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as far as can be prevented, friction between states which are, or which ought to be, friendly. How is the task of peace-maker be- cause that is largely the task which falls to diplomatists and the Foreign Office which controls diplomatists to be pursued if you are to shout your grievances from the house-top whenever they occur? The only result is that you embitter public feeling, that the differ- ences between the two states suddenly attain a magnitude they ought never to be allowed to approach, that the newspapers of the two countries agitate themselves, that the parliaments of the two countries have their passions set on fire, and great crises arise, which may end, have ended sometimes, in international catastrophes."

Mirabeau had said much the same thing in the French Nation- al Assembly in 1790, and subsequent history bore out its wisdom. It was not the diplomatists but the oratorical heat of the Legisla- tive Assembly that plunged Europe into the wars of the Revolu- tion. It was not public opinion, but the wisdom of the diplo- matists on either side, which saved Great Britain and the United States from a renewal of war during the critical years that succeeded the Peace of Ghent in 1814. Had Castlereagh listened to the outcry of the British press and Parliament, had James Monroe and John Quincy Adams listened to the outcry of the American press and Congress, there would have been no hundred years of peace between the two countries. Instances might be multiplied. The world remembers the wars which diplomacy has failed to avert; it has forgotten, or has never known of those and they are many more which diplomacy has averted by a conspiracy of silence.

Diplomacy by Conference. The most striking development of diplomatic practice since the beginning of the World War has been the increasing practice of direct negotiations in conference between the heads of governments, or between the principal ministers of departments concerned in the subjects under dis- cussion. The practice is, of course, not new. The similar circum- stances of the great war against Napoleon had produced similar results in the long series of conferences from that of Chatillon early in 1814 to the Congress of Verona in 1822; and Castlereagh had at the outset commended the convenience of the system, which promised to endow the councils of the Powers " with the efficiency and almost the simplicity of a single State." The practice arose in both cases from the necessity of reaching swift decisions. It is clear, indeed, that the problems to be solved by the Allies during the war were too varied, too technical, and generally too urgent to be dealt with solely through the ordinary diplomatic channels. The practice of direct negotiation between the heads of governments was an obvious counsel of expediency, and began early in 1915 with the visit of M. Millerand to London. In Feb. of the same year there was a meeting of Finance Ministers in London; but the first meeting of the heads of the Allied Governments was that at Calais on July 6. On Nov. 17, at a conference in Paris, it was decided in principle to establish a permanent machinery for coordinating the efforts of the Allies; and on Jan. 19 1916, at a meeting of Mr. Asquith and M. Briand in London, rules for the establishment of an Allied Committee were approved by them. This plan was first applied at the great conference opened at Paris on March 26, at which the prime ministers of France, Italy, Belgium and Serbia were present, together with representatives of Japan, Russia and Portugal. It is unnecessary to give here a list of the further conferences that followed. The significant thing is to quote Sir Maurice Hankey that " in the forcing-house of war the governmental machinery of a veritable League of Nations had grown up, whereby the will of the Allied peoples to win could be put into effect " (p. 15). The system of diplomacy by conference thus revived reached its fullest development, of course, in the great Peace Conference at Paris; and in the League of Nations an attempt was made to give it a permanent organization.

In addition to the advantage of rapidity of decision arising from this system, the claim has been made for it that the states- men ultimately responsible for the policy of their respective countries become personally well acquainted, and that the in- timacy and even friendship which tend to develop out of these meetings make possible an interchange of confidences which would otherwise be impossible. This is, of course, perfectly true. It is also true that, in view of the closer interdependence of the

nations and the vast complexity of their economic relations alone, the old system of diplomacy is no longer sufficient and that " diplomacy by conference has come to stay " (id., p. 25). If this means that the conferences of experts on this or that matter of international interest are to continue, there is nothing to be said against it. If it means that periodical meetings of heads of governments are to be erected into a permanent system, the case is far more doubtful. It may be doubted whether the cause of peace will permanently gain by taking the conduct of all serious international negotiations out of the hands of trained diplo- matists and putting them into those of politicians unversed in diplomatic technique and sensitive to every shifting current of public opinion. Certainly the unrestful world left by the Peace Conference gives evidence enough of the disastrous results of the sounding phrases which heads of governments had used with so much effect on public platforms. Nor is a rapid decision on matters of controversy by any means always a good thing. The world has often been saved from war by the diplomatic dragging out of negotiations until public excitement on either side has subsided. Finally, there is the objection to too frequent con- ferences urged by the British Government at the time of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, which has not lost its validity. They tend, as Lord Bathurst put it, to " keep the mind of Europe afloat," by suggesting to discontented peoples that no settlement is final and that, the machinery for change being permanent in the conferences of the powers, a long and loud agitation will suffice to set it in motion. It may be that the conference system will as the creators of the League of Nations maintain provide a safety-valve for the expansive forces of nationalism; but there is a danger that it may operate in another way, by not allowing these forces to cool. The introduction of an organized legislative element into international relations is thus somewhat of an experiment, and no one can say confidently how it will work out. In any case, however, there will still be room for the old diplomacy in its quasi-legal function of applying the acknowledged public law, and in its trained ability to adjust differences lying beyond it.

Functions and Rights of Diplomatic Agents. The new and far more complicated conditions under which the World War was fought naturally added fresh problems to those which the old writers on diplomacy had discussed, as to the activities proper to those representing the interests of their Prince at a foreign court. Such questions were raised during the war more especially by the activities of the diplomatic agents of the belligerent states accredited to neutral governments. The duty of these agents being to forward the interests of their own states, what limita- tions was it proper and necessary to observe in carrying out this object? In effect, the answer to this question was found, not in establishing new principles, but in applying old principles to new conditions. The old definition of the ambassador as "an honourable spy " certainly applied during the war. In all neutral countries it was the duty of diplomatic agents to collect informa- tion useful to their governments, and to act as centres for an active propaganda of their views and aims. In certain cases, e.g. Switzerland and Holland, neutral countries were made the bases of propaganda and espionage in enemy countries, and these activities were carried on more or less under the supervision of the ministers accredited to the neutral countries. So long as this propaganda did not pass certain bounds there was nothing in this that did violence to the traditional principles of diplomacy, though propaganda had never before been organized on so vast a scale. Nor was the organization of a spy system, centred in neutral countries, a violation of diplomatic propriety, since in this respect all the belligerent nations exercised equal rights.

It was otherwise when diplomatic privileges and immunities were used to cover indirect attacks on the enemy through neutral interests. The most outstanding instances of this arose from the efforts of the Central Powers to interrupt the supply of arms and ammunition to the Allies from the United States. In Sept. 1915 the interception of a letter from Dr. Dumba, Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Washington, to Count Burian proved that the Austrian embassy, with the approval of the German, was con-