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topmost ridges, which, it was hoped, would be reached by day- light a somewhat sanguine anticipation, as it turned out. All went well at the outset. The Turkish posts about the lower spurs were in some cases surprised. The outlets of the gullies were in the assailants' hands soon after midnight. The hostile detach- ments on guard gave way at all points. But the routes to be followed were difficult to find in the dark, the ascent was rapid, the ground was much broken, and the enemy opposed a stubborn resistance to the advance, with the result that this was greatly retarded, and that at daybreak the most forward of the columns was not much more than halfway up. The Ottoman staff had, moreover, on the first alarm begun to hurry reinforcements on the Sari Bair from the rear, while the Allied troops were so much exhausted by their nocturnal experiences that all attempts to win the upper ridge failed on the 7th.

A rearrangement of the attacking forces was carried out during the following night, and the attempt to gain the highest ground was resumed at dawn on the 8th from the positions that had been acquired 24 hours earlier. The Ottoman detachments on the mountain had by this time been reinforced by at least one divi- sion, and they were fully prepared to meet the onset when it came. One of the Allies' columns nevertheless succeeded in establishing itself on a patch of the topmost ridge and in holding on to what had been secured, although the efforts of the assailants miscarried elsewhere. After a fresh reorganization during the night an attempt was yet again made on the gth to win the mountain, and that day some British and Indian troops actually fought their way on to a commanding summit from which the Narrows could be seen, only, however, speedily to be driven off again. The Turks holding the ridge were, moreover, constantly receiving rein- forcements now that Sir I. Hamilton's plan was completely exposed, and so victory definitely decided itself in favour of the defenders early on the loth. For these, by a sudden onset that morning, recovered possession of the patch of high ground which their antagonists had succeeded in wresting from them on the \ 8th and in holding ever since. Then, by a resolute if somewhat costly counter-attack delivered from the dominating position which they occupied, the Osmanlis thrust those opposed to them back down the slopes all along the line and could fairly claim to have gained the upper hand. Strenuous fighting thereupon ceased. Both sides had suffered very severely in the furious encounters that had been in progress since the evening of the 6th, and the troops were completely worn out by their efforts.

The attempt to secure Sari Bair thus failed, and the carefully devised scheme by which the invaders had hoped to establish themselves in a dominating position in the Anzac region at almost the narrowest portion of the Gallipoli Peninsula fell to the ground. It is true that as a result of the operations the area in occupation of the Allies in this quarter had been greatly extended in a northerly direction, so much so indeed that little difficulty was experienced by Gen. Birdwood in securing close contact with the contingents that had landed at Suvla on the 'night of the 6th7th, and from which substantial support had been expected. As a matter of fact, the Suvla troops had afforded the Anzac columns no assistance at all beyond occupying the attention of one of the two Turkish divisions which Liman von Sanders set in motion south-westwards from about Gallipoli as soon as he had satisfied himself as to where danger lay, and the doings of this newly landed force had now to be recorded.

The plans for bringing the nth Division and bulk of the roth Division from the islands to Suvla and disembarking them had been elaborated with meticulous care by the naval and military staffs. As Turkish detachments watching this strip of coastline were known to number only about 2,000 men the Ottoman authorities never contemplating a hostile landing in force in the locality the design was to put most of the attacking troops ashore during the night of the 6th7th as a surprise, and that they should then push on at once and master a range of hills 4 or 5 m. to the east. At Suvla Point the coast (which from there down to about Helles runs roughly N. and S.) turns abruptly to the N.E. to form one side of the Gulf of Saros; along this stretch of the shore a well-defined ridge, starting close to the headland, rises

almost like a wall from the sea and overlooks what may be called the Suvla area from the N., just as the above-mentioned range of hills overlook the area from the east. The area is mostly flat up to the foothills. Close to the bay there is a lake a marsh in dry weather which necessarily cramped the movements of troops landed at or near the bay. Army headquarters assumed that the plain, with the high ground to the E. and N., would be in British hands early on the 7th.

The nth Division from Imbros was to disembark first, and was to be on the right in the subsequent advance. The roth Division from Mudros and Mitylene was to follow it ashore, and, moving forward on the left, would secure the northerly ridge. Most of the nth Division was to land just S. of the bay, but one brigade was to gain its footing inside the bay. The work was to begin as early as possible, allowing for the flotilla only quitting Imbros after dark. Especially constructed lighters, with motor power, were to play an important part in the disembarkations, a number of them having recently arrived from England. Elabo- rate arrangements had been made for water supply to the troops ashore, as the whereabouts and the capacity of wells were doubt- ful. The secret had been well kept, and a difficult operation of war was in its opening stages most successfully carried out.

The two divisions detailed for this Suvla enterprise both belonged to the British " New Army "; they were unconversant with active service conditions, having come straight out from England, and they were being highly tried in being called upon to execute a landing in force at night in face of opposition. There was, indeed, no precedent for an undertaking of this kind under modern tactical conditions. Nevertheless the whole of the infantry of the nth Division was on shore before dawn, and its leading battalions had driven off the Turkish detachments met with in the immediate vicinity of the points of disembarkation. The only hitch that had occurred during the night-time had been at the landing-place within the bay, where the water had proved to be inconveniently shallow for the lighters; this had created some confusion and delay. But the urgent need of pressing forward at once was not realized by the attacking side, and the opposition offered by the parties of Osmanlis close to the bay was taken too seriously after daylight. Moreover, when the first portion of the toth Division arrived from Mitylene soon after dawn, it was decided to put these troops ashore to the S. of the bay, instead of inside the bay as had been intended; so that they found themselves, to start with, on the right of the nth Division and not on its left, the general line of contem- plated advance being to the N. of the lake. They were unfortunately moved from right to left, and this took many hours.

During the forenoon a good landing-place was found inside the bay on its northern side, and the contingent of the loth Division from Mudros disembarked at this point. But no ver- tebrate advance in force took place until comparatively late in the afternoon, and by evening the attacking side, although enjoying a great numerical superiority, had only reached the foot of the hills that lay to the E. of the landing-places and captured one advanced spur. The troops had during the latter part of the day suffered greatly from thirst, the arrangements with regard to water having practically broken down mainly owing to the inexperience of the troops themselves.

When Liman von Sanders (who had fixed his headquarters near Gallipoli) learned during the night of the 6th-7th that the Allies were landing in strong force about Suvla, and were also attacking Sari Bair from Anzac, and after he had satisfied himself that certain threats on the part of his opponents at other points might be regarded as mere feints, he ordered the two Turkish divisions under his immediate orders to proceed towards Suvla with all speed. This, however, meant a two days' march along indifferent roads. The only Ottoman detachments which during the 7th and 8th confronted the two British divisions that had made a descent on this locality were those which had been on guard on the spot when the landing was taking place. Con- sequently there was still on the 8th a great opening left for the attacking side to complete the first part of its programme, i.e. to