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 rier (see 8.658). He was educated at Harrow and first appeared on the stage at the age of twenty at the Garrick theatre, London, then under the management of John Hare. Two years later he joined Herbert Tree at the Haymarket and played with him in Shakespearean plays and his father's play of Trilby, as well as in various melodramas. Amongst many later successes may be mentioned his acting in Barrie's Peter Pan, The Admirable Crichton, Little Mary, What Every Woman Knows and Dear Brutus, and his performances as the hero of Conan Doyle's Raffles and of McCutcheon's Brewster's Millions. He wrote the play A Royal Rival, produced by Lewis Waller, and with his brother, Guy Louis Busson Du Maurier (1865–1915), author of An Englishman's Home (1909), wrote Charles I. and II. DUNAJEC-SAN, BATTLES OF THE. The line of the river Dunajec and that of the San, both in West Galicia, marked the two successive stages in the break-through battle which initiated the Austro-German offensive of 1915 on the eastern front.

After the severe fighting on the Carpathian front (see ) there ensued a pause in the second half of April 1915, both on the side of the Central Powers and on that of the Russians, whose attempts at a break-through had failed. Fighting continued only in the sector of the German Southern Army up to the end of the month, the crowning day being April 24, when Hofmann's Austro-Hungarian corps stormed the Ostry heights.

The general situation on the eastern front was at this time somewhat unsatisfactory. The Austro-Hungarian armies in the Carpathians were exhausted; the IV. and I. Armies, Woyrsch's Army, and the German forces on the eastern front were certainly holding their ground, but were continually being weakened by having to detach troops to the Carpathian front. The Russians were in similar case; the combats in the mountains had absorbed not only great masses of men but also quantities of material, which could not so readily be replaced. Thus, although the danger in the Carpathians was not yet over, Russian offensive movements on a large scale were hardly to be expected.

The position was far more favourable on the German western front, where the Germans awaited the French attacks with calm confidence, while behind the lines the organization of 14 new divisions was nearing completion. The opportunity for improving the situation in the E. appeared, therefore, to have arrived. The desirability of relieving the pressure on the Carpathian front seemed self-evident, and the only question was as to the direction and method of execution of the offensive. The choice appeared to lie between an offensive on a large scale against the whole Russian front, combined with enveloping movements against its northern and southern flanks, and a direct break- through at some part of the line. For the latter operation the area Gorlice-Tarnow appeared to offer advantages; it had been largely denuded of troops by the Russians during the course of their Carpathian offensive, and a drive on Sanok, via the Jaszlo and Krosno basins, would get into the rear of the Russian forces in the Carpathians and roll them up. The length of time that would be necessary for the preparation of an attacking group in the Carpathians, where the railway communications were very bad, would be bound to militate against the success of the first plan, while an enveloping movement in the N. would be too far distant to have any lasting influence in improving the situation in the Carpathians. West Galicia, on the other hand, was well suited as an area of assembly for an offensive group, and the possibilities of success were highly promising.

The High Commands of both the Central Powers had early in April decided, independently of each other, for the second solution of the problem; indeed, the Austrians had, in the middle of March, undertaken an offensive towards Gorlice with weak forces, which resulted only in a tactical success. When the Austrians early in April renewed their request for German divisions to be dispatched to the Carpathians the whole matter came up for discussion; the preliminary conditions for the offensive were arranged by telegraph, and the final decision was arrived at on April 14, at a conference between the two chiefs of the general staffs in Berlin.

The XI. Army, under Gen. von Mackensen, was organized as a shock group, consisting of eight German divisions from the western front, the two divisions of the Austrian VI. Corps, and the 11th Honved Cav. Div.; and it assembled behind the right wing of the Austrian IV. Army. This latter was also placed under Mackensen, who was himself subordinated to the Austrian High Command. These two armies were to carry out the main attack in West Galicia, while the armies of Dankl N. of the Vistula and those of Boroević, Bohm, Linsingen and Pflanzer were to display all possible activity and engage the enemy in their front so as to prevent him from detaching troops to the main attack. Simultaneously two demonstrations in the Prasznysz and Novgorod areas, and a raid on Memel, were planned.

