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leave forces on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles in case of a hostile landing on the coast to the S., and of the divisions on the peninsula he kept two about Gallipoli and Bulair.

How best to utilize the fresh troops joining him from England was anxiously considered by Sir I. Hamilton, and he framed his plans well in advance. The French had from the outset favoured operations on the further side of the Straits, and the expediency suggested itself of either throwing the whole Allied army in that direction, or else of diverting the reinforcements thither as a detached contingent. But there were valid objections to either course. A descent S. of the Straits connoted disembarkation in face of opposition, and, even supposing the landing to be suc- cessful, the force would start work much further from the Nar- rows than were either Helles or Anzac. Then again, to plant down a portion of the Allied troops on one side of the Straits, while continuing operations on the other side, would mean voluntary dispersion of resources in place of concentration. The commander-in-chief weighed the pros and cons and he decided against a combination of war on such lines. There were also not wanting inducements for the Allies to attempt a landing near Bulair, seeing that a victory at that point would carry with it the severance of the Turkish land communications with the pen- insula. But, here again a disembarkation in face of opposition would have to be risked and a dispersion of resources would arise, while there were strong objections from the point of view of ship transport to conveying troops to a point so distant from the island of Imbros as Bulair; for Imbros was to be utilized as the principal concentration point for the reinforcements from England. That the Ottoman commander-in-chief had to be prepared for his opponent adopting one of these two plans offered a strong argument against adopting either of them.

Hamilton decided that his great effort should be made at, and immediately to the N. of, Anzac. The rugged bluffs on which Gen. Birdwood's force had taken root since April were spurs of a tangled mountain mass known as Sari Bair, from the topmost ridges of which the Straits about the Narrows were partially visible at a distance of 4 or 5 miles. The occupation of these topmost ridges must greatly assist in a further advance across the peninsula here at its narrowest point. The plan de- cided upon was secretly to augment the force already at Anzac by about a division and a half, and, with the force thus aug- mented, to secure possession of Sari Bair by a night-attack. But this was only part of the plan. It was also decided that a force of nearly two divisions should, on the same night as the attack on Sari Bair was launched, effect a landing at an entirely new point Suvla Bay, a few miles N. of Anzac, where the Turkish troops were known to be few. The object of this second operation was twofold it would indirectly assist the offensive against Sari Bair, it would also furnish the Allies who were planted down on the outer coast of the peninsula with a much more sheltered landing place and base than Anzac Cove. The I3th Division, with some other detachments from Helles and with one brigade of the loth Division, were the troops chosen to augment Bird- wood's force already at Anzac. The new venture further north was entrusted to the nth Division, which was to assemble in the island of Imbros supported by the rest of the loth Division; the portions of this latter division not detailed for Anzac were to concentrate partly at Mudros, and partly in a port of Mity- lene more than 100 m. from Suvla. The last divisions to arrive, the 53rd and 54th, were to be employed wherever should seem best after the offensive had begun. To land the whole of the reinforcements simultaneously would not have been practicable with the amount of water transport available.

The utmost secrecy was observed by the Allied staff. Appropriate steps were taken to mislead the Ottoman authorities by means of feints and of reconnaissances executed at localities other than those selected for operations. False reports were assiduously circulated by the intelligence department. This part of Hamilton's programme was, indeed, carried out most suc- cessfully, for, although Liman von Sanders was aware of the arrival of large bodies of British troops in the islands, he remained entirely ignorant of his rival's real design until this was actually in execution. The Ottoman commander had organized his forces as a southern group watching Helles and a northern group watching Anzac, with the already mentioned two divisions at the Bulair end of the peninsula. There were large Turkish forces in reserve about Chanak, in addition to substantial contingents disposed to the S. of the outlet of the Straits ready for any move of the Allies in that quarter; but, thanks to a system of jetties erected on either shore at the upper end of the Narrows, and to improved communications, troops could be shifted from side to side of the waterway very rapidly. Numerically, the contending armies would at this very critical juncture of the cam- paign be almost equal, the invaders rather the stronger; but the Turks were much dispersed, so that the result almost hinged upon the speed with which the attacking side should gain ground before the defenders had time to concentrate.

DARDANELLES

AND

GALLIPOLI PENINSULA

The offensive started on Aug. 6 with two preliminary enter- prises. An onset was made upon some of the Turkish trenches in the Helles area, which led to sharp fighting; the object was to prevent the Turks transferring troops northwards, and it prob- ably served its purpose; apart from that, little was accomplished although the affray went on intermittently for a week. Portions of the Australasian force also broke out of the southern sections of the Anzac position, and were rewarded by the acquisition of some very valuable ground after a violent contest; the real purpose, however, was to occupy the attention of the enemy and to conceal a design of much greater moment.

So dexterously had the assembling of the reinforcements within Birdwood's position been effected, that the Turks had entirely failed to detect how the numbers of their opponents in this area had during the last few nights been nearly doubled. The scheme of operations for the capture of the Sari Bair moun- tain mass was that the force detailed for this enterprise should move out in several columns from the northern end of the Anzac position along the low ground near the shore, after dark on the evening of the 6th. On reaching their appointed stations the columns were to wheel to the right and were to work their way up certain steep but well-defined gullies that led towards the