, but usually dense, from which rise trees to a height of some 30 feet. This bush covers hills and valleys and even dry desert, and in the coast region develops into luxuriant jungle. Much of it is infested by the tsetse fly. Some areas are covered with dense forests, others with elephant grass growing 6 to 10 or more feet high. The valleys of almost all the rivers are swampy and fever stricken; during the rains vast areas become inundated; in the dry season, away from the rivers, water is often lacking; wild animals constitute a real danger, especially to the wounded. The climate is tropical and very unhealthy save

on a few high plateaus, and in certain hill districts malaria is endemic. These conditions existed throughout German East Africa, a country nearly double the size of Germany. The “bush” was the greatest asset of the defence. As Gen. Smuts wrote (in 1918), “in the African bush, with its limited visibility, it is practically impossible to enclose an enemy determined to escape.” The method is simple when a force is so hard pushed that destruction is inevitable if resistance continues the order is given to “line for bush,” whereupon the force splits up into parties of threes and fours and vanishes into the bush. Pursuit is hopeless, and the scattered enemy, if well trained, reassembles at an appointed rendezvous. Moreover, so dense is the bush over many thousands of square miles that considerable forces may be on the march within a mile of one another, without being aware of each other's existence. These factors explain why, given sufficient armament and food, von Lettow was still in the field when the Armistice was signed in Europe, in spite of his isolation and the superior forces that after 1916 were brought against him.

Von Lettow had drawn up his plan of campaign before hostilities began, and as the best means of defence had determined to take the offensive against the enemy's most sensitive spot. This he rightly conceived to be the line of the Uganda railway (which runs from Mombasa to Victoria Nyanza). The line is parallel to and about 50 m. distant from the (then) Anglo-German frontier. It passes through the Highlands, where the British European population is concentrated with Nairobi as chief town. On the “German” side of the frontier are the Usambara hills and the Pare mountains, presenting a wall-like face to British East Africa, with few passes. But between the northern end of the Pare mountains and the towering slopes by Kilimanjaro, which rise farther north, was a distinct “gap” forming the usual passage-way between the German and British protectorates. A railway from Tanga, the port of Usambara, ran to Moshi, on the slopes of Kilimanjaro, and at the western end of the “gap.” At its eastern end, in British East Africa, is Taveta. This place was seized by the Germans on Aug. 15 and was used by them as a jumping-off ground for raids on the Uganda railway, raids which included the design of occupying Nairobi.

At the outset, or shortly afterwards, a design was also entertained by the Germans of capturing Mombasa and holding it long enough to wreck the harbours and destroy the great railway bridge from the island to the mainland. This was rendered pos- sible by the return to Dar-es-Salaam in Sept. of the cruiser “Königsberg” (it had sailed from that port shortly before the declaration of war). It was then arranged that a force should march along the coast from Tanga on Mombasa, while the “Königsberg” attacked it from the sea. On Sept. 20 the “Königsberg” appeared off Zanzibar and destroyed the “Pegasus,” which was in the roadstead undergoing repairs. Mombasa, was to be attacked on Sept. 29. But the “Königsberg” did not keep its engagement, ships of the Cape Squadron under Vice-Adml. King Hall intervening. Harried by the British, but not overtaken, the commander of the “Königsberg,” Capt. Looff, in Oct. ran his ship aground in the shallow waters of the Rufiji river, south of Dar-es-Salaam. The land force which was to coöperate with the “Königsberg” was already at Vanga, just within the British border, and it began its march of 50 m. along the coast on Sept. 20. It attacked Gazi, 25 m. from Mombasa, on Sept. 23, was repulsed and forced to retire to the frontier on Oct. 8.

Apart from raids along the coast and on the Uganda railway the Germans made a series of incursions into the frontier districts of Uganda, the Belgian Congo, Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For