After the completion of the assembly of the XI. Army, the distribution of the Austro-German forces in West Galicia and the Carpathians was as follows: In West Galicia, on the Lower Dunajec, the heights of Wai, and the Biala as far as Ciȩzkowice, was the Austrian IV. Army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand (7 inf. divs.). To the right of this, the XI. German Army, under Gen. von Mackensen (10 inf. and i cav. divs.), lay by Luzna and Gorlice as far as Malastów. The Austrian III. Army, under Gen. von Boroević (14 inf. and 2 cav. divs.), stretched from Malastów in a salient curve S. of the Carpathian crest by Zboro to Virava. Thence the Austrian II. Army, under Gen. von Böhm-Ermolli (14 inf. divs.), held its position as far as the heights W. of the Uzsok pass. From here by Zawadka, on both sides of the Orawa and the Oportales, by the Wyszokow saddle to the sources of the Moloda, lay the Southern German Army, under Gen. von Linsingen (9 inf. divs.). Next came the Austrian VII. Army, under Gen. Baron von Pflanzer-Baltin (8 inf. and 5 cav. divs.), curving on the line Solotwina, Ottynia, Horodenka Zaleszczki, and along the Dniester and the frontier.

On the Russian side there stood in the area S. of the Vistula, and on the Carpathian front, the III. Army (Gen. Radko Dimitriev), the VIII. Army (Gen. Brussilov), the Stry detachment and the IX. Army (Gen. Lechitski)—in all some 40 inf. and 16 cav. divs. with at least 10 Militia Opolchevie brigades.

The Break-through of Gorlice-Tarnów (May 2–5).—By the end of April all the preparatory measures for the offensive were complete, and on May I the preliminary bombardment on the front of Mackensen's Army Group began; this was followed at 6 on the 2nd by four hours' intensive fire by some 1,500 guns of all calibres, on a scale far surpassing anything yet known. The Russian trenches, on which many months' labour had been expended, and which were sited with great skill, were soon so shattered that the infantry, who had advanced to assaulting distance, were able to storm them.

During the night of the 2nd the left-wing group of the IV. Army, the combined division under Field-Marshal-Lt. Stoger-Steiner, forced the line of the Lower Dunajec by a surprise attack, and during the day established itself at Otfinow on the eastern bank.

The vigorous offensive of the XI. Army, in which the Austrian VI. Corps specially distinguished itself, met with little resistance from the Russians, who had been completely overwhelmed by the bom- bardment. Between Ciezkowice and the heights S. of Gorlice their lines were completely broken through. The Austrian X. Corps, fighting on the left wing of the III. Army, had a large share in this success. By 5 it had stormed the Russian positions on the heights S.E. of Ropica Ruska, and E. of Malastow, and continued its advance up till a late hour of the night.

The Austro-Hungarian IV. Army, which had to carry the very strong and defensible ridges of Dobrotyn and hills 419 and 402, was also in the end successful, after severe fighting, assisted in some measure by the effect of the XI. Army's break-through. Meanwhile the remaining Austro-German armies kept the Russians on their respective fronts constantly on the alert, and thus prevented any transference of troops; the Russian III. Army alone succeeded in concentrating strong reserves (III. Caucasian Corps and 63rd Res. Div.) in the vicinity of Jaszlo.

The offensive was continued on the 3rd with the utmost energy ; the XIV. Corps stormed hills 419 and 402, while the IX. Corps on the right wing of the army captured the heights E. of Gromnik. Up to mid-day the XI. Army met with little resistance ; in the after- noon, however, it came up against a series of strong positions, which were not captured till the evening, and its right wing reached Wapienne, the centre Biecz, while the left wing occupied the Lipie heights and the ridge N.E. of Olpiny. The left corps of the III. Army stormed Ostra Gora, the Russians in front of it establishing themselves on the E. edge of Magura.

By the 4th such rapid progress had been made that it was possible to extend the attack on the whole front of the III. Army.